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Abstract
My dissertation consists of three chapters related to accrued capital gains.
The first essay is concerned with estimating the marginal propensity to con-
sume (MPC) out of accrued capital gains on owner-occupied housing in Canada.
Its main methodological contribution lies in using a hedonic price equation to
value these gains. The results suggest that for every 1 dollar increase in ex-
pected housing capital gains households increase total consumption by approx-
imately 9.4 cents, and increase non-durable consumption by 7.3 cents.
The second essay of this thesis proposes a model of economic behaviour that
can explain why corporations pay dividends despite their tax disadvantage rel-
ative to share repurchases. The key result is that firms must pay a premium
above the intrinsic value of equity to repurchase shares, reflecting the lock-in
effect caused by a realization-based capital gains tax system. In equilibrium,
firms pay dividends whenever this additional cost is sufficiently high.
The third essay examines the effect of capital income taxation on corpo-
rate payout policy in Canada. The analysis makes use of a new dataset on
share repurchases carried out by Toronto Stock Exchange listed Canadian cor-
porations over the period 1987-2008. It also uses new estimates of Canadian
average marginal tax rates applied to capital income. The results suggest that
total payout is positively related to changes in both the corporate income tax
rate and the capital gains tax rate, but is unaffected by the dividend tax rate.
iii
The results also suggest that share repurchase levels are positively related to
changes in the dividend tax rate and negatively related to changes in the capi-
tal gains tax rate. Dividend payments are found to have a positive relationship
with changes to the capital gains tax rate.
iv
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
My dissertation consists of three chapters. A unifying theme in this work is
accrued capital gains. I study the impact of these gains on household consump-
tion expenditures, and explore the relationships between capital gains taxation
and corporate payout policy.
The first chapter is concerned with estimating the marginal propensity to
consume out of accrued capital gains on owner-occupied housing in Canada.
It is the first such study to use Canadian micro data, and it makes an im-
portant methodological contribution by using a hedonic regression approach to
estimate capital gains. Earlier studies, mostly in the USA and the UK, have
relied on regional house-price indices and other proxies, whereas the hedonic
approach estimates accrued gains based on actual housing transactions.
The analysis is based on data from the Survey of Household Spending (SHS)
2over the years 2000-2006. The SHS is a Canada-wide cross-sectional sur-
vey containing comprehensive information on household consumption expendi-
tures and dwelling characteristics. The latter information is used to estimate
seven hedonic equations, one for each year between 2000-2006, which relate
the market price of a home to its characteristics in that year, and changes in
regression coefficients over time are used to compute capital gains.
The results suggest that household consumption expenditures increase in
the level of accrued capital gains on housing, and that the sustainability of
these gains is important for the magnitude of the increase. When the level
of accrued capital gains is persistent over time, total household consumption
increases by approximately 9.4 cents for every dollar of capital gains income.
Spending on non-durable consumption increases by approximately 7.3 cents.
When the accrued capital gain is temporary, total consumption increases by
approximately 1.6 cents for every dollar of capital gains income. These results
are consistent with the permanent income hypothesis.
My second chapter addresses the corporate payout puzzle, originally identi-
fied by Black (1976). Out of their after-tax profits, corporations pay dividends
and often repurchase shares, generating accrued capital gains for their share-
holders. Capital gains typically attract lower effective rates of tax than divi-
dends, which leads to the payout puzzle: why do corporations continue to pay
3dividends in spite of their relative tax disadvantage? This paper develops a
model of corporate payout policy to explain some aspects of the puzzle.
The key element of the model is the lock-in effect caused by the fact that
capital gains are taxed only upon realization, which implies that taxpayers can
reduce the effective rate of tax by postponing realizations, i.e., by locking in
accrued capital gains. Shareholders with an accrued capital gain, thus, would
require a lock-in premium to compensate them for their higher tax liability
resulting from the sale. This premium is an increasing function of accrued cap-
ital gains and the desired holding period for shares. In this setting firms pay
dividends in equilibrium whenever the lock-in premium is high relative to the
tax disadvantage of dividend payments. It follows that firms with a relatively
high proportion of shareholders with sizeable capital gains and/or long holding
periods face higher repurchasing costs and are thus more likely to pay divi-
dends.
The third chapter explores the empirical relationships between capital in-
come taxation and corporate payout policy. The issue is addressed with a
unique dataset on share repurchase programs executed by Toronto Stock Ex-
change listed Canadian corporations, and with new estimates of Canadian av-
erage marginal tax rates on corporate income, realized capital gains income,
and dividend income. With these resources, the effects of these taxes on total
4payout, dividend payout, share repurchases, and the payout mix are analysed.
It is found that taxes matter for corporate payout decisions. The results
suggest that dividends are positively related to changes in the capital gains
tax rate, whereas share repurchases are positively related to changes in the
dividend tax rate, and negatively related to changes in the capital gains tax
rate. Total payout is positively related to changes in both the capital gains tax
rate and the corporate tax rate, but is unaffected by the dividend tax. These
results are consistent with the theoretical analysis of the second chapter. To
the best of my knowledge, this analysis is the first to simultaneously estimate
the effect of tax changes on dividend payments, share repurchases and total
payout. Examining all three components of corporate payout simultaneously
provides amore complete view of the empirical relationships between tax policy
and payout policy.
5Chapter 2
Real Estate Capital Gains and
Consumer Spending: Some
Results from Canadian Micro
Data
2.1 Introduction
Recent turmoil in US and Canadian housing markets has renewed interest in
the link between house values and household consumption expenditures. The
nature of this link is largely unknown for Canada, and the literature has made
little attempt to analyse it. The current chapter seeks to narrow this gap in
our understanding by estimating the parameters of a consumption function
for Canada, explicitly taking into account the capital gains accruing on owner-
occupied housing, as well as non-housing income. This is accomplished using a
unique data set, taken from the Survey of Household Spending, that contains
6detailed and comprehensive consumption data, and by using an innovative ap-
proach to calculate the capital gains accruing on owner occupied housing. This
approach is based on the hedonic price method, where the value of a house
is estimated using its characteristics and a function linking those characteris-
tics to overall house prices. This method permits a substantial degree of price
variability across observations and provides more accurate estimates compared
with other methods commonly used in the literature. The analysis demon-
strates that capital gains on housing are an important driver of consumption
expenditures in Canada, and capital gains perceived to be persistent have a
much larger effect on consumption than one-off gains.1
The main findings of this chapter are as follows: households in the sam-
ple increase total consumption by approximately 9.4 cents for every 1 dollar
increase in permanent housing capital gains, and increase non-durable con-
sumption by approximately 7.3 cents.2 Households increase total consumption
by approximately 1.6 cents for every 1 dollar increase in contemporaneous one-
off capital gains. This lower estimate for one-off gains is consistent with the
permanent income hypothesis.
It is also found that the elasticity of consumption with respect to “luxury”
1One-off gains are defined here as the sum of permanent and transitory gains in a particular
year.
2The measure of total consumption used in this chapter includes the value of durable good
purchases, not an estimate of the consumption services derived from durable goods.
7goods is approximately 2.5 times higher than the elasticity for total consump-
tion, non-durable consumption, and food purchases, which all have approxi-
mately equal elasticities.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
other relevant literature. Section 2.3 describes the data and provides summary
statistics on Canadian housing wealth. Section 2.4 discusses the method used
to estimate accrued capital gains on owner-occupied housing. Section 2.5 dis-
cusses the approach taken to estimate the consumption function. Section 2.6
reports the estimation results, and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Other Literature
Past studies have typically assumed that housing enters the consumption func-
tion in one of two ways, either through a wealth effect, popularized by Ando and
Modiglinai (1963)’s life cycle model, or through an income effect, where capi-
tal gains on housing are treated as part of total income. These methodologies
are closely related.3 The method ultimately chosen depends on the available
data; the former method requires data on household wealth stocks, the latter
on wealth flows. This chapter focuses on the latter method, though the former
3The life cycle model is concerned with housing wealth, whereas the income model is con-
cerned with the rate of return on housing wealth.
8is treated most often in the literature.4
The results of early work by Elliott (1980) seemed to demonstrate that hous-
ing capital gains had no effect on consumption expenditures in the US. How-
ever, this work was put into question by Peek (1983) and Bhatia (1987), both
showing that capital gains had a significant positive effect. Bhatia (1987) at-
tributed Elliott (1980)’s findings to poorly measured real estate values, which
were based on production costs rather than actual market prices.
Skinner (1989), the first micro-data study to analyse housing wealth effects
found a positive effect on consumption expenditures. Skinner, using data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), from the late 70’s and early 80’s,
showed that this effect is small but significant, and that predictable house price
changes have a larger effect on consumption expenditure than unpredictable
changes. Lehnert (2004), also using data from the PSID, and covering a longer
time span (1963-1999), finds that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
out of housing wealth is between 1.9 and 3.1 cents for US residents, depending
on the model specification used.
Studies based on non-US data have also found positive effects. Bover (2005),
using Spanish data, estimates the MPC out of housing wealth to be 2 cents for
4See Muellbauer (2008) for a survey of papers looking at the effects of housing assets on
consumption.
9the entire population, and 4-6 cents for “prime” aged households, aged 35-44.
Gan (2008), using a unique Hong Kong data set on credit card purchases, esti-
mates the MPC out of housing wealth to be 1.6 cents, and found consumption
is twice as elastic for discretionary spending as for non-discretionary spend-
ing. Campbell and Cocco (2007), using the UK Family Expenditure Survey
over the years 1988 to 2000 estimate the elasticity of consumption with respect
to changes in overall house prices. They find that a 1% increase in UK house
prices lead to, on average, a 1.22% increase in non-durable consumption. For
the average UK house (worth 81,628 UK pounds in 2000) this translates into 8
pence out over every pound increase in housing.
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) (CQS), a recent international study, uses
a panel of 14 OECD countries to estimate the elasticity of consumption with
respect to housing and non-housing wealth. CQS find that the elasticity of
consumption with respect to housing wealth ranges from .11 to .17 depending
on the model specification used, and that the elasticity of consumption with
respect to non-housing financial wealth is, on average, only .02. The authors
point to a number of reasons for this asymmetry, including differences in the
perceived permanence of capital gains on different asset-types, differences in
the tax treatment across asset-types, and the difficulty of measuring certain
forms of wealth.
10
Among the limited number of Canadian studies is Pichette and Tremblay
(2003).5 This study uses aggregate annual Canadian time series data to anal-
yse the effect of housing wealth on the consumption of non-durable goods and
services. The authors find that the MPC out of housing wealth is 5.7 cents, and
like CQS, the MPC out of financial wealth is small - and in this case insignifi-
cant. The current study differs from Pichette and Tremblay (2003) in two main
respects. First, capital gains on housing are analysed, not housing wealth, and
second, this study uses micro-data.
The literature is not completely one sided on the significance of housing
wealth for consumption. Miles (1997), using the UK Family Expenditure Sur-
vey, and Juster et al. (2005) using the PSID, find that consumption is, for the
most part, unresponsive to capital gains on housing. Engelhardt (1996), also
using the PSID, finds the MPC from capital gains is approximately 3 cents, but
notes an asymmetric behavioural response; households experiencing a capital
loss reduce consumption, whereas households experiencing a capital gain leave
consumption unchanged. Levin (1998), using micro-data from the Retirement
History Survey finds no effect on consumption from housing wealth.
5Another Canadian study is Engelhardt (1994), which finds higher house prices reduce the
probability that renters save for a down payment.
11
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
The primary analysis of this chapter is based on data from the Survey of House-
hold Spending (SHS), covering the years 2000-2006. The SHS is a Canada-
wide cross-sectional survey containing comprehensive information on house-
hold consumption expenditures, incomes, household member composition, and
dwelling characteristics. Each year the survey interviews approximately 16,000
respondent households, and is representative of approximately 98% of the Cana-
dian population.6 Data from the 2005 Survey of Financial Security (SFS) is also
used to construct the summary statistics below. The SFS provides information
on the value of Canadian household assets and liabilities.
The importance of housing wealth for Canadian household balance sheets
is sizeable. Figure 2.2 reports the average value of various household asset-
types as a fraction of the average total value. The single largest component
of household wealth is housing, accounting for approximately one third of the
total, followed by employer pension plans at 18.5%. The relative value of hous-
ing is highest for low-to-middle income households, though it remains the most
valuable asset across all income groups. Housing is also the most widely held
asset (not including bank deposits); 62% of households own a home, followed by
6The survey omits particular groups such as Native Americans living on reservations, mem-
bers of religious groups living in communal colonies, people living in residences for senior cit-
izens, people living in full time institutions, and Canadian Forces members living in military
camps.
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RRSPs/LIRAs (51.2%), employer pension plans (48.7%), and other real estate
(15.9%).
Figure 2.1: Household Assets as a Fraction of Total Assets (2005)
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Figure 2.2: Household Asset Ownership Rates (2005)
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As Figure 2.2 illustrates, home ownership rates are increasing in household
income. Over 70% of households with an after tax income grater than $40,000
own a home, and over 90% of households with an after tax income greater than
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$70,000 own a home.
In addition to being a large and widely held asset, housing was also re-
sponsible for almost 45% of the total increase in household assets from 1999
to 2005. These facts highlight the importance of housing wealth for Canadian
household balance sheets, and demonstrate that changes in house prices have
a sizeable effect on aggregate household capital gains.
Unlike the SFS, the SHS does not contain direct house price measures.
Therefore, these must be estimated for the current study. The next section
discusses the estimation strategy used.
2.4 House Price Estimates
So far as can be determined, no data set currently exists that contains infor-
mation on household consumption expenditures and also contains direct infor-
mation on the market value of owner-occupied housing. Past studies, there-
fore, have relied on alternative house-price measures. The two most preva-
lent of which seem to be the use of inter-regional house price averages,7 and
respondent-generated house-price estimates (in the case of US studies relying
on data from the PSID).
7For instance state averages for the US, provincial averages for Canada, and regions for
England.
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This chapter takes a different approach to value housing. The market value
of a household’s primary residence is estimated using a hedonic price function
(HPF). That is, the characteristics of a respondent’s home - such as age, loca-
tion, number of rooms etc. - are used in conjunction with an equation linking
these characteristics with overall house prices to estimate its value. The hedo-
nic approach is often used to assess real-estate values for millage taxation, and
is used in the construction of house price indices. However, this chapter marks
the first time an HPF is used for this type of analysis.
A benefit of using the hedonic approach is it permits a substantial degree of
price variability across individual observations; this benefit is largely absent
when studies rely on inter-regional house price averages as proxies. Also, un-
like respondent-generated house-price estimates, the hedonic regressions used
in this study are based on actual real-estate transactions, this may be benefi-
cial if respondents tend to systematically miss-price their own homes.8
2.4.1 Hedonic Price Functions
Hedonic price theory is based on the assumption that a good’s value is a func-
tion of its characteristics. An empirical HPF estimates the parameters of this
8See Bhatia (2012) for an appraisal of this approach, especially compared with regional
house-price indices and respondent generated estimates.
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function by regressing the price of a product on the characteristics of that prod-
uct. Once an empirical HPF is estimated, it can be used to estimate the value of
a product with any combination of these characteristics. Also, the derivatives
of this function can be used to estimate the marginal contribution of each char-
acteristic towards the good’s overall price. As with any fitted value, the price
estimates derived from an HPF contain error, and only capture the average
price of a product with certain characteristics. Even so, the hedonic method is
used in numerous economic applications requiring a method for pricing hetero-
geneous goods, such as computers, automobiles, houses etc.
A large body of literature on the construction of hedonic price functions has
emerged, in which a variety of model specifications and estimation methodolo-
gies are proposed. The appropriateness of any particular one depends on the
product being analysed, and the nature and quality of the available data. How-
ever, the most commonly chosen specifications appear to be the linear equation,
log-linear equation, and the double-log form. The most commonly chosen es-
timation method is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The choice of a particular
specification is important for deriving unbiased estimates, however, as shown
in Triplett (2004), general economic theory is unable to guide us on the ap-
propriate functional form of hedonic equations, and their selection becomes an
empirical issue.9
9The HPF coefficient estimates are not of interest in their own right (in the current study),
but rather, are of interest for their ability to generate regressors for a second stage regression
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In keeping with most practitioners and housing studies, the base HPFs take
a linear form, and are estimated using OLS. The choice of a linear HPF is less
of an issue for the current study, however, as most of the housing character-
istics are dummy variables - with the exception of room numbers. Also, as
there is no compelling evidence in the literature for a non-linear functional
form, this specification is thought to be appropriate. However, as a robustness
check, HPFs based on a double log and single log (dependent variable) spec-
ification are also estimated and used to estimate capital gains for the second
stage consumption function regressions - the results of which are reported in
Appendix C. The results based on all three HPF specifications are similar.
To estimate a hedonic price function, data on house prices and housing char-
acteristics are needed. Fortunately, the SHS provides both. Each respondent
is asked a number of questions pertaining to the characteristics of their home,
and if a respondent purchased their home in the survey year they are also
asked to report the purchase price. With this information, HPFs based on the
same characteristics reported by each respondent can be calculated, thus pro-
viding an internally consistent way of estimating house prices.
- the consumption function. As long as the parameters of each HPF - which may be more accu-
rately described as linear projections, not structural equations - can be consistently estimated,
then the estimates in the second stage will also be consistent.
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Due to sample size restrictions, and the relative uninformativeness of cer-
tain housing characteristics, some characteristics contained in the survey are
excluded from the HPFs. The characteristics that are included are often used
in the literature (for a survey of the characteristics most often used in the lit-
erature see Sirmans et al. (2005)), and are thought to be the most important
for explaining the variability in house prices across unit and time.10
In total, seven HPFs are estimated spanning the years 2000-2006. Ta-
ble 2.1 below reports the coefficient estimates from the 2006 HPF, along with
the sample size and R-squared. Appendix A reports the coefficient estimates
for all other years. The housing characteristics can be grouped into 6 cate-
gories: province; town type/size; room numbers; type of structure; year built;
and type of heating equipment. As mentioned above, a primary benefit of us-
ing the hedonic method is it permits a substantial degree of price variability
across households. If inter-regional house price averages were used instead,
for instance provincial averages, all of the intra-provincial variability stem-
ming from location and structural differences would have been lost.
Estimates of yearly one-off housing capital gains are derived by first calcu-
lating the value of each respondent’s home using the HPFs, and then taking
10Variables that are redundant, such as “heating fuel”, which is made redundant by the
variable “heating equipment,” are omitted. Also, housing characteristics that are deemed less
important, such as whether a house is equipped with a washing machine and/or dishwasher
are also omitted.
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Table 2.1: Hedonic Regression Coefficients: 2006
Province Type of House
P.E.I. -44171.86 (28932)∗ Semi-Detached -22923.03 (16711)∗
Nova Scotia 21761.28 (22040) Row or Terrace -34337.04 (17841)∗∗
New Brunswick -2590.47 (22493) Duplex 7841.27 (25609)
Quebec 73165.33 (18626)∗∗∗ Apartment (Condo) -44388.31 (17354)∗∗∗
Ontario 110473.40 (18813)∗∗∗
Manitoba 16424.55 (19918) Year Built
Saskatchewan -9340.80 (19998) Between 46-60 3626.98 (16750)
Alberta 122833.10 (19036)∗∗∗ Between 61-70 7955.48 (16779)
British Columbia 188983.10 (19084)∗∗∗ Between 71-80 -34788.43 (15625)∗∗∗
Between 81-90 6090.64 (15575)
Town Type/Size After 91 39711.41 (14514)∗∗∗
Urban Under 100K -89697.27 (9525)∗∗∗
Rural -82719.68 (13226)∗∗∗ Heating Equipment
Forced Air Furnace -41663.74 (16782)∗∗∗
Number of Rooms Heating Stoves -71087.24 (25386)∗∗∗
Total 9840.25 (3009)∗∗∗ Electric Heating -39121.38 (17788)∗∗∗
Number of Bedrooms 10711.08 (6012)∗∗
Number of Bathrooms 50601.42 (7698)∗∗∗ Constant 20844.78 (29688)
Sample Size 634 Adjusted R-Squared 0.55
The constant contains: Newfound Land (Province), Single Detached (Type of House), Before 46 (Year Built) Urban
Over 100K (Town Type/Size), Steam or Hot Water Furnace (Heating Equipment). Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ***-significant at the 5% level, **-significant at the 10% level, *-significant at the 20% level.
first differences. This is done for each respondent household over a four year
period - the survey year and the three previous years - providing four obser-
vations on yearly one-off capital gains for each household, which are use in
Section 2.5 to calculate expectations regarding future capital gains.
2.4.2 Hedonic House Price Index
To determine how well the hedonic regressions do at predicting average in-
tertemporal house price movements, an index is constructed using these re-
gressions, which is compared with the Teranet House Price Index (THPI). The
THPI is a Canada-wide house price index sponsored by the National Bank of
Canada, and serves as the benchmark index in that country. It uses a repeat
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sales methodology, and covers approximately 100,000 dwellings each year (for
an explanation of the repeat sales methodology see Shiller (1991)). The index is
calculated using data from 6 major Canadian cities: Ottawa; Toronto; Calgary;
Vancouver; Montreal; and Halifax, across five provinces.
In an attempt to use the same type of household as in the THPI, the hedo-
nic index uses data on respondents domiciled in the same five provinces, and
living in urban areas with a population in excess of one hundred thousand.
For each of these respondents the market value of their home is estimated us-
ing the HPFs discussed above. The index is constructed by first calculating
the average house price in each year, and then dividing these values by the
average house price in the numeraire year (2000). As with the repeat sales
methodology, a hedonic price index controls for changes in housing stock char-
acteristics, which may be partially responsible for intertemporal average house
price movements. Table 2.2 presents the year-over-year percentage change in
each index. The indices track one another fairly closely, though the hedonic
index is more variable.
Table 2.2: Hedonic Approach Vs. Teranet Composite: Year-Over-Year Appreci-
ations
Year 2006-05 2005-04 2004-03 2003-02 2002-01 2001-00
Hedonic Approach .1471 .0625 .0723 .1416 .0715 .0813
Teranet Composite .1164 .0788 .0798 .0824 .0790 .0461
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2.5 The Consumption Function
This section discusses the consumption function. We start with a discussion of
its functional form, and then discuss a number of control variables used in the
regressions. The consumption variable itself is discussed last.
2.5.1 Characterizing the Consumption Function
The consumption function specification used in this chapter is based on Fried-
man (1957)’s Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH). That is, it is assumed that
a household’s level of current consumption is a function of its expected level of
permanent income, where, strictly speaking, permanent income is the amount
a household can spend in perpetuity and keep wealth constant over time. With
regard to housing wealth, permanent income is equal to the expected perma-
nent level of capital gains accruing on a home - if the implicit income/consumption
derived from occupying a home is excluded, which it is here.
Income from housing capital gains may be used for current consumption in
two broad ways. Either through the use of financial products such as second
mortgages, reverse mortgages, secured lines of credit, etc., or through reduc-
tions in current saving, meant to offset increases in housing wealth.
Accrued capital gains on housing are conceptually equivalent to income
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originating from other forms of wealth - such as human capital, corporate eq-
uity, bonds etc. - and should therefore enter the consumption function in a
similar fashion. However, the MPC from each form of income is unlikely to be
identical. The results of this chapter, and those mentioned above, suggest that
they are in fact different. Therefore, housing capital gains are separated from
other types of income when estimating the Canadian consumption function pa-
rameters.
To make the empirical analysis operational, an estimate of expected per-
manent housing capital gains is required for each household, and hence an
assumption on how expectations are formed in practice is needed. Toward this
end it is assumed that households form expectations adaptively, that is, they
use information on past gains to form expectations about permanent gains.
The decision to use adaptive expectations, rather than rational expecta-
tions, has two components. First, rational expectations require a general equi-
librium framework and additional assumptions on the behaviour of market
participants. It is felt that this would add little to the analysis and complicate
matters. Secondly, adaptive expectations only depend on past gains, a variable
we have reliable estimates of. Given these two reasons, it is felt that adaptive
expectations are appropriate for this analysis.
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The adaptive expectations equation is characterized by a linear function of
past gains, and two weighting structures are used. The first is a geometrically
declining distributed lag, where the importance of a particular realization, in
determining permanent capital gains, is a decreasing function of the elapsed
time subsequent to this realization. The weights of a distributed lag are deter-
mined by a single parameter (λ) and take the following form:
Weight 1 = λ, Weight 2 = λ(1− λ), Weight 3 = λ(1− λ)2, etc.,
where λ is estimated jointly with the other consumption function parameters.11
The distributed lag approach is used extensively in the PIH literature to char-
acterize expectations; for examples of its use see Cagan (1956) and Bhatia
(1972). The second imposes no structure on the weights.12 This method al-
lows the data to reveal the true weighting structure. As shown below, the two
methods produce weight estimates with similar characteristics, and the use of
one vs. the other does not affect the consumption function parameter estimates
materially.
The consumption function specification used in this chapter is as follows:
Ci(t) = α+γInci(t)+β(δ1CGi(t),t+δ2CGi(t),t−1+δ3CGi(t),t−2+δ4CGi(t),t−3)+θXi(t)+εi(t) (1)
11The infinite sequence {λ, λ(1 − λ), λ(1 − λ)2, ...} sums to one. In the regressions below, the
weights are constrained to sum to one, therefore, each weight is set equal to the corresponding
distributed lag term divided by the sum of the distributed lag terms.
12However, the identifying restriction that weights sum to one is imposed.
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s.t.
4∑
h=1
δh = 1 and δh ≥ 0 ∀h,
where i(t) denotes household i of survey year t, Ci(t) denotes the household’s
purchase of consumption goods, Inci(t) denotes the household’s current-period
non-housing after-tax income (discussed below), CGi(t),t, CGi(t),t−1, CGi(t),t−2,
CGi(t),t−3 denote the estimates of one-off housing capital gains for the current
period, 1st lag, 2nd lag, and 3rd lag respectively, Xi(t) are household character-
istics (discussed below), δh are the adaptive expectation weights, γ, β, and θ are
the coefficients of interest, and εi(t), is the error term.
2.5.2 Other Independent Variables
A household’s consumption function also depends on permanent income from
wages, financial wealth, non-housing real estate, transfers, and business in-
come. Unfortunately, the SHS does not provide direct information on these
variables. It does, however, report the income received by a household in the
survey year, and lacking a direct measure of permanent non-housing income,
current non-housing income is used as a proxy variable.13 To be certain, perma-
nent income and current income are imperfectly correlated. This will lead to a
biased coefficient estimate on non-housing income. However, it is believed that
current non-housing income is likely to be a sufficiently good proxy that any
endogeneity bias that might have arisen from the possible correlation between
13Household income reported by the SHS is comprehensive.
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permanent housing income and permanent non-housing income is eliminated.
The non-housing income variable used in this study includes the entire set of
income variables reported by the SHS, less any taxes paid on this income.
In addition to current non-housing income, and permanent accrued capital
gains on housing, a number of variables related to household characteristics
may also affect current consumption. As many of these are added as possi-
ble. The set includes household composition variables, the number of working
individuals, and the age and education level of household members.
2.5.3 The Consumption Variable
A principal benefit of using the SHS is it contains detailed and comprehensive
data on household consumption expenditures. Appendix B lists the set of con-
sumption categories used for the current analysis. As evidenced by this list,
the SHS includes most household consumption items. This provides us with a
fairly complete picture of total household consumption expenditure.
This level of inclusivity is not pervasive throughout the household consump-
tion literature. For instance, a number of early US studies using PSID data re-
lied primarily on food expenditure data. It is possible to estimate an MPC with
a limited number of consumption categories, but these estimates are prone to
bias insofar as income elasticities differ across consumption goods, and these
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differences are not accounted for properly.14 Thus, to generate reliable MPC
estimates it is beneficial to have complete data on household consumption ex-
penditures.
In addition to being comprehensive, the consumption data is detailed. Con-
sumption expenditures are reported at disaggregated levels, and this feature
of the data is exploited to derive elasticity estimates over sets of consumption
goods. It is shown below that permanent housing capital gains affect various
components of consumption - such as total consumption, non-durables, luxury
goods etc. - differently.
One drawback of using data from the SHS is that the consumption variables
likely suffer from measurement error. Respondents are given the difficult task
of estimating annual consumption expenditures, and although encouraged to
reference receipts, credit card statement, bank records etc., a portion of con-
sumption is almost certainly misstated. However, if these errors are uncorre-
lated with the regressors, then the estimates will be consistent.
In the regressions below, a pooled sample is created using three cohorts
covering 2004-2006. The sample is restricted to include only households that
14For instance anMPCmay be estimated by regressing a subset of consumption expenditures
on a regressor of interest, and then scaling the resulting coefficient estimate by the average
ratio of total consumption expenditures to expenditures on this subset. This method is used in
Skinner (1989) and Lehnert (2004).
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own their home (as opposed to renters), had one economic family in the home,
and had lived in their homes for over 1 year.15
2.6 Estimation Results
Table 2.3 presents the main regression results when a distributive lag is used,
and Table 2.4 presents the results when free weights are used. The second
column of each table has total consumption as the dependent variable, and the
third column has non-durable consumption as the dependent variable.16
Before discussing the MPC estimates, it is instructive to discuss the adap-
tive expectation weights, as they form the basis of the permanent housing capi-
tal gains measure. As mentioned above, the weights are estimated jointly with
the other consumption function variables - by Non Linear Least Squares (NLS)
- using total consumption as the dependent variable. They are plotted in Fig-
ure 2.3.
In the free-weight case, the weight estimates on the first and second lag are
15Since capital gains are calculated over a four year period for each respondent (including
three lags), restricting the sample to include only households with a tenure of more than
three years would have been desirable. However, due to the way the house-tenure variable
is grouped, doing this would have forced the exclusion of respondents that moved to their
home after 1990, which the author believed was too costly in terms of sample size and sample
representativeness.
16The weight estimates obtained using total consumption as the dependent variable are used
in the non-durable consumption regressions also; it assumed that weights are constant across
subsets of consumption goods.
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Table 2.3: Consumption Function Results (Distributed Lag (λ)): Pooled Sample
(2004-2006)
Total Consumption Non-Durable Consumption
Permanent Housing CG 0.094∗∗ (0.012) 0.073∗∗ (0.007)
After-Tax Income 0.270∗∗ (0.005) 0.176∗∗ (0.003)
Lambda 0.019 (0.085)
Children 0-4 -723.80∗∗ (179.97) -579.86∗∗ (105.40)
Children 5-17 732.16∗∗ (95.10) 709.06∗∗ (52.93)
Children 18-24 753.64∗∗ (159.18) 581.76∗∗ (98.50)
Adults 25-64 -307.89∗∗ (124.04) -293.62∗∗ (78.76)
Adults Over 65 -103.03 (144.73) -60.70 (93.81)
Couple 2059.09∗∗ (428.61) 659.49∗∗ (260.14)
Couple w Children 4038.23∗∗ (420.92) 3126.40∗∗ (259.89)
Couple w Other 4345.53∗∗ (533.98) 3758.01∗∗ (328.01)
Lone Parent 2166.88∗∗ (257.05) 2595.16∗∗ (161.44)
Other w Relatives 2061.14∗∗ (383.40) 2513.37∗∗ (228.94)
Number of Full Time Earners 1255.33∗∗ (149.52) 1114.36∗∗ (84.80)
Number of Part Time Earners 1613.91∗∗ (111.49) 1212.25∗∗ (69.84)
Head Female -1622.81∗∗ (199.61) -590.39∗∗ (116.51)
Head Age 819.02∗∗ (98.60) 875.10∗∗ (59.79)
Head Education 175.68∗∗ (29.97) 226.40∗∗ (19.62)
Spouse Age 64.29 (41.71) 171.27∗∗ (24.79)
Spouse Education 101.71∗∗ (41.65) 186.41∗∗ (25.99)
Head Age Squared -76.21∗∗ (5.89) -67.24∗∗ (3.69)
2005 596.12∗∗ (178.39) 495.34∗∗ (119.72)
2004 -169.71 (183.05) -27.98 (120.55)
Constant 5518.19∗∗ (451.99) 3163.69∗∗ (277.96)
The weight structure estimated for total consumption is used for non-durable consumption. A description
of each household-specific regressor is contained in Appendix B. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
**-significant at the 5% level. All nominal variables are converted into $2006 Cdn.
large and similar, while the weight estimates on the contemporary gain and
the third lag are relatively small. It is not surprising to find a small weight on
the third lag; the information content of past gains, in computing permanent
gains, is likely to be a decreasing function of time. It is also not surprising
to find a low first weight in the free-weight case. This likely reflects a timing
effect; contemporary capital gains are fully realized at the end of a period, re-
ducing their information content within a period. This timing effect cannot be
accounted for with a distributed lag, however, as the weights are constrained
to be monotonic. Each weight structure is plausible, and no stand is taken on
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Table 2.4: Consumption Function Results (Free Weights): Pooled Sample
(2004-2006)
Total Consumption Non-Durable Consumption
Permanent Housing CG 0.108∗∗ (0.014) 0.079∗∗ (0.008)
After-Tax Income 0.270∗∗ (0.005) 0.176∗∗ (0.003)
Free Weight Contemporary 0.191
Free Weight 1st Lag 0.317∗∗ (0.031)
Free Weight 2nd Lag 0.337∗∗ (0.028)
Free Weight 3rd Lag 0.155∗∗ (0.046)
Children 0-4 -702.57∗∗ (178.48) -561.36∗∗ (104.79)
Children 5-17 745.27∗∗ (95.53) 721.42∗∗ (53.19)
Children 18-24 763.53∗∗ (156.01) 591.88∗∗ (99.94)
Adults 25-64 -290.98∗∗ (123.39) -280.11∗∗ (79.15)
Adults Over 65 -85.66 (143.50) -42.96 (93.84)
Couple 2051.88∗∗ (422.01) 645.63∗∗ (259.24)
Couple w Children 3996.70∗∗ (414.46) 3090.40∗∗ (258.51)
Couple w Other 4291.64∗∗ (538.13) 3717.21∗∗ (328.04)
Lone Parent 2147.28∗∗ (252.43) 2583.18∗∗ (162.16)
Other w Relatives 2060.34∗∗ (387.82) 2513.91∗∗ (227.79)
Number of Full Time Earners 1268.00∗∗ (146.92) 1124.56∗∗ (84.94)
Number of Part Time Earners 1630.88∗∗ (109.58) 1222.49∗∗ (69.71)
Head Female -1625.77∗∗ (201.80) -592.84∗∗ (116.61)
Head Age 808.89∗∗ (98.02) 868.31∗∗ (59.96)
Head Education 167.07∗∗ (29.86) 222.20∗∗ (20.17)
Spouse Age 61.00 (41.51) 169.51∗∗ (24.81)
Spouse Education 98.52∗∗ (40.92) 185.30∗∗ (26.24)
Head Age Squared -75.21∗∗ (5.84) -66.59∗∗ (3.71)
2005 435.35∗∗ (172.21) 372.64∗∗ (105.68)
2004 -413.27∗∗ (195.86) -213.62 (130.42)
Constant 5584.81∗∗ (465.95) 3230.08∗∗ (281.44)
The weight structure estimated for total consumption is used for non-durable consumption. The contemporary
weight is set equal to one minus the other three weights, it is not estimated separately. A description of each
household-specific regressor is contained in Appendix B. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
**-significant at the 5% level. All nominal variables are converted into $2006 Cdn.
the appropriateness of one over the other, however, as the results do not differ
substantially from one weight structure to the other, for brevity, only results
using a distributed lag are discussed.
The MPC estimates from Table 2.3 suggest that households spend an addi-
tional 9.4 cents on total consumption for every 1 dollar increase in permanent
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Figure 2.3: Adaptive Expectations Weights
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housing capital gains, and spend approximately 7.3 cents on non-durable con-
sumption only.17 These results imply that permanent housing capital gains are
an important driver of household consumption spending in Canada. The MPC
estimates are also larger than usually found in the literature, likely owing to
the use of permanent capital gains.
The MPC estimate on non-housing income is low at approximately 27 cents,
which may be due to the use of current non-housing income as a proxy for
permanent non-housing income. As mentioned above, current income is equal
to permanent income plus a random error term - uncorrelated with the latter
variable. This type of measurement error has likely biased the estimate down-
ward. An additional explanation is that the consumption measure, although
17The consumption function regressions are based on generated regressors (capital gains).
Although this does not affect consistency (as mentioned above) NLS standard errors may be
biased (see Pagan (1984) for a discussion of this). Therefore, Bootstrap standard errors are
computed as follows. HPF estimates are generated using bootstrap samples. These estimates
are used to generate capital gains for the second stage regression. The consumption function
parameters are then estimated using bootstrap samples over these data sets. The Bootstrap
coefficient estimates from the second stage regression are then used to calculate standard
errors.
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comprehensive, excludes some components. This may bias the MPC estimate
downward for both housing, and non-housing income. However, the average
household in the sample spends $33,526 (2006 dollars) on consumption - ex-
cluding shelter - which seems to be a reasonable approximation to the actual
average, although it may be a little low.
2.6.1 One-Off Capital Gains
It has been maintained throughout this chapter that permanent rather than
one-off housing capital gains drive consumption. However, it is instructive to
analyse the effect of one-off gains alone, and so a consumption function regres-
sion is run where permanent housing capital gains are replaced with one-off
gains18 (both the contemporaneous gain, and the one-year lagged gain), the re-
sults of which are reported in Table 2.5 (the coefficient estimates on household
characteristics are omitted from this table for brevity).
Table 2.5: One-Off Housing Capital Gains: Pooled Sample (2004-2006)
Contemporary One Year Lag
One-Off Housing Capital Gains 0.016∗∗ (0.0037) 0.018∗∗ (0.0039)
After Tax Income 0.275∗∗ (0.0055) 0.275∗∗ (0.0051)
Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ** - Significant at the 5% level. All nominal variables are converted into $2006 Cdn.
The coefficient estimates on one-off housing capital gains are smaller than
18Where total consumption is the dependent variable.
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on permanent gains. The coefficient estimate on contemporaneous one-off gains
is 1.6 cents, and the estimate on lagged one-off gains is 1.8 cents. The small
size of these estimates, compared with those from permanent gains, is likely
due to the measurement error on one-off gains - as a proxy for permanent gains.
These results have interesting implications. They imply that temporary
swings in housing returns will have little effect on current consumption, whereas
prolonged changes will have large effects. Policy aimed at mitigating the ad-
verse effects of a downturn in house prices (or house price growth) should first
be concerned with the expected duration. If a downturn is expected to be short-
lived, minimal action may be required, if persistent, policies aimed at boosting
consumption may be needed to keep levels constant.
2.6.2 Consumption Elasticities
The last empirical exercise takes advantage of the SHS’s disaggregated con-
sumption data to estimate the income elasticity of various subsets of consump-
tion with respect to permanent housing capital gains.19 This is done for total
consumption, non-durable consumption, food purchased from stores, and a set
of goods that are deemed to be non-essential (“luxury”).20
19Using the distributed lag specification/weights.
20The definition of non-essential is open to interpretation. This set of goods was chosen using
the author’s best judgement, and is reported in Appendix B.
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Table 2.6 presents the elasticity estimate for each consumption subset. The
elasticity estimate for non-durable consumption is only slightly lower than for
total consumption. On the other hand, the elasticity estimate for luxury goods
is approximately 2.5 times higher than for food (.093 and .036 respectively) -
the latter variable is intended to be representative of non-discretionary expen-
ditures.
Table 2.6: Elasticity Estimates
Total Consumption 0.032
Non-Durable 0.032
Food 0.036
Luxury 0.093
These elasticity estimates are calculated using average
expenditures on each consumption category, and the
average house price across all households.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter uses cross-sectional data from the Survey of Household Spending,
a Canadian data set, to estimate the effect of accrued capital gains from owner-
occupied housing on the decision to purchase consumption goods. It adds to the
rather limited research for Canada by estimating such a relationship for two
broad consumption categories and for two measures of capital gains (perma-
nent and one-off).
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It is found that, on average, when permanent capital gains on owner oc-
cupied housing increase by 1 dollar, Canadian households spend an additional
9.4 cents on total consumption, and 7.3 cents on non-durable consumption only.
The relationship between one-off capital gains and consumption is found to be
much smaller in magnitude. The results suggest that a 1 dollar increase in
contemporaneous one-off capital gains leads to a 1.6 cent increase in consump-
tion. This lower MPC estimate for current gains may be attributed to the idea
that consumption decisions are based on permanent capital gains, rather than
one-off capital gains.
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Chapter 3
The Lock-In Effect and the
Corporate Payout Puzzle
3.1 Introduction
This chapter proposes a new model of corporate payout policy that can explain
some aspects of the corporate payout puzzle. The question of whether taxes
affect payout choice - dividend payments vs. share repurchases - has received
considerable attention in the economics literature. Authors arguing that cap-
ital income taxation affects payout choice have the burden of explaining why
dividends are paid in practice despite their tax disadvantage relative to share
repurchases. The explanations provided include diverse factors such as the
mitigation of agency costs, the signalling role of payout, the intrinsic value of
dividend payments, and constraints on the ability to repurchase shares. This
chapter offers an additional explanation, arguing that there is a dead-weight
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cost associated with share repurchases, which makes dividend payments desir-
able in certain situations. In practice, firms likely pay dividends for a number
of these reasons. Isolating and exploring each helps our understanding of firm
payout decisions.
In their pioneering work, Modigliani and Miller (1961) show that firm value
is independent of its payout mix in the absence of personal taxes; arbitrage
opportunities ensure equity markets value dividend payments and share re-
purchases identically when capital markets are complete. The authors go on
to show that management’s influence over firm value is limited to its choice
over investment level and total payout - the payout method is irrelevant. A
justification for this view is provided by Miller and Scholes (1978), who argue
that marginal investors may be unaffected by personal taxes. Miller and Sc-
holes (1978) point out that nuances in the US tax code allow for the avoidance
of capital income taxes by some taxable individuals, and tax-exempt entities
such as pension funds avoid personal taxes altogether.
When complete tax avoidance is not possible, the payout choice is likely to
be relevant for firm value. Indeed, a tax differential on payout method can en-
able management to influence firm value through the payout mix. For example
Black (1976) argues that relatively high dividend taxes vs. capital gains taxes1
1Income generated from a share repurchase takes the form of a capital gain.
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from 1965-1972 in the United States made dividend payments an inferior form
of payout. He claims that the existence of dividend payments over this pe-
riod, given their tax disadvantage, is a puzzle. The payment of dividends in
light of their tax disadvantage is highlighted in a number of economic studies
and seems to be prevalent in both the US and Canada. Poterba (2004) argues
that dividend payments were tax disadvantaged in the US from 1929 to 2003,
and it is argued below that there was a similar tax disadvantage in Canada
from 1987-2008. During these respective periods, a substantial fraction of total
payout in the US and Canada was made in the form of dividends. Dividends
account for the majority of total payout in Canada, and until recently, were
also the majority payout method in the US (Brav et al. (2008)). This chapter
presents a model of firm payout which addresses the payout puzzle.
The model explores the possibility that shareholder lock-in effects (i.e., the
incentive to postpone the sale of equity with an accrued capital gain) make re-
purchasing shares sufficiently expensive that dividend payments become the
marginal form of payout for some firms. Capital gains are taxed upon realiza-
tion in the model, consistent with capital gains taxation in both Canada and
the US. Under this tax structure, investors can reduce the effective rate of tax
on accrued capital gains by postponing realizations, thereby deferring the tax
liability. It follows that when equity has an accrued capital gain the locked-
in value exceeds the after-tax value of liquidating the position. Shareholders
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with an accrued capital gain will thus require a lock-in premium to sell equity
back to the firm. This premium is an increasing function of accrued capital
gains and the desired holding period for firm equity. When shareholders are
heterogeneous with respect to these arguments they have heterogeneous re-
quired lock-in premiums. This leads to upward sloping equity supply curves,
and causes the marginal benefit of a repurchase to fall as more shares are re-
purchased. In equilibrium firms repurchase shares until the marginal benefit
of doing so equals the marginal benefit of paying dividends. At this point firms
start paying dividends. Empirical evidence supporting upward sloping equity
supply curves, caused by heterogeneous shareholder lock-in effects, is found in
Bagwell (1992) and Landsman and Shackelford (1995) for the United States.
McNally et al. (2003) reports similar findings for Canada.
The equity supply curve depends in large part on the joint distribution over
accrued capital gains and desired holding period specific to a firm’s sharehold-
ers. In order to examine the effect of this distribution on dividend payments,
the model is solved numerically, and comparative statics are run for a number
of distributional forms and parameterizations. In general, when the average
accrued capital gain is high, the average desired holding period is long, and the
variance of each is low, firms face higher lock-in premiums and are more likely
to pay large dividends.
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The model is also used to explore the consequences of corporate and per-
sonal tax policy for firm investment and payout decisions. It is found that both
the corporate tax and the capital gains tax reduce the level of corporate invest-
ment, whereas the dividend tax has no effect. Short run total payout increases
in both the corporate tax and the capital gains tax, whereas long-run total pay-
out decreases in both. The dividend tax has no effect on total payout in either
the short-run or the long-run.2
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 contains a
further literature review. Section 3.3 presents Canadian summary data which
supports the existence of a Canadian payout puzzle. Section 3.4 discusses the
payout model and its predictions for corporate payout and investment. Sec-
tion 3.5 uses numerical methods to solve the model and presents comparative
statics and dynamic simulations. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Other Literature
The use of repurchase premiums to explain dividend payments is also explored
in Chowdhry and Nanda (1994). In their signalling model of payout, a firm’s
2Firms in this model are financed exclusively through equity. Capital income tax changes
may affect firm investment/payout decisions differently when debt financing is allowed. How-
ever, this issue is beyond the scope of the current chapter.
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true value is the private information of management. When equity is temporar-
ily undervalued share repurchases are used to increase non-tendering share-
holder wealth. In this way, share repurchases become a signal of undervalua-
tion, and investors demand a premium to tender shares. This premium adds to
the cost of a repurchase, and tax disadvantaged dividend payments are made
when the premium is high relative to the undervaluation. Unlike this model,
the current model assumes no informational asymmetries; the firm’s market
value is known by both management and investors. The repurchase premium
in Chowdhry and Nanda (1994) stems from the information content of repur-
chases, whereas the repurchase premium in the current model is caused by
shareholder-specific lock-in effects.
Signalling models also appeal to tax clienteles and their differential abil-
ity to monitor firms. For instance Allen et al. (2000) argue for a model of tax
clienteles, in which non-taxed “institutional” investors have the ability and ini-
tiative to discover the true value of firms, while taxed “retail” investors do not.
Both investor types own a positive fraction of all firms for purposes of diversi-
fication. To compensate retail investors for relatively high dividend taxes, the
pre-tax yield on dividend paying stocks is higher. This higher yield attracts a
larger proportion of institutional investors to dividend paying stocks, which is
desirable for high quality firms seeking to signal their true value. In a sepa-
rating equilibrium, high quality firms pay dividends and low quality firms fail
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to pay dividends.
A second class of payout model explains dividends by appealing to agency
costs. Easterbrook (1984) proposes that dividends can mitigate two types of
agency costs. The first is caused by management’s incentive to protect job
tenure. Reinvesting firm profits in low-risk low-return projects can reduce the
chance of firm bankruptcy and increase the probability that management re-
mains employed. This investment strategy enhances the value of corporate
debt at the expense of equity. Dividend payments are a way of reducing the
amount of free cash flow available for this purpose. The second type of agency
cost is related to monitoring firm management. When firms are widely held,
the cost of monitoring by an individual investor is usually prohibitively high
relative to the potential gain. Reducing cash reserves by way of dividends
forces management to seek financing in capital markets more often. New in-
vestors provide capital only when compensated for existing agency costs, in-
centivizing their reduction by management.
Other papers, such as Busaba (2012), postulate that dividends are the re-
sult of agency costs but do not mitigate them. Busaba (2012) argues that the
ability to secure debt with collateralizable assets can reduce the agency costs
faced by creditors. Small firms with few collateralizable assets are unable to
secure debt financing cheaply, and are forced to rely on internal funds at the
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cost of dividends. Larger firms with sizeable collateralizable assets have fewer
agency costs associated with debt and are able to obtain debt financing cheaply,
allowing them to pay dividends.
Within the class of perfect information payout models, in which this chapter
fits, the “Traditional” view, discussed in Auerbach and Hassett (2002), and the
“New” view, developed by Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and King (1977),
are prominent. In the Traditional view, investors derive an intrinsic value from
dividend payments. Equity markets react positively to their payment, which
reduces the cost of capital and increases market value. In the New view, firms
face an exogenous binding repurchase constraint, and are unable to use share
repurchases to satisfy the whole of total payout; any payout in excess of this
amount is paid in the form of dividends. Both models have received criticism
based on their assumptions. The intrinsic value of dividends has little theoreti-
cal or empirical justification, as noted in Poterba and Summers (1984), and the
repurchase constraint, assumed in the New view, may have been defensible in
the US prior to the SEC’s 1982 adoption of Rule 10b-18, which eased restric-
tions on share repurchases,3 but has little justification at present in both the
US and Canada.4 The results of these models are compared with the current
3See Allen and Michaely (2003) for a discussion of this rule, and its implications for US
share repurchases.
4In Canada firms are able to repurchase up to 10% of the public float or 5% of shares out-
standing (of a particular class) annually - see Ikenberry et al. (2000) or TSE (2008) for more
information on the regulations regarding share repurchases by Toronto Stock Exchange listed
corporations. However, this constraint was found to be non-binding in practice by the author.
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one below.
3.3 Summary Data
This section provides statistics on Canadian marginal tax rates and Canadian
payout policy to illustrate the empirical basis for the payout puzzle in Canada.
The marginal tax rates faced by individual shareholders on income from div-
idends and realized capital gains are functions of individual tax brackets - de-
termined by total income (along with deductions and tax credits), and province
of residence - determining tax schedules. Average statutory rates are estimated
using the methodology in Sialm (2009), which takes a weighted average of indi-
vidual marginal rates, weighted by the individual’s share of total income from
dividends and realized capital gains. That is:
TAvgb,t =
∑
l
Θl,b,t · Tl,b,t b ǫ {d, g},
where TAvgd,t is the average marginal tax rate on dividend income in year t, T
Avg
g,t
is the average marginal tax rate on realized capital gains income in year t, Θl,d,t
is the proportion of total dividend income earned by individual l in year t, Θl,g,t
is the proportion of total realized capital gains income earned by individual l
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in year t, Tl,d,t is individual l’s marginal tax rate in year t on income from div-
idends, and Tl,g,t is individual l’s marginal tax rate in year t on income from
realized capital gains. Figure 3.1 plots these average Canadian marginal tax
rates from 1987 to 2008.5
Figure 3.1: Average Canadian Marginal Tax Rates: Dividends and Realized
Capital Gains 1987-2008
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Due to the postponement of capital gains taxes until realization, the effec-
tive tax rate on accrued capital gains is necessarily lower than the statutory
rate on realized capital gains. Share repurchases generate income in the form
of an accrued capital gain,6 and therefore, the applicable tax liability is the
effective rate, not the statutory rate. A number of economic studies have esti-
mated the effective accrual capital gains tax rate as a fraction of the statutory
5Chapter 4 contains a detailed discussion of how these rates are calculated.
6They also generate income in the form of a realized capital gain for selling shareholders.
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rate. The estimate in Poterba (1987) is approximately .25, whereas the es-
timates in Protopapadakis (1983) range from .56 to .59. The true ratio is a
matter of some debate.
The numerical section of this chapter estimates the effective tax rate using
a discrete-time extended version of the methodology in Davies and Glenday
(1990), which also incorporates income from both dividends and accrued cap-
ital gains.7 This methodology, known as the accrual equivalent capital gains
tax rate (AECGTR), is the rate of tax, that if applied to capital gains as they
accrue, would result in the same future value of after-tax capital gains income
as taxing capital gains upon realization.8 The Canadian AECGTR is estimated
using an average total yield (on equity) of 6%, split evenly between dividends
and capital gains,9 the average dividend and capital gain tax rates presented
above (over the period 1987-2008) and a ten year average holding period. This
produces an effective-to-statutory capital gains tax ratio of .76.
Table 3.1 reports the relative tax burden (RTB) of dividends vs. capital gains
over the period 1987-2008 using all three tax ratios provided above,10 where the
relative tax burden is defined as in Poterba (2004):
7Davies and Glenday (1990) use a continuous time methodology that omits income from
dividends.
8Appendix D presents a discussion of how this rate is derived.
9This yield is in line with the range of estimates and assumptions found in Campbell (2008),
which provides estimates of the average long-run yield on Canadian equity over the period
1982-2007.
10For Protopapadakis (1983), the middle of his range of estimates is used.
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RTBt =
(1− TAvgd,t )
(1− TAvgg,t ·Ratio)
,
where Ratio is the ratio of effective to statutory capital gains taxes.
Table 3.1: Relative Tax Burden of Dividends vs. Capital Gains: 1987-2008
Year .25 Ratio .575 Ratio .76 Ratio Year .25 Ratio .575 Ratio .76 Ratio
1987 0.726 0.795 0.841 1998 0.745 0.853 0.930
1988 0.761 0.852 0.914 1999 0.753 0.860 0.935
1989 0.756 0.848 0.910 2000 0.760 0.849 0.910
1990 0.758 0.866 0.942 2001 0.770 0.830 0.869
1991 0.754 0.863 0.942 2002 0.777 0.837 0.875
1992 0.756 0.868 0.947 2003 0.777 0.836 0.874
1993 0.748 0.862 0.944 2004 0.779 0.838 0.876
1994 0.735 0.852 0.938 2005 0.779 0.838 0.877
1995 0.753 0.870 0.954 2006 0.848 0.913 0.955
1996 0.745 0.858 0.939 2007 0.868 0.934 0.977
1997 0.749 0.858 0.936 2008 0.875 0.942 0.986
In all three series the relative tax burden of dividends is below unity, mean-
ing that dividend payments yielded a lower after-tax return to shareholders
than repurchasing firm equity. Due to this tax disadvantage, it would appear
that Canadian firms could have maximized market value by choosing a pay-
out policy excluding dividend payments altogether. This was not the case in
Canada, however. Despite their tax disadvantage, dividend payments have
persisted in Canada over the period 1987-2008. They are the largest form of
payout in Canada, and are used by more firms than are share repurchases.
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To illustrate this, Figure 3.2 plots aggregate dividend payments made by
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) listed Canadian corporations from 1987 to 2008,
and Figure 3.3 plots aggregate share repurchases over the same period.11 Ag-
gregate dividend payments were higher in each of the 22 years reported. Divi-
dend payments were 87 times higher than share repurchases in 1987, and 223
times higher in 1991. From 1991 onward the multiple has decreased substan-
tially, reaching a low in 2007 of 2.8 times share repurchases.
Figure 3.2: Aggregate Dividend Payments: TSE Listed Canadian Corporations
($2008)
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The average dividend payment is also higher, as Figure 3.4 illustrates. The
average dividend payment among dividend paying firms, and the average amount
spent repurchasing shares among repurchasing firms, have both increased
over the period 1987-2008. The average amount spent repurchasing shares
increased 21 fold over the period 1987-2006, later dropping to 9.5 times 1987
11Chapter 4 contains a detailed discussion of how these series are derived.
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Figure 3.3: Aggregate Share Repurchases: TSE Listed Canadian Corporations
($2008)
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levels in 2008. Average dividend payments rose more steadily over this period,
increasing a little over twofold from 1987-2008. In spite of the higher growth
rate, average share repurchases were lower than average dividend payments
in each of the 22 years.
Figure 3.4: Average Payout by Paying Firms: Dividends and Share Repur-
chases, TSE Listed Canadian Corporations ($2008)
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Figure 3.5: Fraction of Firms Paying Dividends and Repurchasing Shares: TSE
Listed Canadian Corporations
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In addition to higher levels, a larger number of Canadian firms chose to
pay dividends than repurchase shares, as Figure 3.5 illustrates. Dividend pay-
ments were chosen by more firms in each of the 22 years reported. However,
the fraction of firms paying dividends has decreased over time. In 1987 80% of
firms paid a dividend, whereas only 30% of firms paid one in 2008. The trend
is opposite for repurchases; in 2008 23% of firms repurchased stock, whereas
only 12% repurchased stock in 1987. This trend is similar to that found in the
United States.
Share repurchases have become a more prominent form of payout as of late.
However, Canadian firms still have a preference for paying dividends. The
model presented in the next section provides an explanation for why dividends
are paid in practice.
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3.4 The Lock-In Model
The economy is assumed to be populated by a number of corporations each
producing a single good sold in markets with perfectly elastic demand. Profit
functions have decreasing returns and only depend on non-depreciating cap-
ital. Firms are financed exclusively through equity via capital markets with
perfectly elastic supply. There is no uncertainty about future output demand
or the required after-tax rate of return on capital, which are both constant over
time. Firms live forever and seek to maximize shareholder wealth by maximiz-
ing current market value. Profits generated by the firm are subject to corporate
income tax, which is constant across firms; after-tax profits can be retained,
used to pay dividends, or used to repurchase shares.
Each firm is owned by a large number (continuum) of shareholders requir-
ing an after-tax rate of return equal to ρ.12 Shareholders are heterogeneous
with respect to their desired holding periods and level of accrued capital gains
on firm equity.13 A joint realization over desired holding period (H) and tax
base (α) (one minus the ratio of capital gains to equity value) characterizes
12This rate of return is satisfied through dividend payments and appreciations in the intrin-
sic value of firm equity (discussed below).
13The potential processes that generate each source of heterogeneity are not modelled in the
current chapter. This would complicate the analysis while adding little to the main thesis.
In practice, both sources of heterogeneity are witnessed. The first depends on factors such
as retirement planning and portfolio management, while the second depends on the timing of
past share purchases.
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an investor-type, and each firm faces a stationary distribution over investor-
types. Denote the distribution over investor types by F (α,H) and the corre-
sponding density by f(α,H).14 Shareholders seek to maximize wealth and are
indifferent between receiving after-tax income in the form of dividends and ac-
crued/realized capital gains; all three sources of income are identical according
to the Haig-Simons income definition.
At the personal level, dividend income results in an immediate tax liabil-
ity, whereas capital gains are taxed upon realization.15 To simplify the model,
a single dividend tax rate, and a single tax rate on realized capital gains, are
used. This is standard in the literature (for example, see Poterba and Summers
(1984)) and reduces the model’s complexity. The after-tax value of dividend
income is straightforward to calculate; it equals the gross dividend payment
multiplied by one minus the dividend tax rate. The after-tax value of accrued
capital gains is more complicated due to the postponement of capital gains
taxes. As discussed in Section 3.3, an AECGTR is used to value accrued cap-
ital gains income. The AECGTR is shareholder specific, owing to differences
among optimal holding periods.16 For the current model, a single AECGTR is
used to value accrued capital gains income. This rate can be thought of as an
14Shareholders are distributed continuously over tax base, and discretely - in one year inter-
vals - over optimal holding period.
15This system of taxation is used in both Canada and the United States. For a discussion of
Canadian capital income tax policy see Monaghan and Wilson (2012).
16It also depends on shareholder tax brackets via the realized capital gains tax rate, and the
dividend tax rate. It was assumed above that these rates were constant across shareholders.
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average among the firm’s shareholders.
The timing of firm operations is as follows. Firms have a specific level of
capital to start each period, which they use to produce output. At the end
of each period firms sell output, generate profits, and pay corporate tax. The
remaining net income can then be used to pay dividends, repurchase shares,
and purchase capital. Firms purchase capital first, pay dividends next, and
repurchase shares last. Firms may also sell capital at the end of each period to
pay dividends and repurchase shares. The value of a firm in period t takes the
following form:
Vt =
(1− τd)Dt
(1 + ρ)
+
(1− τa)[
Vt+1
(1−δt)
− Vt]
(1 + ρ)
+
Vt
(1 + ρ)
, (1)
where Vt is the value at time t, Dt is the dividend payment made at the end of
period t, δt is the fraction of the firm repurchased at the end of period t, Vt+1 is
the value of the firm at the beginning of period t + 1 (which occurs simultane-
ously with the end of period t), τd is the dividend tax rate, τa is the AECGTR,
and ρ is the after-tax required rate of return on equity. Accrued capital gains
([ Vt+1
(1−δt)
− Vt]) can be generated in one of two ways: by increasing the market
value of the firm (Vt+1) through capital acquisition; and by repurchasing shares
(δt). After a share repurchase, the remaining shareholders own a larger frac-
tion of the firm. Provided the firm’s value does not decrease by too large an
amount the market value of each remaining share will increase, leading to an
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accrued capital gain.
In both the New view and Traditional view models of corporate payout pol-
icy, all shares are repurchased at a price equal to the intrinsic value of equity.17
The current model differs in this respect by arguing that most shareholders
will in fact require a premium over this price to sell their shares during a re-
purchase program. The origins of this premium are discussed next.
The ability to postpone taxes on income from accrued capital gains produces
a lock-in effect, wherein shareholders have a financial incentive to postpone
their realization. Once capital gains are realized, the resulting tax liability
reduces an investor’s gross wealth by the tax. That part of gross wealth used
to pay the tax is no longer available for investment, and the returns that would
have accrued on it are lost. A remuneration above the intrinsic value of equity
must be offered for an investor to be indifferent between selling equity with
an accrued capital gain and holding it for a desired number of years. We will
call this remuneration the lock-in cost, which is characterized by the following
equation:18
L(α,H) = X
{
(1−ατg){(1−τg)Ω(H)+τg(1−τd)d·
∑H−1
h=0 Ω(h)}+ατg(1−τg)
(1−τg){(1−τg)Ω(H)+τg(1−τd)d·
∑H−1
h=0 Ω(h)}+τg(1−τg)
− 1
}
,
17The stock’s intrinsic value is the maximum amount an outside investor would pay for it.
18See Appendix E for a derivation of the lock-in cost function. This function holds for H ≥ 1.
When H = 0 the lock-in cost is 0 (i.e., L(α, 0) = 0).
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S.T. Ω(v) = (1 + r + (1− τd)d)
v,
where X is the intrinsic value of the stock, α is the ratio of tax base to mar-
ket value, H is the desired holding period, τg is the realized capital gains tax
rate, τd is the dividend tax rate, d is the rate of return from dividends, and r
is the rate of return from capital gains. The lock-in cost is decreasing in the
tax base and increasing in the desired holding period.19 Recall that sharehold-
ers are heterogeneous with respect to these arguments, implying heterogeneity
among shareholder-specific lock-in costs. Figure 3.6 below graphs a numerical
example of the lock-in cost as a function of tax base (α) and holding period (H).
Figure 3.6: Lock-In Cost Example
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For this example, the intrinsic value of equity (X) is equal to 1, the gross rates of return on dividends and capital
gains are each 3.5%, the tax rate on dividends is 17.1%, and the tax rate on realized capital gains is 20.9% (which are
the average rates for 2008 from Section 3.3).
19See Appendix F for a proof of these results.
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The firm’s equity supply curve can be derived by ranking shareholders ac-
cording to their lock-in costs, from lowest to highest. The equity supply curve
is an increasing function (possibly weakly over some intervals) of the amount
repurchased. However, the exact shape depends on the shareholder distribu-
tion over tax base and desired holding period (F (α,H)). If we denote the equity
supply curve by S(q), where q is the number of shares repurchased, and S(q)
is the reservation price of the marginal shareholder, i.e., the intrinsic value of
equity (X) plus the marginal shareholder’s lock-in cost, then it is characterized
by the following equations:
S(q) = X + L̂(q),
q =
HM∑
H=0
∫
{(α,H)|L(α,H)≤L̂(q)}
f(α,H)dα,
where HM is the maximum desired holding period among shareholders of the
firm, and {(α,H)|L(α,H) ≤ L̂(q)} is the set of shareholders with holding period
H that have lock-in costs less than L̂(q).
As shown below, optimal firm behaviour dictates that shares are repur-
chased in the most inexpensive way possible. This ensures that the market
value of equity - with respect to the remaining shareholders - is maximized.
Due to shareholder-specific lock-in costs firms must pay a premium over the
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intrinsic value of equity to attract shareholders with an accrued capital gain
and non-zero holding period. We will call this the lock-in premium. The lock-in
premium required by each shareholder constrains the number of shares that
can be repurchased for a given amount spent. The extent to which this happens
depends on the tendering20 behaviour of shareholders, i.e., the relationship be-
tween a shareholder’s lock-in cost and the lock-in premium they demand. We
can derive upper and lower bounds on this premium as a function of investor
type, amount spent, and the distribution over investor type.
If F (·) is the distribution over investor type and A is the total amount spent
on a repurchase, then the minimum lock-in premium demanded by investor
type (α,H) is:
P ((α,H), F (·), A) = L(α,H),
where P (·) is the lock-in premium and L(α,H) is investor type (α,H)’s lock-in
cost. Any lock-in premium below this amount decreases investor type (α,H)’s
wealth. The maximum lock-in premium demanded by investor type (α,H) is:
P ((α,H), F (·), A) = max{(α,H)}B{L(α,H)},
where {(α,H)}B is the set of investor types fromwhich shares are repurchased.21
20The word tendering is meant to denote the sale of stock back to the firm.
21This set is determined by the distribution over investor-types (F (·)) and the amount spent
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That is, the maximum lock-in premium demanded by investor type (α,H) is
equal to the maximum lock-in cost among the set of shareholders that sell eq-
uity back to the firm. To see this, note that if an investor type (α′, H ′)ǫ{(α,H)}B
demands a price above the intrinsic value of equity (X) plus this lock-in pre-
mium, e.g. X + P ((α′, H ′), F (·), A) + β, (β > 0), then given the continuity of α,
and the continuity of the lock-in cost function with respect to α, there exists an
η > 0 and investor type (α′′, H ′′)ǫ{(α,H)}NB = {(α,H)}U/{(α,H)}B such that
X + L(α′′, H ′′) + η < X + P ((α,H), F (·), A) + β22. If investor type (α′′, H ′′) offers
this price23 firms choose to repurchase from them and not (α′, H ′) - they can
repurchase shares more cheaply this way. Investor type (α′, H ′) is worse off by
P ((α,H), F (·), A) − L(α′, H ′) ≥ 0 and would therefore not choose to demand a
higher price.
Given these lower and upper bounds on lock-in premiums, tendering be-
haviour is modelled two ways. The first assumes that shareholders are willing
to tender shares at a price equal to the intrinsic value of equity plus their
specific lock-in cost. This tendering behaviour is analogous to perfect price dis-
crimination, except that here, the buyer pays different amounts for the same
good. The second assumes that shareholders are willing to tender shares at
a price equal to the intrinsic value of equity plus the maximum lock-in cost
(A).
22Where {(α,H)}U is the set of all shareholders.
23I.e., X + L(α′′, H ′′) + η
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among the set of tendering shareholders. This tendering behaviour is some-
what analogous to perfect competition, where a single market clearing price is
paid for all goods sold. In both cases the most inexpensive way to repurchase
shares is to repurchase from the pool of shareholders with the lowest lock-in
costs, i.e. those with relatively low accrued capital gains and/or those wishing
to sell relatively soon. The repurchase function - defined as the intrinsic value
of equity repurchased for a given amount spent repurchasing shares - based on
the first tendering assumption, denoted the weak repurchase function (WRF),
is characterized as follows:
R(A) = max{α(H)}
[
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα
]
X
S.T.
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
[X + L(α,H)] · f(α,H) dα = A.
These equations state that for every H, firms choose an α(H) such that the in-
trinsic value of shares repurchased (R(A)) is maximized, while adhering to the
constraint that the cost of repurchasing these shares is equal to the amount
spent (A). Where the cost of each share repurchased is equal to the intrinsic
value (X) plus the shareholder-specific lock-in cost (L(α,H)). This repurchase
function represents the cheapest possible way a firm can repurchase shares.
Appendix C includes an alternate derivation of the WRF using the firm’s eq-
uity supply curve.
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The repurchase function based on the second tendering assumption, de-
noted the strong repurchase function (SRF), is characterized as follows:
R(A) = max{α(H)}
[
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα
]
X
S.T. [max{H} L(α(H), H) +X ] ·
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα = A.
The interpretation of these equations is similar to those of the WRF except that
the cost of each share is equal to the intrinsic value of equity plus the maxi-
mum lock-in cost among the repurchased shares (max{H} L(α(H), H)). This
repurchase function represents the most expensive way to repurchase firm eq-
uity. Appendix C includes a derivation of the SRF using the firm’s equity supply
curve.
For any distribution over investor-type, both the weak and strong repur-
chase functions are increasing in the amount spent and below (possibly weakly)
the 45◦ line. As more shares are repurchased, the marginal shareholder’s lock-
in cost increases. From this, it follows that the WRF is concave in the amount
spent.24 The concavity of the SRF depends on the distribution over investor
type. However, the SRF is bounded above by the WRF, i.e., for any amount
spent, fewer shares are repurchased using the SRF.25 The derivative of each
24For a proof of this result see Appendix C.
25For a proof of this result also see Appendix C.
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repurchase function is decreasing in the intrinsic value of the firm. As the
intrinsic value of the firm declines more shares are repurchased for a given
amount spent, and the marginal shareholder’s lock-in cost becomes higher.
At this point it is not important to choose among the two functional forms
when discussing firm equilibrium behaviour; the qualitative results are identi-
cal with both. A specific functional form is specified in the numeric section, but
for now we will refer to both as the “repurchase function”.
3.4.1 Firm Equilibrium Behavior
With the modelling environment now characterized, we can turn to the firm’s
equilibrium behaviour next. Recall that firms seek to maximize market value,
represented by equation 1. This can be re-written as:
Vt =
(1− τd)Dt
(1 + ρ)
+
(1− τa)[Vt+1 +R(At)− Vt]
(1 + ρ)
+
Vt
(1 + ρ)
,
since the fraction of the firm repurchased (δt,), equals
R(At)
Vt+1+R(At)
.26 Solving for
Vt gives us:
26The fraction of the firm repurchased equals the intrinsic value of repurchases divided by
the market value of the firm, which equals the continuation value (value after shares are
repurchased) plus the intrinsic value of repurchases.
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Vt = [1 +
ρ
(1− τa)
]−1{Dt
(1− τd)
(1− τa)
+R(At) + Vt+1}.
This equation can be rewritten further as the following infinite sum (with
transversality condition: limt→∞[(1 +
ρ
(1−τa)
)−t · Vt] = 0)
Vt =
∞∑
t=1
[1 +
ρ
(1− τa)
]−t[Dt
(1− τd)
(1− τa)
+R(At)].
The per-period budget constraint is:
(1− τc)π(Kt) = Dt + At + It,
where τc is the corporate tax rate, Kt is the capital stock available at the begin-
ning of period t, π(·) is the decreasing returns profit function, At is the amount
spent repurchasing shares at the end of period t, and It is the level of invest-
ment made at the end of period t.27 The law of motion for capital is:
Kt+1 = Kt + It.
Since dividends cannot be negative, the following constraint also applies:
Dt ≥ 0.
27Given this budget constraint, it is clear that for any amount spent repurchasing shares
(At), the firm’s value is largest when shares are repurchased in the most inexpensive way, i.e.,
when R(At) is maximized for a given At.
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The Lagrangian for the infinite sum is:
L =
∞∑
t=1
[1 +
ρ
(1− τa)
]−t{[Dt
(1− τd)
(1− τa)
+R(At)] + µt[π(Kt)(1− τc)−Dt −At − It]
+ λt[Kt −Kt+1 + It] + ξt[Dt]},
where λt, µt, and ξt are Lagrange multipliers. The first order conditions are:
Dt :
(1−τd)
(1−τa)
− µt + ξt = 0, (2)
Kt+1 : λt+1 + µt+1π
′(Kt+1)(1− τc)− (1 +
ρ
(1−τa)
)λt = 0, (3)
It : µt − λt+1 = 0, (4)
At : R
′(At)− µt = 0. (5)
3.4.2 Equilibrium Firm Payout and the Payout Puzzle
The shadow value of net profit is equal to R′(At) from equation 5, i.e., the
marginal value of total payout is always equal to the marginal value of share
repurchases. When the dividend constraint binds (i.e., firms fail to pay divi-
dends) the multiplier on the dividend constraint (ξt) is positive and R
′(At) >
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(1−τd)
(1−τa)
from equation 2. In this case, a marginal share repurchase is more valu-
able than a dividend payment, and share repurchases are the marginal (and
only) form of payout. When the dividend constraint fails to bind (i.e. firms wish
to pay dividends) the Lagrange multiplier on dividends (ξt) is zero. From equa-
tion 2 we know R′(At) =
(1−τd)
(1−τa)
, i.e., the marginal benefit of a share repurchase
is equal to the marginal benefit of dividends. Since the repurchase function is
concave, whenever dividends are paid they become the marginal form of pay-
out.28 This is intuitive since the marginal value of dividends is constant at
(1−τd)
(1−τa)
, while the marginal benefit of a repurchase is decreasing in the amount
spent. Firms repurchase shares up to the point where the marginal benefit of
doing so equals the marginal benefit of paying dividends. At this point firms
stop repurchasing shares and switch to dividend payments. In equilibrium div-
idends are paid when the repurchase function is sufficiently concave, total pay-
out is sufficiently large, and/or the relative tax burden is sufficiently high. The
crucial assumption here is the existence of heterogeneous lock-in costs which
cause the marginal benefit of repurchases (R′(At)) to fall as more shares are
repurchased.
28The WRF is everywhere concave. The SRF is concave locally whenever dividends become
the marginal form of payout.
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3.4.3 The Value of Firm Capital
The marginal value of capital in the Traditional view - also known as marginal
q - is equal to unity (see Poterba and Summers (1984)). This follows from share
repurchases being the marginal form of payout, and the ability of firms to re-
purchase all shares for their intrinsic value. In the New view, dividends are the
marginal form of payout, and the marginal value of capital is (1−τd)
(1−τa)
< 1 (also
see Poterba and Summers (1984)). That is, the value of capital within a firm is
less than its replacement cost; capital is essentially “trapped” within a firm.
The marginal value of capital in the Lock-In model (λt) can be derived using
equations 4 & 5, which gives us λt = R
′(At). If firms pay dividends, marginal
q equals (1−τd)
(1−τa)
. As with the New view, when dividends are the marginal form
of payout, capital is trapped within a firm. When share repurchases are the
marginal form of payout, marginal q is greater than (1−τd)
(1−τa)
but also less than
unity. Unlike the Traditional view, when share repurchases are the marginal
form of payout the marginal value of capital within a firm is less than its re-
placement cost. In the Lock-In model, capital is trapped within a firm regard-
less of the marginal form of payout. Shareholders would like to reduce the
amount of firm capital, since its internal value is less than its outside value,
but have no way of doing so without incurring costs. In the case of dividends,
the cost is a high dividend tax rate; in the case of share repurchases, the cost
is a repurchase premium.
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3.4.4 Investment Levels
The level of corporate investment and the aggregate capital stock affect the
long-term aggregate welfare in an economy. This section discusses the effects
of taxes on the level of corporate investment and the capital stock.
Optimal corporate investment requires that the rate of return on amarginal
investment is equal to the user cost of capital. If we denote by i the gross return
on a marginal investment, then undertaking this investment yields i(1− τc) in
net-of-corporate-tax profit, one period hence. If R′(At) is the marginal value of
total payout in period t (discussed above), and R′(At+1) is the marginal value
of total payout in period t + 1, then the marginal investment generates an
accrued capital gain of: i(1 − τc)R
′(At+1) + [R
′(At+1) − R
′(At)]. The first term
of this expression is the after-corporate-tax value of profits generated by the
investment, while the second is the intertemporal difference in the marginal
value of capital. Since accrued capital gains generate a tax liability, captured
by the AECGTR (τa), only (1 − τa){i(1 − τc)R
′(At+1) + [R
′(At+1) − R
′(At)]} of
the investment’s return is left after both taxes (corporate and AECGTR) are
accounted for. The cost of this investment is the forgone marginal value of
total payout in period t (R′(At)), leading to the following after tax return:
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(1− τa){i(1− τc)R
′(At+1) + [R
′(At+1)− R
′(At)]}+R
′(At+1)
R′(At)
− 1.
Shareholders require a constant after-tax rate of return ρ. Equating the above
return with ρ, and solving for i characterizes the user cost of capital:
i∗ =
R′(At)
R′(At+1)
{
ρ
(1− τc)(1− τa)
+
1
(1− τc)
[1−
R′(At+1)
R′(At)
]
}
. (6)
In an equilibrium, firms invest up to the point where a marginal investment
yields a return equal to the user cost of capital, i.e. π′(Kt) = i
∗.
The user cost of capital is an increasing function of both the corporate tax
rate and capital gains tax rate. Both taxes reduce the net return on investment,
requiring a larger gross return to satisfy a shareholder’s required after-tax re-
turn (ρ). Given the decreasing returns profit function, both taxes also reduce
the level of corporate capital.29 Dividend taxes do not affect the user cost of
capital, and like the New view, have no effect on capital levels.
In a steady state At+1 = At, and the user cost of capital is:
ρ
(1−τc)(1−τa)
, its
long-run level. When firms are not in a steady state the user cost of capital
depends on whether dividends are paid. When dividends are paid R′(At+1) =
R′(At) =
(1−τd)
(1−τa)
, and the user cost of capital is equal to the steady state level.
29See Appendix J for a proof of this result.
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Here, investment is a function of exogenous variables only (τg, τc, ρ, and π
′(·)).
When dividends are not paid At+1 does not equal At, and total investment de-
pends on the functional form of R(·). In this case, investment and total payout
depend on endogenous variables, i.e., the amount spent on repurchases over
time. In both the Traditional view and the New view, a new steady state can
be reached immediately following a permanent corporate and/or capital gains
tax change. In the Lock-In model, transition to a new steady state is gradual
when share repurchases are the marginal form of payout.
3.4.5 The Effect of Tax Changes on Corporate Payout
Corporate Tax Rate
From the discussion above, we know that the user cost of capital is an increas-
ing function of the corporate tax rate, i.e., ∂[i∗]
∂τc
= ρ
(1−τc)2(1−τa)
> 0. Short-run
investment moves in the opposite direction of a corporate tax change (given
the decreasing returns profit function, and the condition π′(Kt) = i
∗), causing
short-run total payout to move in the same direction.30 In a long-run equilib-
rium, both the capital stock and total payout move in the opposite direction
of a corporate tax change, whereas investment is unaffected due to the non-
depreciating capital assumption.
30Conditional on a certain level of net income.
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Realized Capital Gains Tax Rate
The capital gains tax rate affects the user cost of capital in a fashion similar
to the corporate tax rate (through the AECGTR). Recall that the user cost of
capital is an increasing function of the capital gains tax rate. This causes short-
run total payout to be an increasing function as well. The level of investment,
and the long-run capital stock, move in the opposite direction of a capital gains
tax change, and therefore, log-run total payout moves in the opposite direction
also.
Dividend Tax Rate
The dividend tax has no effect on the user cost of capital, and therefore no effect
on the level of investment or total payout. To see why the dividend tax leaves
the user cost of capital unaffected, first suppose dividends are the marginal
form of payout. Then a dividend tax change causes the marginal value of
capital to change by
∂
(1−τd)
(1−τa)
∂τd
= (−1)
(1−τa)
times the tax change, in both the current
and subsequent period. From equation 6 we know that when both R′(At) and
R′(At+1) change by the same proportion the user cost of capital is unaffected.
Therefore, a dividend tax change has no effect on the user cost of capital when
dividends are the marginal form of payout.
When share repurchases are the marginal form of payout the same result
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holds. When the dividend yield is zero (which must be the case when share
repurchases are the marginal form of payout) a dividend tax change has no
effect on the repurchase function’s first derivative,31 and therefore no effect
on the marginal value of capital in both the current and subsequent period.
Given that R′(At) and R
′(At+1) are unaffected, the user cost of capital is also
unaffected. In both cases the user cost of capital remains constant following
a dividend tax change, leaving the level of investment and total payout un-
changed as well.
3.5 Numerical Solution to the Lock-In model
This section presents steady-state comparative statics of the Lock-In model
using a numerical solution to the firm’s problem. It also presents simulated
dynamic responses to various tax changes. The results are intended to supple-
ment the general results provided above and give us a better understanding of
how modelling assumptions affect equilibrium outcomes.
An important building block of the Lock-In model is the multivariate dis-
tribution over accrued capital gains and holding period specific to a company’s
31See Appendix H for a proof of this result.
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shareholders. This distribution characterizes the measure of shareholders hav-
ing each possible lock-in cost and it plays a significant role in determining the
cost of a share repurchase program, and thus equilibrium outcomes. Ideally,
a number of company-specific empirical distributions could be estimated and
used in the numerical exercises. However, lacking the necessary data on basis
values and shareholder characteristics, this task is beyond the scope of the cur-
rent chapter. Instead, the joint distribution is parametrized, and comparative
statics are run when these parameters are changed. There is no claim that
the distributions used in this exercise reflect any true empirical distribution;
however, an attempt is made to make clear how the chosen parameters affect
equilibrium outcomes.
The first set of parameter values characterize the joint distribution’s sup-
port. For the base-case distribution it is assumed that investors hold assets
between zero years (would like to sell immediately) and twenty years, and
have between zero and one hundred percent capital gain. We shall initially
ignore the case where shares are held with a capital loss, reflecting the work
of Constantinides (1983), where it is shown that holding assets with a loss is
never optimal when capital markets are complete and capital loss offsets exist.
Such positions are optimally sold immediately. Second, bivariate normality is
imposed (truncated and discretized over the support), the mean is centred on
the support, and each standard deviation is set to 50% of the mean. Last, the
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correlation coefficient between accrued capital gains and holding period is as-
sumed to be negative. The rationale for this assumption is as follows: investors
purchase stock with an ideal initial holding period, those with shorter current
holding periods have thus, on average, held the stock for longer and have ac-
cumulated larger capital gains.32 If we make the stronger assumption that in-
vestors have uniform initial holding periods, and equity returns are constant,
then the correlation coefficient would be negative one. However, investors have
different initial holding periods and equity returns are stochastic in practice,
so the correlation coefficient is likely greater than negative one. For the initial
parametrization a correlation coefficient of -.35 is chosen, which is allowed to
change in the comparative statics section.33
In addition to the joint distribution over investor type, the company’s re-
purchase function also depends on the parameter values of the lock-in cost
function, which include the company’s equity value (X), the statutory tax rate
on income from dividends and realized capital gains (τd and τg respectively),
and the firm’s payout policy (the yield on dividends (d) and on capital gains
(r)). Recall the lock-in cost function:
L(α,H) = X
{
(1−ατg){(1−τg)Ω(H)+τg(1−τd)d·
∑H−1
h=0 Ω(h)}+ατg(1−τg)
(1−τg){(1−τg)Ω(H)+τg(1−τd)d·
∑H−1
h=0 Ω(h)}+τg(1−τg)
− 1
}
,
32Given a positive return from accrued capital gains.
33There is no particular motivation for choosing a correlation coefficient of -.35 for the base-
case parametrization.
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S.T. Ω(v) = (1 + r + (1− τd)d)
v.
In the base-case parametrization the most recent estimates of the average
statutory tax rate paid by Canadian investors on income from dividends and
realized capital gains are used, which are 17.1% and 20.9%, respectively in
2008.
In a steady state, both firm value and the firm’s payout policy are equi-
librium quantities that depend on the repurchase function itself, the profit
function, statutory tax rates (both corporate and personal), the AECGTR, and
the required after-tax rate of return ρ. In addition, the AECGTR is endoge-
nous with respect to the yield on dividends and capital gains. This gives rise
to a fixed point problem in four variables: firm value, dividend yield, capital
gain yield, and the AECGTR. These fixed points are solved for using numerical
methods.
In the base-case parametrization, the 2008 estimate of the average national
corporate tax rate paid by Canadian firms34 is used, which was 31.5%. A 6%
after-tax required rate of return is used, which is in line with the range of
34Chapter 4 includes a detailed discussion of how this average corporate tax rate is
calculated.
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equity returns estimated by Campbell (2008) for Canadian firms over the pe-
riod 1982-2007, which was discussed above. For simplicity, a logarithmic profit
function is used.35 Table 3.2 reports steady-state equilibrium values using the
base-case model for both the weak and strong repurchase functions.
Table 3.2: Steady State Equilibrium Values: Benchmark Parametrization
Dividends Repurchases
Class of Firm Value Capital Stock Level (Yield %) Level (Yield %) AECGTR
Distribution
Strong 21.85 8.58 .86 (3.9) .72 (3.3) 16.38
Weak 21.91 8.57 .13 (.6) 1.44 (6.6) 16.43
As this table illustrates, equilibrium values depend on the type of repur-
chase function used. The SRF’s first derivative is everywhere lower than that
of the WRF, causing the marginal benefit of a repurchase to fall faster when the
SRF is used. Firms pay dividends once the marginal benefit of doing so equals
the marginal benefit of repurchasing shares, therefore, firms pay more divi-
dends with the SRF. The dividend yield is 3.9% when the SRF is used, which is
6.5 times higher than for the WRF (.6%). Due to the higher dividend yield, the
AECGTR is lower for the SRF, which causes the steady-state capital stock to
be higher. Total payout is higher for the SRF, but the average after-tax value
35To ensure profits are positive, the profit function is: ln(K+1), since K can be less than 1 in
principle.
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of total payout is lower, since more payout is made in the form of tax disadvan-
taged dividends. The gross return using the SRF is 7.24% compared to only
7.21% using the WRF.
If we subtract the intrinsic value of repurchases from the amount spent
repurchasing shares we can calculate the repurchase premium. Both the abso-
lute value of the repurchase premium and the per-share repurchase premium
are higher for the SRF. The absolute value is $.006 for the SRF and $.0055 for
the WRF. The per-share repurchase premium is $.19 for the SRF, and only $.09
for the WRF.
3.5.1 Comparative Statics
Comparative statics (CS) will now be presented when the parameter values
of the investor-type distribution are changed. These results are derived us-
ing only the SRF. The results are qualitatively identical for both types. The
distribution’s truncated normality is maintained at first, and dividend payout
is analysed when adjustments are made to the mean, covariance matrix, and
support, while holding constant the AECGTR from the base-case model. The
second set of CS exercises act on the class of investor-type distribution.
Table 3.3 reports the fraction of total payout going toward dividends when
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the mean of the investor-type distribution is adjusted. The table’s columns
correspond to changes in average holding period, which is varied from 7 to 13
years. The rows correspond to changes in average base, which is varied from
35% to 65%.
Dividend payments increase in average holding period and decrease in av-
erage base. For instance, no dividends are paid when the average investor has
a base of 65% and holding period of 7 years. When the average holding period
is increased to 13 years, and the average base is 35%, dividend payments make
up 80% of total payout. As average holding period increases and average base
decreases, a larger fraction of shareholders require higher lock-in premia to
sell their shares. This makes large share repurchases less desirable, and in-
creases the fraction of payout made with dividends.
Table 3.3: Fraction of Total Payout Going Toward Dividends: Comparative
Statics - Mean Adjustments
Average Holding Period (Years)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
35 0.469 0.569 0.644 0.702 0.743 0.776 0.801
40 0.410 0.510 0.602 0.660 0.718 0.743 0.776
Avg. 45 0.319 0.435 0.544 0.619 0.660 0.702 0.735
Base 50 0.210 0.344 0.452 0.544 0.602 0.660 0.685
(%) 55 0.076 0.218 0.344 0.452 0.527 0.585 0.627
60 0.000 0.076 0.218 0.327 0.419 0.494 0.544
65 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.210 0.302 0.377 0.435
The next CS exercise acts on the covariance matrix. Table 3.4 reports the
78
fraction of total payout going toward dividends when the standard deviations
of both holding period and base, as well as the correlation coefficient between
the two, are adjusted. The rows of Table 3.4 report adjustments to the standard
deviation of both base and holding period, which are varied between 30% and
90% of their respective means. The columns of Table 3.4 correspond to adjust-
ments to the correlation coefficient, which is varied between -.65 and -.05.
The payment of dividends decreases in the standard deviation and increases
in the correlation coefficient. As the standard deviation increases the mass of
shareholders requiring both low and high lock-in premia also increases. The
fraction of equity that may be repurchased in a given period is limited by the
inability to issue debt and the constant profit stream assumed by the model.
Because repurchase programs target low-cost shares, it follows that all selling
shareholders have below-average lock-in costs, making changes to the distri-
bution of shareholders with above-average lock-in costs irrelevant for the re-
purchase decision.36 The net result of this is that a higher standard deviation
increases the number of cheap shares, which makes repurchase programs more
desirable, and reduces the yield on dividends.
A high correlation coefficient (one that is closer to zero) reduces the mass of
36This follows from the fact that, given a reasonable after-tax required rate of return, net
profit is less than half of the firm’s market value in every year. For instance, in the base-case
model, net profit is less than 10% of the firm’s market value when both the strong and weak
repurchase functions are used.
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shareholders with relatively short holding periods and few capital gains, and
simultaneously increases both the mass of shareholders with relatively short
holding periods and large capital gains, and shareholders with long holding pe-
riods and few capital gains.37 The first effect increases the cost of a repurchase
program whereas the last two decrease it. On net, the first effect dominates,
and the cost of a repurchase program increases in the correlation coefficient.
Table 3.4: Fraction of Total Payout Going Toward Dividends: Comparative
Statics - Covariance Matrix Adjustments
Correlation Coefficient Between α and H
-0.65 -0.55 -0.45 -0.35 -0.25 -0.15 -0.05
Standard 30 0.801 0.801 0.818 0.818 0.835 0.843 0.859
Deviation 40 0.660 0.677 0.677 0.685 0.685 0.702 0.718
of α and H 50 0.510 0.510 0.527 0.544 0.560 0.569 0.585
(% of Mean) 60 0.360 0.360 0.377 0.394 0.410 0.419 0.435
70 0.235 0.235 0.252 0.252 0.268 0.285 0.302
80 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.159 0.159 0.176 0.193
90 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.092 0.109
The next CS exercise acts on the support of the investor-type distribution.
Table 3.5 reports the fraction of total payout going toward dividends when
shareholders are allowed to maintain equity positions with capital losses, and
the maximum holding period is varied between 17 and 23 years. The columns
correspond to upper bounds on tax base, which are varied between 1 and 1.3
times the current market price.38 The rows correspond to maximum holding
37It also decreases the mass of shareholders with long holding periods and large capital
gains - those with a high lock-in cost - which, as argued above, is not relevant for repurchase
decisions.
38A tax base ratio greater than 1 means that the initial stock price was greater than the
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periods. All shares with a capital loss are sold for a price at least as great as
the intrinsic value of equity since capital markets have perfectly elastic supply.
When the upper bound on tax base increases the fraction of total payout
going toward dividends declines. This happens because the measure of cheap
shares increases, decreasing the repurchase premium for any amount spent,
and increasing the benefit of a repurchase program. The fraction of total pay-
out going towards dividends decreases in the maximum holding period. As the
maximum holding period increases the slope of the investor-type distribution
falls everywhere. This decreases the absolute value of the second derivative
of the repurchase function, enabling more shares to be repurchased before the
marginal benefit of repurchasing shares equals the marginal benefit of paying
dividends.
Table 3.5: Fraction of Total Payout Going Toward Dividends: Comparative
Statics - Support Adjustments
Upper Bound of Base (%)
1.3 1.25 1.2 1.15 1.1 1.05 1
17 0.050 0.159 0.268 0.377 0.452 0.527 0.585
Upper 18 0.034 0.143 0.252 0.344 0.435 0.510 0.569
Bound of 19 0.000 0.126 0.218 0.327 0.419 0.494 0.560
Holding 20 0.000 0.092 0.210 0.302 0.394 0.469 0.544
Period 21 0.000 0.076 0.193 0.285 0.377 0.452 0.527
(Years) 22 0.000 0.067 0.176 0.268 0.360 0.435 0.510
23 0.000 0.050 0.159 0.252 0.344 0.419 0.494
current market price: a capital loss.
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In the final CS exercise the class of investor-type distribution is changed.
Table 3.6 reports the steady-state equilibrium values when the distribution
is: uniform; log-normal; and chi-squared. With a uniform distribution, a larger
mass of shareholders have low lock-in costs, and the repurchase function is less
concave due to a constant sloping CDF, as compared with the base-case normal
distribution. More shares are repurchased, and the dividend yield is lower as a
result. Both the log-normal and chi-squared distributions have higher sloping
PDF’s over the set of tendering shareholders, as compared with the benchmark
normal distribution. This results in more concave repurchase functions, and
less shares are repurchased.39
Table 3.6: Steady State Equilibrium Values: Different Distribution Class’
Dividends Repurchases
Class of Firm Value Capital Stock Level (Yield %) Level (Yield %) AECGTR
Distribution
Uniform 21.90 8.55 .03 (.1) 1.55 (7.1) 16.59
Chi-Squared 21.83 8.58 1.07 (4.9) .51 (2.3) 16.36
Log-Normal 21.83 8.58 .95 (4.3) .63 (2.9) 16.41
39The mean of all three distributions are the same as the base-case model. The covariance
of the log-normal distribution is also the same as the base-case model. The uniform and chi-
squared distributions do not have covariance parameters.
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3.5.2 Dynamic Simulations
This section presents impulse response functions (IRF) for changes in the cor-
porate tax rate, dividend tax rate, and the realized capital gains tax rate. Ini-
tial tax rates and parameter values are taken from the base-case model above.
The top two sub-plots of Figure 3.7 show IRF’s for a change in the corpo-
rate tax rate, where the change happens in period t. The upper-left sub-plot
shows the IRF for a 1% increase in the corporate tax rate. This tax change
increases the user cost of capital, which reduces the optimal level of capital.
Investment in period t decreases as a result, and total payout increases. The
lower steady-state level of capital is realized in period t+1 and total payout is
lower from that period forward. The higher tax liability on corporate profits,
and lower total payout after period t, reduce total firm value. This reduces
the marginal benefit of repurchasing shares for any amount spent, as a larger
fraction of the firm is repurchased, implying higher lock-in premia as more
expensive shareholders are involved. As a result, the amount spent repurchas-
ing shares declines. Firm value in period t is slightly higher than in period
t+1 onward, owing to the liquidation value of corporate capital and the corre-
sponding higher total payout. Dividend payments increase in period t owing
to higher total payout and lower repurchases. They decline in period t+1 on-
ward due to lower total payout. The yield on dividends and capital gains are
unchanged in the new steady state. The upper-right sub-plot shows the IRF for
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a 1% decrease in the corporate tax rate. The effect on equilibrium quantities
are opposite those for a 1% increase.
The middle two sub-plots show IRF’s for a change in the capital gains tax.
The middle-left sub-plot shows the IRF for a 1% increase in the tax during
period t. By increasing the AECGTR, the increased capital gains tax raises
the user cost of capital and lowers the steady-state capital stock. This reduces
investment and increases total payout in period t. The new steady-state cap-
ital stock is realized in period t+1, and total payout is lower from that point
onward. Share repurchases are lower for three reasons. First, firm value is
reduced by the AECGTR in a similar fashion to the corporate tax, reducing the
marginal benefit of a repurchase for any amount spent. Second, the increased
capital gains tax rate further reduces the marginal benefit of a repurchase by
strengthening the lock-in effect. Third, dividend payments become more de-
sirable as they reduce a now higher tax liability on capital gains. As a result,
repurchases decline. Dividend payments are higher in period t for two reasons:
first, the reduced level of share repurchases, and second, the higher level of
total payout. From period t+1 onward dividends are higher owing to the first
reason, which outweighs the lower level of total payout. The middle-right sub-
plot shows the IRF for a 1% decrease in the capital gains tax rate, the effects
of this on equilibrium quantities are opposite for the 1% increase.
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Figure 3.7: Dynamic Response to Tax Changes
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The bottom two sub-plots show IRF’s for dividend tax changes. The bottom-
left sub-plot shows the IRF for a 1% increase in the dividend tax in period
t. Unlike the previous two tax changes, a change in the dividend tax has no
effect on the user cost of capital, and therefore no effect on the capital stock,
investment levels, and total payout. A higher dividend tax reduces the benefit
of paying dividends by reducing the after-tax value of gross dividends. It also
increases the marginal benefit of repurchasing shares by weakening the lock-in
effect, but reduces it by decreasing firm value. On net, the weaker lock-in effect
and decreased benefit of dividends dominates the firm value effect, and share
repurchases increase. Total payout is constant and dividends decrease. The
new steady state payout levels are achieved in period t+1. The bottom-right
sub-plot shows the IRF for a 1% decrease in the dividend tax, again, the effects
on equilibrium quantities are opposite those above.
3.6 Conclusion
Studies have shown that dividends are tax disadvantaged in the United States
relative to share repurchases. This chapter has argued that dividends are
likely to be tax disadvantaged in Canada also. Despite this, dividend pay-
ments constitute a significant fraction of total corporate payout in both coun-
tries, giving rise to a payout puzzle: persistent dividend payments appear to be
an inferior form of payout from a firm value maximization perspective.
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This chapter has proposed a model of corporate payout policy which offers
an explanation for the payout puzzle by appealing to the lock-in effect caused
by the postponement of taxes on capital gains. It is argued that shareholder
lock-in effects require firms to pay a premium over the intrinsic value of equity
when repurchasing shares. This premium adds to the cost of a share repur-
chase program, and tax disadvantaged dividends are paid whenever this pre-
mium is sufficiently high.
The premium depends on the shareholder distribution over accrued capi-
tal gains and desired holding period specific to a firm. It also depends on the
tendering behaviour of shareholders, i.e., the relationship between a share-
holder’s lock-in cost and the premium demanded. Repurchase functions are
derived that reflect lower and upper bounds on these premiums, and the model
is solved using a number of shareholder distributions. In general, dividend pay-
ments are highest when shareholders demand the maximum lock-in premium,
when the average accrued capital gain is high, the average holding period is
long, and when the variance of these arguments is low.
The model is used to explore the consequences of tax policy for corporate
investment and payout policy. It is found that investment is a decreasing func-
tion of both the corporate tax and the capital gains tax, and is unaffected by the
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dividend tax. Short-run total payout increases in both the corporate tax and
the capital gains tax, whereas long-run total payout decreases in both. The div-
idend tax has no effect on total payout in either the short-run or the long-run.
The model is also used to derive the marginal value of corporate capital. It
is found that the outside value of corporate capital, i.e., its replacement cost, is
higher than its marginal value within a firm. That is to say, corporations are
overcapitalised, shareholders would like to reduce the amount of capital within
a firm but are unable to do so without incurring a cost. When dividends are the
marginal form of payout the cost is a relatively high dividend tax rate; when
share repurchases are the marginal form of payout the cost is a repurchase
premium.
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Chapter 4
Capital Income Taxation and
Corporate Payout Policy:
Empirical Results from Canada
4.1 Introduction
A key assumption of the model developed in Chapter 3 is that shareholders face
personal tax on income from dividends and realized capital gains. These taxes
affect equity value through corporate payout policy, and corporate managers -
assumed to maximize shareholder wealth - select the level of payout, and the
payout mix, in accordance with prevailing tax rates. When taxes adjust, firm
value is affected, and optimal payout policy is likely to change. Capital income
taxation, therefore, has two effects in Chapter 3, one on firm value, the other
on payout policy. This chapter focuses on the the second effect, the relationship
between taxes and payout policy, while a number of empirical studies from the
US have identified the first effect.
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Among US firm-value studies is Ayers et al. (2002) which demonstrates that
the 1993 US dividend tax increase1 caused a reduction in stock prices, and that
stocks with high dividend yields experienced the greatest price declines. In ad-
dition, Lang and Shackelford (2000) and Dai et al. (2006) show that the 1997
US tax cut on long-term capital gains2 caused a general stock-price appreci-
ation. Both Lang and Shackelford (2000) and Dai et al. (2006) conclude that
the appreciation resulted from a capitalization of the expected future tax sav-
ings on realized capital gains brought about by the tax decrease.3 In addition,
Sialm (2009) supports the conclusion that dividend taxation and capital gains
taxation both affect stock prices. This study, based on US data over the pe-
riod 1913-2006, shows that aggregate equity valuation during this time was
negatively related to the average tax liability on income from dividends and
realized capital gains. In light of the evidence provided by these studies, it
is reasonable to conclude that capital income taxation matters for firm value.
The author takes this effect as given and addresses the second effect: do firms
respond to tax changes?4
1The 1993 US Revenue Reconciliation Act increased the maximum tax rate on dividend
income from 31% to 39.6%.
2This tax cut was part of the 1997 US Taxpayer Relief Act, which reduced the tax rate on
long-term capital gains from 28% to 20% among investors in the top income bracket.
3This analysis is complicated by the tax’s potential to have two offsetting effects. First, the
reduced tax liability on capital gains is expected to be capitalized into the stock’s price, thereby
increasing firm value. Second, the reduced capital gains tax rate is expected to reduce the
lock-in effect, thereby lowering shareholder reservation prices and putting downward pressure
on stock prices.
4Despite the empirical evidence in support of a tax effect on stock prices, some in the lit-
erature still argue that such an effect may not exist. Prominent articles cited in support of
94
This is done using a unique dataset complied by the author on corporate
stock repurchases executed by Canadian corporations listed on the Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSE), and new estimates of average Canadian capital income
tax rates over the period 1985-2008. The main findings of this chapter are as
follows: 1) Total payout is positively related to year-over-year changes in the
corporate income tax rate and the realized capital gains tax rate, whereas total
payout is unaffected by changes in the dividend tax rate. These effects, how-
ever, appear with a one year lag. That is, the current first difference of each tax
has no effect on total payout, while the lagged first difference has the stated
effect. The finding that total payout is positively related to changes in both
the corporate tax rate and the capital gains tax rate, and is unaffected by the
dividend tax rate, is consistent with the predictions in Chapter 3. These re-
sults are also consistent with the “New view” model of corporate payout policy,
while they are inconsistent with the “Traditional view” model, which predicts
a dividend tax effect.5 2) The results also suggest that share repurchases are
this claim include Miller and Scholes (1978) and Stiglitz (1983), which together provide a num-
ber of sophisticated financial strategies that can eliminate the personal tax on equity income.
However, both Miller and Scholes (1978) and Stiglitz (1983) require strong assumptions for
their results to hold. Some of these do not hold in practice, and others are unlikely to hold
in practice. Other authors have argued that the payout method is irrelevant for firm value
since investors can equalize the tax liability on dividends and accrued capital gains by selling
and repurchasing equity around the ex-dividend day. If these transactions are carried out with
non-taxed entities, such as pension funds, the tax liability on both sources of income can be
equalized (for an explanation of how this strategy works see Allen and Michaely (2003) and
Kalay (1984)). However, the effectiveness of this strategy relies on factors such as bid-ask
spreads and the transactions costs of selling and buying equity. Elton et al. (1984) argue that
these, and other costs, make this strategy ineffectual.
5The New and Traditional view models were formulated to explain the corporate payout
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positively related to changes in the dividend tax rate and negatively related to
changes in the capital gains tax rate. These results provide evidence that firms
choose to repurchase more shares when the relative tax penalty on dividends
increases, either through an increase in the dividend tax rate or a decrease in
the capital gains tax rate. It is also found that share repurchases are positively
related to changes in the corporate income tax rate. 3) Dividend payments are
positively related to changes in the capital gains tax rate, but are unaffected by
changes to the dividend tax rate at any reasonable significance level. However,
the coefficient estimates on the dividend tax are all negative.
This study also analyses the effect of taxes on the fraction of total payout
distributed as a dividend. It is found that firms increase this ratio when the
capital gains tax increases, and decrease this ratio when the dividend tax in-
creases. This finding is consistent with the prediction in Chapter 3 that firms
substitute between payout method as the relative tax burden changes.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides
a brief overview of the literature. Section 4.3 discusses the data set. Sec-
tion 4.4 presents summary statistics on corporate payout policy over the period
puzzle. In the New view model, firms face an exogenous binding repurchase constraint. All
payout above this constrained amount must be made with dividends. In the Traditional view
model, investors derive an intrinsic value from dividends, implying that dividends can reduce
the user cost of capital and increase firm value. For a discussion of these models see Poterba
and Summers (1984).
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1987-2008. Section 4.5 discusses the empirical specification for the payout-
level equations (i.e., the level of total payout, dividends and share repurchases)
and presents the estimation results. Section 4.6 discusses the empirical spec-
ification for the payout mix equation (i.e., the fraction of total payout used for
dividends) and presents the estimation results, and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Other Literature
The existing literature has generally found that taxes matter for payout pol-
icy. Moser (2007), which analyses US firms over the period 1986-2004, when a
number of key tax regime changes took place, finds that firms are more likely
to distribute funds via share repurchases when the tax rate on dividend income
is high relative to the tax rate on realized capital gains. When Moser separates
firms according to shareholder tax sensitivity (i.e. the degree of shareholder
tax exposure), he finds that firms with a relatively high proportion of tax sensi-
tive shareholders are more likely to substitute dividends for share repurchases
when the dividend tax rate is relatively high.
In their analysis of the 2003 US Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act, which reduced the tax rate on dividend income for all taxable individuals,6
Chetty and Saez (2005) find that the fraction of firms paying dividends, and the
6Taxpayers in the bottom two income tax brackets, facing a marginal tax rate of 10 and 15
percent faced a 5 percent tax rate after the reform. Taxpayers facing marginal rates of 25, 28,
33 and 35 percent faced a 15 percent rate after the reform.
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average dividend payment among payers, both increased following the tax re-
form. The authors also find that total payout increased during this period, and
reject the hypothesis that share repurchases were substituted for dividends.
Further, they find that dividend payments increased by a larger amount when
firms had tax sensitive shareholders, similar to Moser (2007). Using the same
tax reform, Brav et al. (2008) also find evidence that dividends increased fol-
lowing the dividend tax cut. However, the authors argue that these increases
were short-lived, and conclude that the tax cut had no long-term effect.
Contrary to Brav et al. (2008), the results in Poterba (2004) suggest that
the dividend tax penalty7 has no short-run effect on dividend payout, but a
significant long-run effect. The estimates of Poterba (2004) are based on US
firms over the period 1935-2002. He finds that the average long-run elasticity
of dividend payments with respect to the dividend tax penalty is 3.3. Lie and
Lie (1999) also find a positive relationship between share repurchases and the
dividend tax rate using a sample of US firms over the period 1980-1994.
De Jong et al. (2003) use 1997 survey response data from 191 of the 500
largest non-financial Canadian firms listed on the TSE to determine which fac-
tors are most important for payout decisions. Their results suggest that per-
sonal capital income taxation is an important factor for both types of payout.
7Defined as the ratio of one minus the dividend tax rate to one minus the effective tax rate
on accrued capital gains.
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It is found that firms are more likely to repurchase shares when shareholders
have a tax-induced preference for repurchases, and are more likely to pay div-
idends when shareholders have a tax preference for dividends. In addition, De
Jong et al. (2003) also find that managerial stock options reduce the probability
that dividends are paid, and asymmetric information among outsiders reduces
the chance that shares are repurchased.8
In a study similar to De Jong et al. (2003), Brav et al. (2005) survey 384
US financial executives to determine the factors that drive corporate payout
decisions. They find that dividend initiations are heavily influenced by sus-
tainable increases in earnings and the demand for dividends by institutional
investors, while share repurchases are mostly used to offset option dilution and
to take advantage of under-priced equity. Unlike De Jong et al. (2003), Brav
et al. (2005) find that, although a subset of respondents reported that personal
capital income taxation is a factor in the payout decision, the majority of firms
claim that taxes are of second-order importance to the factors mentioned above.
However, as mentioned in Brav et al. (2005) market participants need not un-
derstand the reasons for performing certain behaviours for economic models to
be predictive. It may be that financial executives do not understand the true
impact of capital income taxation. The survey design in De Jong et al. (2003)
8This last result is consistent with the theory of Brennan and Thakor (1990), which pro-
poses that during a repurchase program uninformed shareholders (those who do not know the
firm’s true value) may transfer wealth to informed shareholders by selling under-priced equity
and failing to sell overpriced equity. This reduces the desirability of repurchase programs for
uninformed investors.
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is intended to limit such problems.9
4.3 Data Set Construction
This chapter makes extensive use of data on average marginal tax rates and
corporate share repurchases in Canada. In this section, the steps taken to
estimate each are discussed.
4.3.1 Personal Marginal Tax Rates on Dividend and Real-
ized Capital Gains Income in Canada
The marginal tax rate on income from dividends and realized capital gains
faced by taxable Canadian shareholders depends on their level of taxable in-
come (total income less deductions), tax credits,10 and province of residence.
Canada uses a bracket system of income taxation, with generally rising rates.
During the last 25 years, Canada has imposed a number of surtaxes and claw-
backs that also depend on income. These factors led to non-linear tax schedules
at both the federal and provincial levels. All Canadians face the same federal
9The survey questions in De Jong et al. (2003) do not explicitly indicate the relationships
of interest. Also, multiple questions are used to elicit the same information in an attempt to
reduce the respondent’s bias. Unlike Brav et al. (2005), De Jong et al. (2003) use the survey to
identify firm characteristics, which are then linked to payout policy behaviour.
10In cases where taxes payable are less then allowed non-refundable tax credits.
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tax schedule,11 but provincial tax schedules generally differ by province; in ad-
dition, both federal and provincial tax schedules often differ by year. Using
tax forms provided by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and Revenue Que-
bec, federal and provincial tax schedules for dividend income and capital gains
income are calculated for each province and for each year over the period 1985-
2008.12 All tax schedules are derived by setting tax credits, other then the basic
personal amount for individuals, equal to zero.
Every year the CRA publishes the aggregate amount of taxable income
claimed by individuals across income brackets, broken down by source of in-
come. From these statistics, the proportion of dividend and capital gains in-
come claimed by individuals in each bracket can be calculated. For instance,
in 2008 Canadian taxpayers claimed $38.5 billion in aggregate taxable divi-
dends and $13.6 billion in aggregate taxable capital gains.13 Of these totals,
individuals with taxable incomes between $45,000 - $50,000 claimed taxable
dividends of $860 million and taxable capital gains of $199 million, which were
2.2% and 1.5% of their respective totals, while individuals with taxable incomes
above $250,000 claimed taxable dividends of $16.6 billion and taxable capital
gains of $7.3 billion, which were 43% and 54% of their respective totals. These
fractions are calculated for each income bracket in each year over the period
11Other than residents of Quebec, which can reduce the federal tax using the refundable
Quebec abatement.
12The marginal tax rate on income from dividends and realized capital gains is different from
other forms of income. See Appendix I for an explanation of how these rates are calculated.
13That is, taxpayers received this income in 2008.
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1985-2008.
The marginal tax rate on each source of income within each income bracket,
and in each province, is then calculated using the tax schedules derived above.14
For instance, in 2008 the marginal tax rate on dividend income faced by On-
tario residents with taxable incomes between $45,000 - $50,000 was 7.5%, and
15.6% for realized capital gains. For individuals with taxable incomes over
$250,000, the marginal tax rate on dividend income was 24%, and 23.2% for
realized capital gains. Average marginal tax rates for each province are then
calculated by taking a weighted average of the bracket-specific marginal tax
rates, weighted by the proportion of total income (from dividends and realized
capital gains) claimed by individuals within each bracket. This is done for ev-
ery year, and every province.
The CRA also publishes the aggregate amount of income claimed by res-
idents of each province broken down by income type. To derive national av-
erage marginal tax rates on dividends and realized capital gains, a weighted
average of the provincial averages is taken, where the weights are the pro-
portion of total income (from dividends and realized capital gains) claimed by
14At times an income bracket has multiple marginal tax rates. The average marginal tax
rate within these brackets is calculated by taking a weighted average of the individual rates,
weighted by the proportion of the bracket’s income range subject to each tax.
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residents of each province. For instance, of the $38.5 billion in aggregate tax-
able dividends claimed in 2008, $13.7 billion (35%) were claimed by residents
of Ontario, whereas $6.1 billion (16%) were claimed by Quebec residents, and
of the $13.6 billion in aggregate taxable capital gains, $4.4 billion (32%) were
claimed by residents of Ontario, whereas $2.3 billion (17%) were claimed by
Quebec residents. Figure 4.1 plots the national average marginal tax rate se-
ries for dividends and realized capital gains over the period 1985-2008, derived
using the method outlined above.15
Figure 4.1: Average Canadian Marginal Tax Rates: Dividends and Realized
Capital Gains 1985-2008
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15Realized capital gains were subject to one of three inclusion rates in 2000, depending on
when they were realized. Capital gains realized before February 28th were subject to an inclu-
sion rate of 75%. The inclusion rate for capital gains realized from February 28th to October
17th was 66.67%. Capital gains realized after October 17th were subject to an inclusion rate
of 50%. The average Canadian marginal tax rate series used in this chapter (and chapter 3) is
calculated using a 66.67% inclusion rate for all capital gains realized in 2000.
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4.3.2 The Marginal Tax Rate on Corporate Income
The Canadian average corporate tax rate is also used in the estimations below.
Its construction is discussed next.
In Canada, there are three rates of corporate tax, one for small business,
one for large manufacturing firms, and one for large non-manufacturing firms.
The firms used in the empirical analysis are all sufficiently large that none
would qualify for the first rate. Each Canadian corporation pays the same
federal corporate tax rate, and a unique provincial rate. Ideally, the actual cor-
porate tax rate faced by each firm in the sample could be calculated, however,
the author has limited firm-sector data and no data on province of incorpora-
tion. Therefore the national average corporate tax rate is estimated as follows.
For each province, corporate tax rates are calculated for manufacturing and
non-manufacturing firms.16 The national average rate for each sector is then
calculated by taking a weighted average of the province-specific rates (plus the
federal rate), weighted by the province’s share of national corporate income.
To estimate the average Canadian corporate tax rate, a weighted average of
the national average rates on manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms is
taken, weighted by the proportion of corporate income generated by firms des-
ignated as manufacturing and non-manufacturing. This provides the national
average Canadian corporate tax rate series used in the current analysis.
16Annual issues of “Finances of the Nation” (published by the Canadian Tax Foundation)
provide historical corporate tax rates.
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4.3.3 Share Repurchases and Dividends
As discussed below, estimating the value of corporate share repurchases is com-
plicated by data limitations. The estimation method used in the current chap-
ter is discussed next. This is followed with a discussion of its limitations, and
a comparison to other methods used in the literature.
The TSE reports the number of securities repurchased each month by TSE
listed corporations in its publication “The Daily Record.” Back-dated issues of
this publication are used to create a data set containing all common stock re-
purchases made by TSE listed corporations from 2001 to 2008, and data is used
from McNally et al. (2003) for common stock repurchases spanning 1987 to
2000. These two data sets are combined to produce a unique data set contain-
ing all monthly repurchases of common stock made by TSE listed companies
from 1987 to 2008.
The Daily Record also publishes monthly repurchase data on preferred shares
and income trust units. However, these data were omitted, the former due to
the debt-like qualities of preferred shares, and the latter due to the special tax
treatment of income trusts.
To estimate the amount spent by each repurchasing firm in each month, the
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number of shares repurchased is multiplied by the average monthly stock price
of these shares. This is estimated using daily price data from Datastream.17
In some cases, especially in early years, price data is unavailable. These firm-
years are omitted from the data set. This underestimates aggregate repurchase
figures, and may also bias average numbers, although the sign and magnitude
of this bias is unknown. Dividend numbers are taken from Datastream, and
when unavailable, from Compustat.18 If firms had missing dividend data they
were also omitted from the data set. This underestimates aggregate numbers,
and may also bias averages.
This estimation strategy for share repurchases is subject to error for at least
two reasons. First, the time and day that shares are repurchased within a
month is not observed. Insofar as share prices fluctuate over the period of
a month, the monthly repurchase numbers will overestimate (underestimate)
actual repurchases when firms repurchase a large fraction of shares on days
with relatively low (high) stock prices. Second, if firms have superior market
timing, they may be able to systematically repurchase shares at a price below
that faced by the average investor. Evidence that firms have this ability during
Canadian repurchase programs is provided by McNally et al. (2006), where it
is shown that over the period 1987-2000 repurchasing firms paid an average
17Datastream is published by Thomson Reuters. It contains a number of time series data
sets on stock prices and other firm level, and aggregate, data.
18Compustat is published by Standard & Poor’s. Like Datastream, it contains company-
specific data.
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of 6.6% less for shares than an average investor over the repurchase program
year.19 It is likely that 6.6% is an upper bound on any systematic over-pricing
inherent in the data set however, since firms not only choose the day(s) of the
month on which to repurchase shares but also the month itself. If firms re-
purchase more shares during months with relatively low share prices, to time
the market, then the share repurchase estimates used in this study should
have systematic under-pricing less than 6.6%, since the repurchase measure
accounts for variability between months.20
Although the share repurchase estimates contain error, they may be an im-
provement over the share repurchase series used in the literature. Most US
studies involving share repurchase data use the Compustat series “Purchases
of Common and Preferred Stock” (Compustat data item A115) for company-
specific repurchases. This series is problematic however, since it aggregates
a number of different transactions including purchases of common stock, pur-
chases of preferred stock, conversions of other classes of stock into common
stock, purchases of treasury stock, retirement of common or preferred stock,
and redemptions of redeemable preferred stock.21 Although some authors at-
tempt to overcome this problem using various methods (for instance see Fenn
19TSE regulations stipulate that repurchase programs last for a duration of one year. For
more information on TSE regulations regarding repurchase programs see TSE (2008).
20If firms are able to time the market, as evidenced by the 6.6% price advantage, than this
assumption is likely justified.
21This series reports the dollar amount spent on these transactions.
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and Liang (2001)), a substantial amount of error is likely to remain. The cur-
rent repurchase series, on the other hand, only contains common stock repur-
chases.
Another source for US share repurchase data is the Securities Data Com-
pany (SDC), which is used, for instance, in Jagannathan et al. (2000). This
series is also problematic, however. The share repurchase numbers found in
the SDC represent statements that a firm intends to repurchase the reported
number of shares; firms have no obligation to actually repurchase the stated
amount. Second, since the SDC aggregates share repurchase announcements
from a number of sources, double counting may arise. The repurchase series
used in this chapter contains actual share repurchases, and there is no double
counting.
In addition to these measures, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) propose three
others, specifically the change in shares outstanding reported by the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP)22 and Compustat, and the dollar change
in treasury stocks reported by Compustat. However, all three measures are
contaminated by non-repurchase activity affecting the number of outstanding
shares. This activity includes share distributions through benefit plans, the
22CRSP is maintained by the Chicago Booth School of Business, and contains a number of
time series data sets related to stock prices and the number of shares outstanding.
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exercise of executive stock options and contemporaneous stock sales. In addi-
tion, the first two measures suffer from the same problem as the measure used
here, i.e., one must price the repurchased shares.
With regard to Canadian data, studies may also use the Ontario Securi-
ties Commission’s (OSC) Insider Reporting Database, which reports the price
at which repurchase trades occurred. However, this dataset is incomplete.
According to McNally et al. (2006) around half of the repurchase programs
implemented over the period 1987-2000 do not appear in the OSC database.
In addition, of the repurchase programs that do appear in the OSC database,
many are incomplete. For instance, only 72% of the repurchase programs that
appear in the OSC have reported total share repurchases within 25% of the
actual amount (McNally et al. (2006)). Given this level of incompleteness, the
OSC database is inappropriate for the current analysis.
4.4 Summary Statistics
The data set used in this chapter contains financial information on 1,924 firms
listed on the TSE over the period 1987 to 2008. Firms in the data set appear
an average of 7 years over the sample period, with a median of 6 years. Of the
1,924 firms in the sample, 33%, or 630 firms repurchased shares in at least one
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year, and 41% or 786 firms paid a dividend in at least one year. Firms that re-
purchased shares did so an average of 41% of the time, while dividend-paying
firms made dividend payments 75% of the time. The perceived “stickiness” of
dividends is reflected in this higher percentage. The stickiness of dividends
is usually attributed to the market’s negative reaction to a dividend cut. For
instance, Denis et al. (1994) finds that US firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange over the period 1962-1988 expe-
rienced an average negative abnormal return of approximately 6% over the
two days surrounding a dividend reduction announcement. Similar results are
found in Below and Johnson (1996).
Of the 1,034 firms with positive payout over at least one year in the sample,
37% paid a dividend and repurchased some equity, while 39% paid a dividend
only, and 24% repurchased shares only. Of the dividend paying firms, 49% also
repurchased shares, while 61% of repurchasing firms also paid a dividend.
Table 4.1 reports the number of firms appearing in the sample in each year,
and also reports the number of firms that repurchased shares and paid divi-
dends. From this table we can see that the absolute number of firms paying
dividends has remained relatively constant over time, with a low of 245 firms
in 2001 and a high of 331 firms in 1990. However, the fraction of firms paying
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dividends has declined over time owing to a growing number of TSE listed com-
panies. The number of firms repurchasing shares was relatively constant over
the latter part of the 1980’s and the early part of the 1990’s. After this point
the number of repurchasing firms increased markedly. Indeed, more firms re-
purchased shares over the four years 1996-1999 than over the preceding nine
years combined. The number of repurchasing firms peaked in 2000 with 177,
and then declined to 149 in 2001. Over the six years following this, the num-
ber of repurchasing firms remained relatively constant, and then in 2008 the
number peaked again to 214, the highest level up to that point.
Table 4.1: Number of TSE-Listed Firms in the Sample by Year: 1987-2008
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Firms 393 401 406 442 454 455 461 465 449 489 549
Repurchasers 46 39 33 62 40 32 28 37 54 77 96
Dividends Paid 316 324 318 331 322 295 280 276 275 281 286
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Firms 596 600 578 725 824 894 938 973 965 977 946
Repurchasers 143 163 177 149 133 144 122 130 116 150 214
Dividends Paid 286 272 252 245 248 262 282 306 310 295 285
This table reports the number of firms contained in the dataset in each year between 1987-2008, and how many of these firms paid a
dividend and repurchased shares.
Table 4.2 reports aggregate dividend and share repurchase levels over the
period 1987-2008. Aggregate dividends were relatively flat over the period
1987-1997, fluctuating within a $10 billion range that centred around $25 bil-
lion. In 1998 dividends increased to over $40 billion, a 56% increase over the
previous year. Dividends reverted back to their 1997 levels the following year,
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Table 4.2: Aggregate Dividend and Share Repurchase Levels 1987-2008: TSE
Listed Canadian Corporations (Millions of $2008)
Year Repurchases Dividends Year Repurchases Dividends
1987 285.26 24,953.36 1998 3,970.60 40,712.16
1988 503.16 26,962.84 1999 3,470.95 27,563.76
1989 697.11 30,220.86 2000 8,004.51 27,568.43
1990 590.07 29,144.07 2001 5,979.45 32,726.81
1991 117.74 26,321.35 2002 3,165.30 30,634.14
1992 337.09 24,328.58 2003 3,900.91 34,509.86
1993 320.58 20,523.80 2004 6,796.77 37,729.89
1994 498.48 22,472.16 2005 11,553.22 43,710.10
1995 1,020.83 22,959.75 2006 14,850.87 45,337.03
1996 2,225.18 24,020.76 2007 17,026.48 49,031.58
1997 4,699.34 26,111.45 2008 12,528.24 51,039.48
and began a steady climb over the next ten years, reaching a high of $51 billion
in 2008. Share repurchases were relatively constant over the period 1987-1994,
remaining under $1 billion. In 1995 share repurchases grew considerably, dou-
bling the previous year’s amount. Over the next two years share repurchases
continued to double year-over-year, and finally levelled off over the period 1997-
1999. In 2000 share repurchases spiked to over $8 billion, the highest level up
to that point. In 2001 share repurchases dropped to $6 billion and started an
upward trend which peaked in 2007 at $17 billion. In 2008 share repurchases
fell to $12.5 billion.
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4.5 Empirical Analysis of Payout Levels
As mentioned above, the primary focus of this chapter is on estimating the ef-
fect of tax rate changes at the personal and corporate level on corporate payout
policy. We start by looking at total payout, and then at each component of total
payout. The empirical specification for the total payout regression is discussed
next. It is based on the theory developed in Chapter 3.
4.5.1 Empirical Specification
As in Chapter 3, total payout in period t (TPt) is equal to net income minus
investment, or
TPt = (1− τ
c
t )π(Kt)− It,
where π(·) is the profit function, Kt is capital in place at the start of period t,
τ ct is the corporate tax rate, and It is the level of investment. Alternatively,
investment can be written as the difference between the future capital stock
and the current capital stock, or
TPt = (1− τ
c
t )π(Kt)− [Kt+1 −Kt].
Noting that capital levels are the solution to a firm-value maximization prob-
lem that depends on the corporate tax rate, the accrued capital gains tax rate
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(τat ), and the dividend tax rate (τ
d
t ), we can write total payout as
TPt = (1− τ
c
t )π(K
∗(τ ct−1, τ
a
t−1, τ
d
t−1))− [K
∗(τ ct , τ
a
t , τ
d
t )−K
∗(τ ct−1, τ
a
t−1, τ
d
t−1)],
where K∗ is the optimal level of capital. This expression states that capital is
the solution to a firm-value maximization problem that depends on tax rates.
In Appendix J it is show that K∗ is a decreasing function of the corporate tax
rate and the capital gains tax rate, and is unaffected by the dividend tax, or
∂K∗(τ ct , τ
a
t , τ
d
t )
∂τ ct
< 0,
∂K∗(τ ct , τ
a
t , τ
d
t )
∂τat
< 0,
∂K∗(τ ct , τ
a
t , τ
d
t )
∂τdt
= 0.
Current capital (Kt) is determined in period t − 1 and is therefore pre-
determined in period t. In addition, tax rates are exogenous to the firm’s de-
cision. The choice variables include investment (It), dividend payout (Dt), and
share repurchases (At). The expected value of total payout, which is the sum-
mation of dividends and share repurchases, conditional on net income (NIt)
is
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E[TPt|NIt] = NIt − E[K
∗(τ ct , τ
a
t , τ
d
t )−K
∗(τ ct−1, τ
a
t−1, τ
d
t−1)|NIt],
where NIt = (1 − τ
c
t )π(Kt). When firms are in a steady state the following
must hold τ bt = τ
b
t−1 for b ǫ (c, a, d). Thus E[It|NIt] = 0 from the non-depreciating
capital assumption in Chapter 3. Therefore TPt = NIt, that is, total payout is
completely explained by net income in a steady state; taxes have no indepen-
dent explanatory power. However, taxes partially explain total payout in the
short run whenever they change, due to their effect on optimal capital stocks
and the level of investment, i.e.:
∂[Kt+1 −Kt]
∂[τ ct − τ
c
t−1]
< 0,
∂[Kt+1 −Kt]
∂[τat − τ
a
t−1]
< 0,
∂[Kt+1 −Kt]
∂[τdt − τ
d
t−1]
= 0.
This motivates the following empirical specification:
TP jt = α + γNI
j
t +
∑
bǫ(c,g,d)
βb[τ
b
t − τ
b
t−1] + δZ
j
t + ε
j
t ,
where j denotes a specific firm, α is the constant, Z is a set of control variables
discussed below, τ g is the realized capital gains tax rate (derived above), which
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is used in place of τa.23 γ, δ, and βb b ǫ (c, g, d) are coefficients to be estimated,
and εjt is the error term, assumed to have a conditional mean zero normal dis-
tribution.
Firms may elect to have zero payout in any particular year. Due to these cor-
ner solution outcomes, the process that generates total payout is modelled as
a type 1 Tobit, similarly to Fenn and Liang (2001). That is, firms are assumed
to have a latent desired level of total payout TP jt (described above), with condi-
tional mean zero normally distributed errors. Total payout cannot be negative
in practice however.24 Therefore, whenever the latent total payout variable is
negative, firms optimally choose zero total payout, which is observed. That is:
TP j∗t =
TP
j
t if TP
j
t > 0,
0 if TP jt ≤ 0,
where TP j∗t is observed total payout. The conditional likelihood function that
results from this data generating process is:
23In Chapter 3 it is shown that τa is necessarily smaller than τg due to the postponement of
taxes on accrued capital gains. However, τa is unknown. A standard approach in the literature
for estimating τa is to scale τg by a constant smaller than one (for instance see Poterba (2004)).
This is usually an acceptable approach. However, it may be problematic in Canada over the
period 1985-1993 due to the lifetime capital gains exemption (LCGE) introduced in 1985. In
1985 the LCGE allowed for an individual to exempt up to $500,000 of capital gains income over
his/her lifetime. The exemption was reduced to $100,000 in 1987 except for farm property and
shares held in qualifying small businesses. In 1994 the exemption was eliminated, except in
the case of capital gains originating from farm property and small business. This exemption
served to reduce the tax rate on accrued capital gains. This issue, and the proposed solution to
it, are discussed below.
24Firms are unable to extract dividend payments from investors, although they are able to
issue new shares. However, the issuance of new shares is a financing decision, and is concep-
tually different from the decision to repurchase shares.
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f(TP j∗t |X
j
t ; β) =
{
1− Φ
(
−βXjt
σε
)}I[TP j∗t =0]{
1
σε
φ
(
TP j∗t − βX
j
t
σε
)}I[TP j∗t >0]
,
where X is the complete set of independent variables outlined below, β is the
complete set of coefficients, I[·] is the indicator function, Φ is the standard
normal cumulative distribution function, φ is the standard normal probabil-
ity density function, and σε is the standard error. The results from estimating
the coefficients of this model are presented in Section 4.5.3.
4.5.2 Additional Variables
The theoretical model underlying this empirical specification omits a number
of factors that have been shown to affect firm payout. Including them will in-
crease the efficiency of the tax rate coefficient estimates. The first additional
firm-specific variable is the firm’s debt to asset ratio. Firms that are unable
to obtain cheap debt financing are generally thought to be more likely to use
internal funds for investment (see e.g. Busaba (2012)). Therefore, the level of
debt may provide a proxy for a firm’s ability to acquire debt financing inexpen-
sively. If this is the case, then a positive coefficient estimate on the debt to
asset ratio is expected. The variance of net income is also included as an in-
dependent variable. Although there is little reason to expect that the variance
of net income affects total payout directly, there is theoretical and empirical
evidence to suggest that it affects the form of payout. Markets react negatively
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to dividend cuts, and therefore, corporations with high income variability may
find share repurchases are a more attractive form of payout. The variance of
net income, therefore, belongs in the dividend and share repurchase regres-
sions below; it is included in the total payout regressions for consistency. The
final firm-specific variable included is total assets. This serves as a proxy for
firm size. We expect total payout to increase in total assets; as firms become
larger and more established, their growth opportunities decrease, and a higher
proportion of their earnings are paid out to investors (see Allen and Michaely
(2003) for evidence of this).
Three time series variables that are not firm-specific are also included.
These are: Canadian real GDP; the S&P 500 index divided by the book value
of firms in the sample; and the interest rate on 3-month government of Canada
debt. Canadian real GDP is included to proxy for overall economic conditions
in Canada. The S&P 500 index, divided by the book value of the sample firms,
is included to proxy for the level of accrued capital gains on firm equity. Chap-
ter 3 predicts that the level of share repurchases will decrease as the level of
accrued capital gains increases. As discussed below, this is not found to be the
case. The final variable included is the interest rate on three month Govern-
ment of Canada debt. In the model of Chapter 3, the required after-tax rate of
return is assumed to be constant. In practice, this rate may be time dependent.
A high required rate of return places downward pressure on capital stocks and
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investment, and may therefore affect conditional payout. This rate is proxied
for by the Government of Canada interest rate discussed above.
As mentioned above, the capital gains tax series does not take into ac-
count the lifetime capital gains exemption (LCGE) introduced in 1985.25 The
$500,000 lifetime exemption likely reduced the effective tax rate on accrued
capital gains markedly. Due to this, the tax years 1985-1986 have been ex-
cluded from the capital gains time series. Since the tax variables are year-
over-year changes, the sample of firms must be restricted to the years 1988-
2008 when the first difference of tax rates are included, and to 1989-2008 when
lagged first differences are included. This reduces the sample by 2.8% in the
former case, and by 5.7% in the latter case.
From 1987 onward a $100,000 lifetime exemption remained, which also
acted to reduce the effective tax rate on accrued capital gains until it was elim-
inated in 1994. However, the effect of this exemption on the accrued capital
gains tax rate is likely to be small for two reasons. First, the absolute size of
the exemption is small considering that in 2008, for example, 66% of realized
capital gains were claimed by individuals with average realizations of $83,000
25See footnote 23 infra.
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in 1987 dollars and $104,000 in 1993 dollars.26 Second, the large surge in real-
izations in 1985 and 1986 likely eliminated a large fraction of the $100,000 ca-
pacity that remained after 1986. In addition, excluding all LCGE years would
reduce the sample size considerably. Limiting the sample to the years 1995-
2008 would reduce the sample size by 24.9%; limiting the sample to the years
1996-2008, in the case of a lagged first difference, would reduce the sample size
by 28%.27
4.5.3 Results
Column two of Table 4.3 presents coefficient estimates when the first difference
of taxes - the contemporary tax rate minus the one year lag - are included as
independent variables (Model 1). Unsurprisingly, the coefficient estimate on
net income is positive and significant. This result is predicted by the model of
Chapter 3 and is intuitive. Total assets also appear to have a positive effect
on total payout levels. This is likely the result of two factors. First, firms with
larger assets likely have larger permanent incomes. If permanent income is an
important determinant of total payout (for example see Brav et al. (2005)), then
asset levels may provide information that current income does not. Second, as
mentioned above, well established firms with limited growth opportunities are
26These individuals were selected for having after-tax incomes greater than $150,000.
27It may be possible to derive a reasonable estimate of the effective capital gains tax rate
over the period 1985-2008 that accounts for the LCGE, and other factors that affect this rate.
However, this task is complicated by a number of factors, such as the behavioural response of
shareholders to the LCGE, and is beyond the scope of the current analysis.
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likely to have a larger stock of assets, and less need for investment. The re-
sults also suggest that total payout is positively related to the ratio of debt to
assets, although this effect is only significant at the 11% level. Conversely, the
variance of net income appears to have a negative effect on total payout, al-
though, as with the ratio of debt to assets, this estimate is significant at the
11% level only. GDP has a negative effect on total payout. This is likely due to
the positive relationship between GDP and the growth opportunities of firms.
As predicted by the model in Chapter 3, the interest rate variable is positively
related to total payout. A higher interest rate implies a higher user cost of cap-
ital, which serves to reduce the optimal capital stock and investment.
Turning our attention to tax changes, we can see that all three coefficient
estimates are not statistically different from zero, implying that there is in-
sufficient evidence to support the claim that firms adjust total payout when
differences between current and lagged taxes arise. This is contrary to the pre-
dictions of Chapter 3. In order to explore tax effects further, the lagged first
difference of taxes is also included. The results of this regression are reported
in the third column of Table 4.3 (Model 2). Here, taxes seem to matter. The
coefficient estimates are positive and significant for both the corporate tax and
the capital gains tax. These estimates suggest that firms adjust total payout
in response to tax changes, but with a lag. Two possible reasons for this are
1) the speed with which investment can be adjusted, and 2) the timing of tax
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Total Payout Levels, Canadian Firms 1988-2008:
Tobit Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1
Variable Year > 1987 Year > 1988 Year > 1988
Net Income 0.154** (0.043) 0.149** (0.043) 0.149** (0.043)
Income Variance -4.30E-11 (2.7E-11) -4.33E-11* (2.6E-11) -4.20E-11* (2.6E-11)
Assets 0.0049** (7.8E-04) 0.0050** (7.9E-04) 0.0050** (7.9E-04)
Debt/Assets 4,766 (2,946) 4,756 (3,022) 4,834 (3,015)
Index/Book 8,750,065** (3.5E+06) 4,794,241 (3.1E+06) 8,873,071** (3.6E+06)
GDP -0.321** (0.111) -0.226** (0.091) -0.326** (0.118)
Interest-Govn’t Can. 11,074** (2,073) 11,976** (3,485) 11,197** (2,114)
Constant 83,081 (66,978) 16,465 (68,025) 84,619 (72,389)
Div: Cur-Lag1 29,238 (179,986) 146,295 (259,874) 30,573 (212,384)
Div: Lag1-Lag2 -87,928 (182,868)
CapGain: Cur-Lag1 139,648 (114,792) 24,107 (135,183) 140,991 (133,221)
CapGain: Lag1-Lag2 305,456** (114,840)
Corp: Cur-Lag1 -278,546 (255,631) -419,263 (340,757) -286,056 (336,646)
Corp: Lag1-Lag2 927,836* (520,086)
Pseudo R2 0.0287 0.0283 0.0282
Pseudo Log Likelihood -99716 -95183 -95190
Model 1 has 6690 left-censored observations, 6897 uncensored observations, model 2 has 6617 left-censored observations, 6569
uncensored observations. ∗∗ - significant at the 5% level, ∗ - significant at the 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regression variables are in thousands of 2008 Canadian dollars other than interest and tax rates (which are represented as
fractions), and GDP which is in millions of 2008 Canadian dollars. “Cur-Lag1” denotes the current first difference and
“Lag1-Lag2” denotes the lagged first difference.
change announcements. In the model of Chapter 3, investment is adjusted
immediately, whereas in practice investment levels may take time to adjust.
Second, tax changes in Canada are usually announced at the end of the first
quarter of each year. Payout decisions made prior to this date may be based
on the previous year’s tax rates. The positive coefficient estimates on the cor-
porate tax and the capital gains tax are predicted by the model of Chapter 3,
as discussed above. The coefficient estimates on the dividend tax are not sig-
nificantly different from zero, also consistent with the predictions of Chapter 3.
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The coefficient estimates on the non-tax variables from model 2 are similar
to those of model 1. The fourth column of Table 4.3 reports coefficient estimates
for model 1 using the sub-sample that was used to estimate the coefficients for
model 2. This regression is run in order to test whether the results of model
2 are an artifact of the sub-sample used for this regression. This is likely not
the case, as the coefficient estimates from model 1 using both sub-samples are
nearly identical.
4.5.4 Levels of Share Repurchases and Dividends
The next set of regressions analyse the effect of taxes on the level of dividends
and share repurchases, using the empirical specification above. A Tobit model
is also used for these regressions, reflecting a number of zero observations on
both dividends and share repurchases.
Table 4.4 reports coefficient estimates when the dependent variable is share
repurchases. Column two reports estimates when the current first difference
is included, and column three includes a lagged first difference. In both spec-
ifications the capital gains tax is found to have a negative effect on the level
of share repurchases. Conversely, the dividend tax is found to have a posi-
tive effect on repurchases in both models. It would appear that firms increase
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Table 4.4: Determinants of Share Repurchase Levels, Canadian Firms 1988-
2008: Tobit Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1
Variable Year > 1987 Year > 1988 Year > 1988
Net Income 0.014* (0.008) 0.015* (0.009) 0.015* (0.009)
Income Variance -6.32E-14 (1.1E-11) -5.28E-13 (1.1E-11) -2.96E-13 (1.1E-11)
Assets 0.0012** (1.8E-04) 0.0012** (1.8E-04) 0.0012** (1.8E-04)
Debt/Assets -11,600 (9,909) -10,991 (10,005) -9,550 (9,898)
Index/Book 1.75E+07** (3.3E+06) 1.36E+07** (3.3E+06) 1.72E+07** (3.4E+06)
GDP -0.191** (0.076) 0.021 (0.093) -0.180** (0.081)
Interest-Govn’t Can. 2,017 (2,518) 11,733** (3,516) 2,005 (2,540)
Constant -215,585** (72,503) -442,751** (102,406) -227,488** (75,496)
Div: Cur-Lag1 449,580** (224,300) 1,000,420** (290,958) 499,424** (249,013)
Div: Lag1-Lag2 393,940* (221,468)
CapGain: Cur-Lag1 -511,118** (134,294) -444,059** (150,165) -543,752** (146,511)
CapGain: Lag1-Lag2 -514,432** (136,702)
Corp: Cur-Lag1 -442,721 (328,651) 212,763 (401,955) -348,592 (385,739)
Corp: Lag1-Lag2 1,252,341** (403,977)
Pseudo R2 0.0081 0.0084 0.0080
Pseudo Log Likelihood -32396 -31795 -31806
Model 1 has 11448 left-censored observations, 2139 uncensored observations, model 2 has 11086 left-censored observations, 2100
uncensored observations. ∗∗ - significant at the 5% level, ∗ - significant at the 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regression variables are in thousands of 2008 Canadian dollars other than interest and tax rates (which are represented as
fractions), and GDP which is in millions of 2008 Canadian dollars. “Cur-Lag1” denotes the current first difference and
“Lag1-Lag2” denotes the lagged first difference.
the level of share repurchases when the relative tax penalty for dividends in-
creases, either through an increase in the dividend tax rate or a reduction in
the capital gains tax rate. The corporate tax rate is found to have a positive
effect on share repurchases in the second model. The positive estimate may be
a result of higher total payout following a corporate tax increase (which was
found in the total payout regressions) where part of this higher total payout
flows into share repurchases.
With respect to the non-tax variables, it appears that share repurchases are
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increasing in both net income and total assets. In model 1, share repurchases
are decreasing in GDP, and in model 2 repurchases are increasing in the inter-
est rate. Share repurchases are positively related to the index-to-book-value
variable. This is likely due to a price effect; higher share prices increase the
cost of repurchasing shares for any number repurchased. Column three reports
the results using model 1 on the sub-sample from model 2. As with total pay-
out, the coefficient estimates are almost identical using both sub-samples.
Table 4.5: Determinants of Dividend Levels, Canadian Firms 1988-2008: Tobit
Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1
Variable Year > 1987 Year > 1988 Year > 1988
Net Income 0.154** (0.044) 0.148** (0.043) 0.149** (0.043)
Income Variance -5.30E-11 (4.1E-11) -5.46E-11 (4.0E-11) -5.35E-11 (4.0E-11)
Assets 0.0044** (8.3E-04) 0.0045** (8.4E-04) 0.0045** (8.4E-04)
Debt/Assets 5,888* (3,475) 5,894* (3,571) 5,963* (3,565)
Index/Book 5,180,227 (3.5E+06) 1,974,433 (3.2E+06) 5,522,642 (3.7E+06)
GDP -0.342** (0.128) -0.286** (0.109) -0.356** (0.137)
Interest-Govn’t Can. 11,415** (2,345) 10,366** (3,568) 11,519** (2,400)
Constant 104,752 (71,426) 78,408 (71,375) 112,627 (77,821)
Div: Cur-Lag1 -128,360 (165,673) -122,290 (223,568) -157,093 (198,784)
Div: Lag1-Lag2 -130,269 (178,329)
CapGain: Cur-Lag1 343,098** (148,557) 222,806 (162,308) 365,885** (169,523)
CapGain: Lag1-Lag2 427,371** (131,336)
Corp: Cur-Lag1 16,944 (231,602) -224,149 (322,130) -38,402 (315,177)
Corp: Lag1-Lag2 639,794 (512,463)
Pseudo R2 0.0302 0.0297 0.0296
Pseudo Log Likelihood -87632 -83152 -83159
Model 1 has 7556 left-censored observations, 6031 uncensored observations, model 2 has 7479 left-censored observations, 5707
uncensored observations. ∗∗ - significant at the 5% level, ∗ - significant at the 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regression variables are in thousands of 2008 Canadian dollars other than interest and tax rates (which are represented as
fractions), and GDP which is in millions of 2008 Canadian dollars. “Cur-Lag1” denotes the current first difference and
“Lag1-Lag2” denotes the lagged first difference.
Table 4.5 reports coefficient estimates when dividends are the dependent
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variable using the same regression models outlined above. In all three regres-
sions the capital gains tax has a positive effect on dividend payout; when the
capital gains tax increases, dividends become less tax disadvantaged relative
to share repurchases, and firms seem to increase dividend payout as a result.
However, the coefficient estimates on the dividend tax are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero, although they do have an intuitive sign.
As with the total payout and share repurchase regressions, the level of net
income is positively related to the level of dividend payout. In addition, total
assets, the debt to asset ratio, and the interest rate on government debt are
also positively related to dividend payout. Whereas the variance of net income
and the level of GDP are negatively related to dividend payout.
In summary, the capital gains tax has a significant effect on total payout,
dividends, and share repurchases. The effect is positive for total payout and
dividends, and negative for share repurchases. The dividend tax has a positive
effect on share repurchases and no effect on dividends or total payout. The
corporate tax has a positive effect on total payout and share repurchases.
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4.6 Empirical Analysis of the Payout Mix
We have examined the effect of tax changes on corporate payout levels. The
next empirical exercise is to analyse the effect of tax rate changes on the share
of corporate payout paid in the form of dividends. This provides a better un-
derstanding of how firms substitute between dividends and share repurchases
in response to tax changes. So far as can be determined, this is the first study
to examine the effect of all three capital income taxes on the share of payout
paid in the form of dividends. However, a number of studies have examined
the effect of other firm-specific variables on this fraction.
Loudermilk (forthcoming), using US data over the period 1992-2002, es-
timates the effect of firm level variables including the volatility of earnings,
market-to-book ratio, operating income to total assets and non-operating in-
come to total assets, on the fraction of total payout used to repurchase shares,
using a two-limit pooled Tobit estimator. She finds that operating income and
the lagged dependent variable have a positive effect on the ratio of share re-
purchases to total payout, and finds no significant effect for the other three
variables.
Fenn and Liang (2001) analyse the effect of various company-specific vari-
ables on the ratio of repurchases to total payout in the United States over the
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period 1993-1997 using a two-limit Tobit model. They find this ratio is increas-
ing in the market to book ratio and the volatility of net operating income, but is
unaffected by the level of operating income, assets, and debt. The authors ar-
gue that the insignificant coefficient estimates on operating income, assets, and
debt, confirm their hypothesis that dividends and share repurchases are sub-
stitutes, and hypothesise that the positive coefficient estimate on the market
to book ratio reflects a positive relationship between a firm’s growth prospects
and the uncertainty of future cash flows. As cash flows become more uncertain,
repurchases are preferred to dividends, given the former payout method’s flex-
ibility.
4.6.1 Empirical Specification
The ratio of dividends to total payout is a fraction that lies between zero and
one, with probability mass at each end point. Due to the double-censored na-
ture of the payout ratio variable, a two-limit Tobit model is used. More formally,
if δ = βX+ε is the latent variable representing the desired fraction of total pay-
out used to pay dividends, where X is a set of independent variables discussed
below, and ε is the error term, then the observed fraction δ∗ is characterized by
the following:
128
δ∗ =

0 if δ ≤ 0,
δ if 0 < δ < 1,
1 if δ ≥ 1.
If the assumption is made that ε is a normally distributed, conditional mean
zero random variable, then the conditional likelihood function takes the follow-
ing form:
f(δt∗j |X
t
j ; β) = Φ
(
−βX tj
σε
)I[δt∗j =0]
Φ
(
−βX tj
σε
)I[δt∗j =1]{ 1
σε
φ
(
δi,t − βX
t
j
σε
)}I[0<δt∗j <1]
.
This model is estimated using the set of firm-year observations with pos-
itive payout. This is done to avoid undefined payout ratios. The set of firm
specific independent variables used in the level equations are also used here,
except now they are scale by the firm’s level of total assets. This is done to
control for firm size (for each firm specific independent variable) since the de-
pendent variable has no firm-size specific scale. In addition, the log of total
assets is substituted for the level of total assets. The results of this regression
are reported in Table 4.6.
4.6.2 Results
The second column of Table 4.6 includes the current first difference of all three
taxes, the third column includes the lagged first difference, and the last column
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Table 4.6: Dividends as a Fraction of Total Payout, Canadian Firms 1988-2008:
Two Sided Tobit Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1
Variable Year > 1987 Year > 1988 Year > 1988
Net Income/Assets 0.00016 (0.00018) 0.00016 (0.00018) 0.00016 (0.00018)
Inc. Var./Assets -2.04E-10** (3.8E-11) -2.06E-10** (3.8E-11) -2.07E-10** (3.8E-11)
Log of Assets 0.111** (0.0081) 0.115** (0.0085) 0.116** (0.0085)
Debt/Assets 0.663** (0.116) 0.686** (0.118) 0.657** (0.119)
GDP -2.50E-06** (2.2E-07) -3.89E-06** (3.1E-07) -2.68E-06** (2.3E-07)
Interest 0.0062 (0.015) -0.0889** (0.020) 0.0063 (0.016)
Constant 2.594** (0.303) 4.350** (0.403) 2.713** (0.314)
Div: Cur-Lag1 -6.121** (1.372) -12.041** (1.696) -7.708** (1.543)
Div: Lag1-Lag2 -5.736** (1.411)
CapGain: Cur-Lag1 7.998** (0.822) 7.080** (0.918) 8.773** (0.888)
CapGain: Lag1-Lag2 6.224** (1.021)
Corp: Cur-Lag1 0.875 (1.867) -4.609* (2.377) -1.659 (2.141)
Corp: Lag1-Lag2 -9.118** (2.421)
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.0905 0.0855
Pseudo Log Likelihood -5097 -4942 -4969
Model 1 has 866 left-censored observations, 4758 right-censored observations, and 1273 uncensored observations, model 2 has 862
left-censored observations, 4469 right-censored observations, and 1238 uncensored observations. ∗∗ - significant at the 5% Level,
∗ - significant at the 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Interest and tax rates are represented as fractions, GDP is
in millions of $2008 Cdn. “Cur-Lag1” denotes the current first difference and “Lag1-Lag2” denotes the lagged first difference.
presents the results of model 1 estimated over the sub-sample used for model
2. The coefficient estimates for the firm-specific non-tax variables are similar
across the three regressions. They suggest that current income has no statis-
tically significant effect on the payout ratio. This is consistent with Fenn and
Liang (2001), but runs counter to Loudermilk (forthcoming), which, as men-
tioned earlier, finds a positive effect.
It is found that the variance of net income has a negative effect on the pay-
out ratio. This is also consistent with Fenn and Liang (2001), and inconsistent
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with Loudermilk (forthcoming), which finds no such relationship. This result
is further evidence in support of the hypothesis that share repurchases are a
more flexible form of payout; firms with higher income variability may find it
harder to maintain a steady stream of dividends. It is found that larger firms,
i.e., those with larger assets, are more likely to use dividends to a larger extent.
It is also found that more highly leveraged firms, i.e., those with higher debt
to asset ratios, are more likely to use dividends than share repurchases. Fenn
and Liang (2001) finds no such relationship. GDP is found to have a negative
effect on the payout ratio in model 1, as does the interest rate in model 2.
Regarding tax rates, we can see that the first difference of personal capital
income taxation matters for the payout ratio from model 1. When the dividend
tax increases, firms substitute share repurchases for dividends in an appar-
ent attempt to reduce the tax liability of shareholders. When the tax rate on
capital gains increases, the opposite occurs, firms substitute away from share
repurchases and toward dividends.
When lagged first differences of capital income taxes are also included, the
results are similar. From model 2, we see that both the current and lagged first
difference of dividend taxation have a negative effect on the ratio of dividends
to total payout, while the current and lagged first difference of the capital gains
tax rate have a positive effect.
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The corporate tax rate appears to have a negative effect on the payout ra-
tio in model 2. This effect is significant at the 10% level for the contemporary
first difference, and significant at the 5% level for the lagged first difference.
This last result may be due to the reduction in accrued capital gains follow-
ing a corporate tax rate increase.28 Lower levels of accrued capital gains will
reduce the lock-in effect and make share repurchases more attractive. The co-
efficient estimates using model 1, estimated over both sub-samples, are almost
identical.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides new evidence that firms adjust corporate payout policy
in response to tax changes at the corporate and personal level. The empirical
analysis employs a unique dataset on share repurchases and Canadian average
marginal tax rates on income from dividends and realized capital gains. The
sample consists of 1,924 firms listed on the TSE over the period 1987-2008,
which provides 13,587 firm-year observations. It is found that firms increase
total payout in response to increases in both the capital gains tax rate and the
corporate income tax rate, but that total payout does not respond to changes
in the dividend tax rate. These results are consistent with the predictions of
28An increase in the corporate tax rate will reduce firm value by reducing net income levels
for any amount of gross income.
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Chapter 3.
In addition to the level of total payout, this chapter also analyses the com-
ponents of total payout, i.e., the level of dividends and share repurchases, in
isolation. The results suggest that share repurchases are negatively related to
changes in the capital gains tax rate and positively related to changes in the
dividend tax rate. As the tax penalty on dividends increases, either through an
increase in the dividend tax rate or a reduction in the capital gains tax rate,
firms increase share repurchases. Dividend levels, on the other hand, are pos-
itively related to changes in the capital gains tax rate, but are unaffected by
changes in the dividend tax rate. This last result is surprising. If the dividend
tax penalty increases from a decrease in the capital gains tax rate, firms in-
crease dividend payments, but do not alter dividend payments when the tax
penalty adjusts following a dividend tax rate change. The corporate tax rate is
found to have a positive effect on share repurchases and no effect on dividend
levels.
When examining the ratio of dividends to total payout, we find that this ra-
tio is positively related to changes in the capital gains tax rate and negatively
related to changes in the dividend tax rate, suggesting that firms substitute
away from dividends when the relative tax penalty on dividends decreases, as
we would expect.
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There is an ongoing debate as to whether firms adjust payout policy in re-
sponse to tax changes.29 This chapter adds to this debate by demonstrating
that capital income taxation likely has an effect on corporate payout policy in
Canada.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis makes several contributions to the economics literature related to
accrued capital gains. The first chapter presents estimates of the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) out of accrued capital gains on owner-occupied
housing in Canada. It uses a set of hedonic price functions to estimate the
value of each respondent’s house over a number of years. First differences of
these estimates are used to derive estimates of accrued capital gains. A no-
table benefit of using the hedonic method is it permits a substantial degree of
house-price variability across individual observations. Also, unlike a number
of studies that use respondent-generated house price estimates, the estimated
capital gains used in this chapter are based on actual real-estate transactions.
If respondents tend to misprice housing (see Bhatia 2012 for a literature sur-
vey on this point), then MPC estimates based on capital gains derived from
hedonic price functions may be better for inference based on observable house
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price changes.
It is maintained throughout this chapter that permanent, rather than cur-
rent, housing capital gains drive consumption. To estimate these gains an
adaptive expectations approach is used that incorporates four years of one-
off gains. The results suggest that Canadian households spend an average of
9.4 cents more on total consumption for every 1 dollar increase in permanent
housing capital gains. As predicted by the permanent income hypothesis (see
Friedman (1957)), when current gains are substituted for permanent gains the
MPC estimate falls to 1.6 cents.
The second chapter develops a model of corporate payout policy that can
explain some aspects of the corporate payout puzzle, that is, the payment of
dividends in practice despite their tax disadvantage relative to share repur-
chases. It is argued that personal taxes on realized capital gains produce a fi-
nancial disincentive among shareholders toward selling corporate equity with
an accrued capital gain and non-zero desired holding period. This is known as
the lock-in effect. Repurchasing firms, therefore, must pay a premium above
the intrinsic value of equity to offset this effect. This premium adds a cost to
share repurchases. Firms pay tax disadvantaged dividends whenever this cost
is sufficiently high.
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The model is used to explore the effects of capital income taxation on op-
timal corporate capital stocks and corporate payout policy. It predicts that
optimal capital stocks are a decreasing function of both the corporate tax rate
and the capital gains tax rate, but are unaffected by the dividend tax rate. As
the first two taxes increase, the user cost of capital also increases, which causes
firms to divest capital. This causes higher total payout initially, but lower total
payout when the new steady state is reached - when lower capital stocks are
realized.
The final chapter of this thesis presents estimates of some empirical re-
lationships between capital income taxation and corporate payout policy in
Canada. It makes use of a new dataset on corporate share repurchases car-
ried out by Toronto Stock Exchange listed Canadian corporations over the pe-
riod 1987-2008, and new estimates of Canadian national average marginal tax
rates on capital income. The share repurchase series used for this analysis is
likely to be an improvement over other series used in the literature, owing to
the disaggregation of common stock repurchases from other corporate financial
transactions.
The results of this chapter suggest that total payout levels are positively
related to changes in both the corporate tax rate, and the realized capital gains
tax rate, but are unaffected by changes to the dividend tax rate. These results
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are consistent with the predictions of chapter 3. The results also suggest that
share repurchases are positively related to changes in the dividend tax rate
and negatively related to changes in the capital gains tax rate. Conversely,
dividends are found to be positively related to changes in the capital gains tax
rate..
5.1 Bibliography
BHATIA, K. B. (2012): “Estimating Market Based Housing Capital Gains with
Micro Data: Some Results from the Canadian Survey of Household Spend-
ing,” Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, Working Pa-
per.
FRIEDMAN, M. (1957): A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton.
142
Appendix A
Hedonic Coefficient Estimates
2000-2005
Table A.1: Hedonic Regression Coefficients: 2005
Province Type of House
P.E.I. -57251.32 (23593)∗∗∗ Semi-Detached -36461.03 (18200)∗∗∗
Nova Scotia 28012.35 (18170)∗ Row or Terrace -39141.83 (16045)∗∗∗
New Brunswick 5483.15 (17541) Duplex 61272.48 (20510)∗∗∗
Quebec 54074.40 (17013)∗∗∗ Apartment (Condo) -58952.54 (15065)∗∗∗
Ontario 122734.20 (18671)∗∗∗
Manitoba 27220.92 (18132)∗ Year Built
Saskatchewan 19313.32 (18971) Between 46-60 -17467.50 (15617)
Alberta 98638.50 (18073)∗∗∗ Between 61-70 -5681.16 (14973)
British Columbia 179963.80 (17433)∗∗∗ Between 71-80 -21158.30 (13077)∗
Between 81-90 6142.13 (13578)
Town Type/Size After 91 38978.17 (11892)∗∗∗
Urban Under 100K -73852.37 (8507)∗∗∗
Rural -69984.87 (10783)∗∗∗ Heating Equipment
Forced Air Furnace -54812.66 (12443)∗∗∗
Number of Rooms Heating Stoves -61158.46 (21828)∗∗∗
Total 15231.60 (2653)∗∗∗ Electric Heating -46378.10 (13222)∗∗∗
Number of Bedrooms -6868.42 (5679)
Number of Bathrooms 30708.75 (6862)∗∗∗ Constant 51934.43 (24605)∗∗∗
Sample Size 599 Adjusted R-Squared 0.55
The constant contains the same variables as in the regressions of Table 2.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
***-significant at the 5% level, **-significant at the 10% level, *-significant at the 20% level.
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Table A.2: Hedonic Regression Coefficients: 2004
Province Type of House
P.E.I. -33993.00 (22175)∗ Semi-Detached -12077.92 (14765)
Nova Scotia -3541.60 (15681) Row or Terrace -28625.44 (17462)∗
New Brunswick 20310.76 (16257) Duplex 32206.16 (20913)∗
Quebec 43379.86 (15266)∗∗∗ Apartment (Condo) 17712.06 (16098)
Ontario 92805.17 (15291)∗∗∗
Manitoba -8184.06 (16652) Year Built
Saskatchewan -15761.00 (16155) Between 46-60 -8470.53 (14130)
Alberta 56107.57 (15696)∗∗∗ Between 61-70 -15780.80 (15039)
British Columbia 110789.70 (15194)∗∗∗ Between 71-80 -8915.82 (13024)
Between 81-90 25346.84 (13104)∗∗
Town Type/Size After 91 37963.32 (12381)∗∗∗
Urban Under 100K -60903.36 (7883)∗∗∗
Rural -62478.73 (10247)∗∗∗ Heating Equipment
Forced Air Furnace -21963.47 (12834)∗∗
Number of Rooms Heating Stoves -22169.92 (22433)
Total 16003.63 (2473)∗∗∗ Electric Heating -48488.64 (13214)∗∗∗
Number of Bedrooms -5478.01 (4995)
Number of Bathrooms 34167.38 (6436)∗∗∗ Constant 19141.66 (23141)
Sample Size 634 Adjusted R-Squared 0.55
The constant contains the same variables as in the regressions of Table 2.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
***-significant at the 5% level, **-significant at the 10% level, *-significant at the 20% level.
Table A.3: Hedonic Regression Coefficients: 2003
Province Type of House
P.E.I. -47937.92 (22197)∗∗∗ Semi-Detached 41782.17 (16084)∗∗∗
Nova Scotia 2364.54 (18949) Row or Terrace -13157.92 (12338)
New Brunswick -4815.29 (19221) Duplex 8279.10 (16923)
Quebec 13021.78 (16277) Apartment (Condo) 1617.26 (13913)
Ontario 114512.90 (18079)∗∗∗
Manitoba 3778.05 (18355) Year Built
Saskatchewan -16383.39 (19811) Between 46-60 -15590.75 (13609)
Alberta 50117.36 (18097)∗∗∗ Between 61-70 -1220.21 (13706)
British Columbia 93296.59 (17800)∗∗∗ Between 71-80 -29883.68 (12354)∗∗∗
Between 81-90 -13643.02 (12645)
Town Type/Size After 91 6156.27 (12433)
Urban Under 100K -60924.08 (8085)∗∗∗
Rural -48949.34 (8921)∗∗∗ Heating Equipment
Forced Air Furnace -25800.64 (12292)∗∗∗
Number of Rooms Heating Stoves -38871.64 (19329)∗∗∗
Total 8676.75 (2288)∗∗∗ Electric Heating -29709.99 (12996)∗∗∗
Number of Bedrooms 7417.07 (4749)∗
Number of Bathrooms 35122.15 (5710)∗∗∗ Constant 31069.04 (23867)∗
Sample Size 611 Adjusted R-Squared 0.52
The constant contains the same variables as in the regressions of Table 2.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
***-significant at the 5% level, **-significant at the 10% level, *-significant at the 20% level.
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Table A.4: Hedonic Regression Coefficients: 2002
Province Type of House
P.E.I. -36046.05 (19848)∗∗∗ Semi-Detached -432.72 (17059)
Nova Scotia 6599.46 (16313) Row or Terrace -21461.79 (12701)∗∗
New Brunswick -1316.82 (17782) Duplex 21510.99 (18364)
Quebec 6429.78 (15449) Apartment (Condo) -12417.08 (14762)
Ontario 80471.47 (15489)∗∗∗
Manitoba 12426.97 (16183) Year Built
Saskatchewan -17748.98 (16351) Between 46-60 2079.23 (12457)
Alberta 42854.75 (15679)∗∗∗ Between 61-70 1432.65 (12969)
British Columbia 73641.75 (15328)∗∗∗ Between 71-80 -9474.55 (11094)
Between 81-90 8504.05 (11850)
Town Type/Size After 91 38055.43 (11153)∗∗∗
Urban Under 100K -45289.07 (8146)∗∗∗
Rural -42820.09 (8343)∗∗∗ Heating Equipment
Forced Air Furnace -15783.98 (12748)
Number of Rooms Heating Stoves -37089.71 (19790)∗∗
Total 8324.57 (2357)∗∗∗ Electric Heating -28489.01 (13187)∗∗∗
Number of Bedrooms 448.57 (5015)
Number of Bathrooms 25423.15 (5684)∗∗∗ Constant 36292.83 (21779)∗∗
Sample Size 614 Adjusted R-Squared 0.40
The constant contains the same variables as in the regressions of Table 2.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
***-significant at the 5% level, **-significant at the 10% level, *-significant at the 20% level.
Table A.5: Hedonic Regression Coefficients: 2001
Province Type of House
P.E.I. -28967.65 (23264) Semi-Detached 1909.20 (14224)
Nova Scotia 12164.42 (15714) Row or Terrace -32033.79 (13417)∗∗∗
New Brunswick 3553.70 (16429) Duplex -12304.60 (18983)
Quebec 14106.39 (15560) Apartment (Condo) 25369.08 (13712)∗∗
Ontario 81934.58 (15860)∗∗∗
Manitoba 2922.27 (16395) Year Built
Saskatchewan 6895.61 (16356) Between 46-60 -38888.09 (14621)∗∗∗
Alberta 48134.38 (15874)∗∗∗ Between 61-70 -37932.11 (10682)∗∗∗
British Columbia 97651.15 (15522)∗∗∗ Between 71-80 -40034.09 (10563)∗∗∗
Between 81-90 -45283.70 (8044)∗∗∗
Town Type/Size After 91 -32119.26 (8605)∗∗∗
Urban Under 100K -49518.04 (7864)∗∗∗
Rural -60435.79 (8323)∗∗∗ Heating Equipment
Forced Air Furnace -10894.91 (11838)
Number of Rooms Heating Stoves -2325.12 (16308)
Total 11997.89 (2243)∗∗∗ Electric Heating -12420.98 (13042)
Number of Bedrooms -4415.35 (4840)
Number of Bathrooms 35872.03 (5365)∗∗∗ Constant 23819.88 (21079)
Sample Size 584 Adjusted R-Squared 0.51
The constant contains the same variables as in the regressions of Table 2.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
***-significant at the 5% level, **-significant at the 10% level, *-significant at the 20% level.
145
Table A.6: Hedonic Regression Coefficients: 2000
Province Type of House
P.E.I. -25965.31 (17051)∗ Semi-Detached 7350.57 (19572)
Nova Scotia -7015.47 (12859) Row or Terrace -21671.01 (10061)∗∗∗
New Brunswick 2143.65 (13127) Duplex 4319.60 (15632)
Quebec 7235.06 (12637) Apartment (Condo) -21160.56 (12314)∗∗
Ontario 68692.67 (12536)∗∗∗
Manitoba 4829.25 (12859) Year Built
Saskatchewan 1094.96 (13319) Between 46-60 -19822.76 (11763)∗∗
Alberta 31888.30 (12211)∗∗∗ Between 61-70 -23334.02 (9313)∗∗∗
British Columbia 90891.27 (12315)∗∗∗ Between 71-80 -36335.39 (9242)∗∗∗
Between 81-90 -30886.76 (7308)∗∗∗
Town Type/Size After 91 -10877.17 (7925)∗
Urban Under 100K -42009.82 (6901)∗∗∗
Rural -49437.23 (7178)∗∗∗ Heating Equipment
Forced Air Furnace -1301.40 (9489)
Number of Rooms Heating Stoves -1850.85 (16749)
Total 6902.60 (1868)∗∗∗ Electric Heating -361.95 (10710)
Number of Bedrooms 3202.51 (4230)
Number of Bathrooms 37898.80 (5141)∗∗∗ Constant 11592.77 (18562)
Sample Size 509 Adjusted R-Squared 0.53
The constant contains the same variables as in the regressions of Table 2.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
***-significant at the 5% level, **-significant at the 10% level, *-significant at the 20% level.
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Appendix B
Consumption Categories and
Regressor Descriptions
B.1 Consumption Categories
Non-Durables
Movies.
Sports Events.
Live Arts.
Heritage Centers.
Rented and leased vehicles.
Total expenditure for gas and other fuels for owned and leased automobiles.
Total other maintenance and repair expenses for automobiles.
Total expenditure for parking costs.
Recreation vehicle operation.
Rented recreational vehicles.
Total expenditure for charitable contributions.
Total expenditure for clothing.
Total expenditure for telephone services.
Expenditure for cellular services.
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Expenditure for Internet services.
Expenditure for domestic help.
Total expenditure for food.
Expenditure for rental of DVDs, video tapes, videodiscs and video games.
Expenditure for rental of audio, video, computer and communications equip-
ment.
Total expenditure for rental of cablevision and satellite services.
Total expenditure for reading materials and other printed matter.
Expenditure for sports and athletic equipment.
Toys, electronic games and arts/hobby materials.
Total expenditure for photographic goods and services.
Total expenditure for the use of recreation facilities.
Total expenditure for tobacco products and alcoholic beverages.
Expenditure for package trips.
Total expenditure for pet expenses.
Durables
Automobile and truck purchases.
Accessories for owned vehicles.
Total expenditure for purchases of recreational vehicles.
Audio equipment.
Expenditure for televisions, VCRs, DVD players, DVD recorders, video cam-
eras, and other television/video components.
Total expenditure for household furnishings.
Total expenditure for household equipment.
Total expenditure for computer equipment and supplies.
Expenditure for purchases of bicycles, parts and accessories.
B.2 Non-Essential ConsumptionGoods (Luxuries)
Live Arts.
Sports Events.
Heritage Centers.
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Expenditure for domestic help, for example housekeepers, cleaners, and paid
companions.
Expenditure for meals and snacks purchased from restaurants.
Total expenditure for the use of recreation facilities.
Expenditure for other cultural and recreational services, for example fishing
and hunting licenses, guide services, party planning, and other rental of sports
facilities.
Expenditure for package trips.
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B.3 Regressor Descriptions
Variable Name Variable Description
Children 0to4 Number of children aged 0 to 4.
Children 5to17 Number of children aged 5 to 17.
Children 18to24 Number of children aged 18 to 24.
Adults 25to64 Number of adults aged 25 to 64.
Adults 65Older Number of adults aged 65 and older.
Number of Full Time Earners Number of full-time earners in the household.
Number of Part Time Earners Number of part-time earners in the household.
Head Female The head of the household is a female (single mother).
Head (Spouse) Age Age of the household head (spouse if applicable): 5-year intervals
for ages 25-84, and dummies used for ages under 25 and over 84.
Head (Spouse) Education Education level attained by the household head (spouse if
applicable): Variable ranges from 1-8, representing 8 attainment
levels in ascending order.
Head Age Squared The head’s age squared.
Couple Husband and wife with no children and no additional persons.
Couple w Children Couple with single children and no additional persons.
Couple w Other Couple with additional related persons (may have children).
Lone Parent Lone-parent household with no additional persons.
Other w Relatives Any other household where there is a related secondary person
and no unrelated secondary person, or household with spouse
not married or not present.
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Appendix C
Consumption Function
Regression Results Using
Alternate Hedonic Equation
Specifications
The following four tables report estimation results using alternate HPF specifi-
cations when deriving housing capital gains. The results in Tables C.1 and C.2
are based on a distributed lag specification (for the household’s adaptive expec-
tations equation), and Tables C.3 and C.4 use a free-weight specification. The
results in Tables C.1 and C.3 are derived using estimates of capital gains de-
rived from a double-log HPF specification, and the results in Tables C.2 and C.4
are derived using estimates of capital gains derived from a single-log (i.e., log
of house prices) HPF specification. A description of each regressor is contained
in Appendix B.
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Table C.1: Consumption Function Results: Distributed Lag (λ) - Double Log
Total Consumption Non-Durable Consumption
Permanent Housing CG 0.089∗∗ (0.011) 0.068∗∗ (0.008)
After-Tax Income 0.269∗∗ (0.005) 0.175∗∗ (0.003)
Lambda 0.145∗ (0.081)
Children 0-4 -701.70∗∗ (163.78) -562.12∗∗ (99.00)
Children 5-17 712.18∗∗ (92.13) 694.49∗∗ (54.50)
Children 18-24 709.78∗∗ (160.50) 548.96∗∗ (86.62)
Adults 25-64 -320.54∗∗ (125.29) -302.77∗∗ (83.29)
Adults Over 65 -118.74 (159.66) -71.47 (88.76)
Couple 2015.06∗∗ (449.84) 628.26∗∗ (240.66)
Couple w Children 3959.80∗∗ (422.45) 3068.66∗∗ (236.71)
Couple w Other 4157.46∗∗ (583.05) 3617.28∗∗ (324.00)
Lone Parent 2155.84∗∗ (260.01) 2586.10∗∗ (172.62)
Other w Relatives 2044.69∗∗ (358.11) 2502.46∗∗ (215.16)
Number of Full Time Earners 1284.31∗∗ (132.44) 1136.64∗∗ (81.19)
Number of Part Time Earners 1614.10∗∗ (114.11) 1212.31∗∗ (70.27)
Head Female -1666.89∗∗ (189.96) -617.55∗∗ (113.62)
Head Age 812.53∗∗ (101.71) 870.03∗∗ (55.90)
Head Education 167.34∗∗ (34.35) 220.55∗∗ (19.23)
Spouse Age 65.41 (43.88) 172.60∗∗ (24.34)
Spouse Education 108.25∗∗ (38.93) 191.60∗∗ (23.15)
Head Age Squared -76.28∗∗ (5.90) -67.31∗∗ (3.27)
2005 535.82∗∗ (177.67) 449.69∗∗ (128.84)
2004 -248.37 (174.83) -88.91 (117.07)
Constant 5854.87∗∗ (512.81) 3419.21∗∗ (282.20)
The weight structure estimated for total consumption is used for non-durable consumption. Bootstrap standard
errors in parenthesis. **-significant at the 5% level, *-significant at the 10% level. All nominal variables are
converted into $2006 Cdn.
152
Table C.2: Consumption Function Results: Distributed Lag (λ) - Single Log
Total Consumption Non-Durable Consumption
Permanent Housing CG 0.090∗∗ (0.011) 0.068∗∗ (0.008)
After-Tax Income 0.268∗∗ (0.006) 0.175∗∗ (0.004)
Lambda 0.160∗ (0.087)
Children 0-4 -696.54∗∗ (176.98) -557.90∗∗ (105.40)
Children 5-17 709.90∗∗ (93.66) 693.63∗∗ (53.27)
Children 18-24 708.76∗∗ (157.95) 549.35∗∗ (99.93)
Adults 25-64 -317.10∗∗ (131.55) -300.00∗∗ (79.58)
Adults Over 65 -120.74 (145.43) -71.62 (93.15)
Couple 2031.27∗∗ (446.31) 634.43∗∗ (259.27)
Couple w Children 3981.54∗∗ (413.83) 3081.01∗∗ (258.80)
Couple w Other 4170.47∗∗ (525.95) 3625.50∗∗ (322.15)
Lone Parent 2168.24∗∗ (265.24) 2597.30∗∗ (161.07)
Other w Relatives 2063.67∗∗ (393.17) 2515.81∗∗ (228.54)
Number of Full Time Earners 1287.37∗∗ (151.82) 1138.95∗∗ (84.74)
Number of Part Time Earners 1611.32∗∗ (118.35) 1209.27∗∗ (71.13)
Head Female -1665.81∗∗ (197.47) -622.91∗∗ (116.23)
Head Age 810.93∗∗ (100.11) 869.30∗∗ (59.09)
Head Education 166.32∗∗ (29.07) 220.35∗∗ (19.61)
Spouse Age 64.84 (41.38) 171.99∗∗ (24.52)
Spouse Education 107.08∗∗ (39.12) 191.04∗∗ (25.78)
Head Age Squared -76.06∗∗ (5.93) -67.17∗∗ (3.64)
2005 591.12∗∗ (193.30) 489.08∗∗ (129.96)
2004 -183.87 (183.28) -42.31 (123.08)
Constant 5822.61∗∗ (501.96) 3401.42∗∗ (276.68)
The weight structure estimated for total consumption is used for non-durable consumption. Bootstrap standard
errors in parenthesis. **-significant at the 5% level, *-significant at the 10% level. All nominal variables are
converted into $2006 Cdn.
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Table C.3: Consumption Function Results: Free Weights - Double Log
Total Consumption Non-Durable Consumption
Permanent Housing CG 0.097∗∗ (0.012) 0.071∗∗ (0.009)
After-Tax Income 0.268∗∗ (0.005) 0.175∗∗ (0.003)
Free Weight Contemporary 0.257
Free Weight 1st Lag 0.348∗∗ (0.040)
Free Weight 2nd Lag 0.292∗∗ (0.038)
Free Weight 3rd Lag 0.103∗∗ (0.047)
Children 0-4 -687.79∗∗ (164.19) -550.48∗∗ (99.29)
Children 5-17 726.03∗∗ (92.02) 707.21∗∗ (54.17)
Children 18-24 725.05∗∗ (159.94) 563.53∗∗ (87.26)
Adults 25-64 -289.90∗∗ (125.25) -279.08∗∗ (82.77)
Adults Over 65 -110.34 (159.98) -61.25 (88.63)
Couple 1998.65∗∗ (451.10) 610.96∗∗ (241.95)
Couple w Children 3907.66∗∗ (423.64) 3028.28∗∗ (237.66)
Couple w Other 4096.64∗∗ (582.73) 3576.81∗∗ (324.28)
Lone Parent 2125.46∗∗ (262.19) 2565.63∗∗ (172.67)
Other w Relatives 2005.68∗∗ (359.18) 2474.98∗∗ (215.76)
Number of Full Time Earners 1297.58∗∗ (131.15) 1146.12∗∗ (81.48)
Number of Part Time Earners 1628.86∗∗ (113.90) 1221.59∗∗ (70.19)
Head Female -1670.52∗∗ (189.79) -619.16∗∗ (114.20)
Head Age 801.50∗∗ (102.70) 862.56∗∗ (55.94)
Head Education 164.19∗∗ (34.59) 219.97∗∗ (19.48)
Spouse Age 65.45∗∗ (43.99) 173.09∗∗ (24.34)
Spouse Education 104.93∗∗ (38.57) 189.84∗∗ (23.22)
Head Age Squared -75.33∗∗ (5.94) -66.67∗∗ (3.27)
2005 503.18∗∗ (160.33) 423.75∗∗ (113.36)
2004 -383.37 (181.11) -191.11 (119.10)
Constant 5864.30∗∗ (520.43) 3428.97∗∗ (284.12)
The weight structure estimated for total consumption is used for non-durable consumption. The contemporary
weight is set equal to one minus the other three weights, it is not estimated separately. Bootstrap standard
errors in parenthesis. **-significant at the 5% level. All nominal variables are converted into $2006 Cdn.
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Table C.4: Consumption Function Results: Free Weights - Single Log
Total Consumption Non-Durable Consumption
Permanent Housing CG 0.099∗∗ (0.012) 0.071∗∗ (0.009)
After-Tax Income 0.268∗∗ (0.006) 0.175∗∗ (0.004)
Free Weight Contemporary 0.264
Free Weight 1st Lag 0.356∗∗ (0.047)
Free Weight 2nd Lag 0.290∗∗ (0.043)
Free Weight 3rd Lag 0.090∗ (0.054)
Children 0-4 -679.42∗∗ (177.56) -544.29∗∗ (98.81)
Children 5-17 726.50∗∗ (94.61) 708.13∗∗ (53.74)
Children 18-24 724.91∗∗ (158.12) 564.23∗∗ (92.37)
Adults 25-64 -281.67∗∗ (132.72) -273.29∗∗ (76.47)
Adults Over 65 -111.60 (144.67) -61.15 (92.53)
Couple 2016.67∗∗ (447.64) 618.95∗∗ (261.34)
Couple w Children 3925.51∗∗ (413.69) 3038.27∗∗ (256.46)
Couple w Other 4099.20∗∗ (526.56) 3577.87∗∗ (327.02)
Lone Parent 2135.10∗∗ (265.61) 2574.80∗∗ (163.77)
Other w Relatives 2018.97∗∗ (389.79) 2484.08∗∗ (217.19)
Number of Full Time Earners 1300.58∗∗ (151.61) 1148.23∗∗ (90.27)
Number of Part Time Earners 1627.98∗∗ (118.84) 1219.98∗∗ (65.97)
Head Female -1666.77∗∗ (197.76) -622.57∗∗ (116.60)
Head Age 796.88∗∗ (101.24) 859.76∗∗ (55.18)
Head Education 162.14∗∗ (28.86) 218.98∗∗ (18.53)
Spouse Age 64.85 (41.49) 172.42∗∗ (25.78)
Spouse Education 102.68∗∗ (39.36) 188.51∗∗ (22.63)
Head Age Squared -74.89∗∗ (6.01) -66.37∗∗ (3.17)
2005 555.43∗∗ (184.47) 459.89∗∗ (113.68)
2004 -334.42∗ (195.83) -156.09 (132.64)
Constant 5837.26∗∗ (499.87) 3415.13∗∗ (302.13)
The weight structure estimated for total consumption is used for non-durable consumption. The contemporary
weight is set equal to one minus the other three weights, it is not estimated separately. Bootstrap standard
errors in parenthesis. **-significant at the 5% level, *-significant at the 10% level. All nominal variables
are converted into $2006 Cdn.
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Appendix D
Accrual Equivalent Capital Gains
Tax Rate
The AECGTR is calculated based on the assumption that after-tax dividend
income is reinvested in the firm. If we denote the stock’s intrinsic value by
X, the dividend tax rate by τd, the tax rate on realized capital gains by τg, the
AECGTR by τa, the rate of return from dividends as d, and the rate of return
from capital gains as r, then the after-tax value of equity using a realization
based tax system (τg) is
ATV
τg
H = (1− τg)X [(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H − 1− (1− τd)d
H−1∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h]
+X [1 + (1− τd)d
H−1∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h].
This equation is derived in Appendix E. The after-tax value of equity using an
accrual based tax system (τa) is
ATV τaH = X(1 + (1− τα)r + (1− τd)d)
H .
Equating the after-tax value from both taxation schemes, and solving for τa
yields
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τa(τm, τg, r, d,H) =
(1+r+(1−τd)d)
r
− ((1−τg)(1+r+(1−τd)d)
H+τg(1+(1−τd)d·SUM))
1
H
r
,
where
SUM =
H−1∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h.
157
Appendix E
Derivation of the Lock-In Cost
Function
The lock-in cost function is calculated based on the assumption that after-tax
dividend income is reinvested in the firm. If we denote the stock’s intrinsic
value by X, the dividend tax rate by τd, the tax rate on realized capital gains
by τg, the rate of return from dividends by d, the rate of return from capital
gains by r, the ratio of tax base to market value by α, and the desired holding
period by H, then the future after-tax value of equity (ATV ) with respect to
investor type (α,H) after H years is
ATV (α,H) = (1− τg)X [(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H − α− (1− τd)d
H−1∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1 − τd)d)
h]
+X [α+ (1− τd)d
H−1∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h].
To see this, note that whenH is equal to 1 the following is true about the stock’s
market value (MV ), tax base (B), capital gain (CG), and future after-tax value
after one year:
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MV (α, 1) = X(1 + r + (1− τd)d),
B(α, 1) = X [α+ (1− τd)d],
CG(α, 1) = MV (α, 1)−B(α, 1) = X [(1 + r + (1 − τd)d)− α− (1− τd)d],
ATV (α, 1) = (1− τg)X [(1 + r + (1− τd)d)− α− (1 − τd)d] +X [α+ (1− τd)d].
Note: the equation for MV assumes that the after-tax dividend payment is
reinvested prior to the stock’s sale.
When H is equal to 2, the following is true about the stock’s market value,
tax base, capital gain, and future after-tax value after two years:
MV (α, 2) = X(1 + r + (1 − τd)d)
2,
B(α, 2) = X [α+ (1− τd)d+ (1− τd)d(1 + r + (1 − τd)d)],
CG(α, 2) = MV (α, 2)−B(α, 2) = X [(1+r+(1−τd)d)
2−α− (1−τd)d− (1−τd)d(1+r+(1−τd)d)],
ATV (α, 2) = (1 − τg)X [(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
2 − α− (1 − τd)d− (1− τd)d(1 + r + (1− τd)d)]
+X [α+ (1− τd)d+ (1 − τd)d(1 + r + (1− τd)d)].
Continuing this process produces the general formula above for ATV (H).
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When a company repurchases stock from investor type (α,H) for the amount
Y , the investor realizes the capital gain and pays the capital gains tax. The net
amount remaining for reinvestment (NR), after paying the capital gains tax, is
NR(α,H) = (1− τg)[Y − αX ] + αX,
and the future after tax value of this new position (ATV Y ), after H years is
ATV Y (α,H) = (1− τg)NR(α,H)[(1 + r + (1 − τd)d)
H − 1− (1− τd)d
H−1∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h]
+NR(α,H)[1 + (1− τd)d
H−1∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h].
Notice that α is replaced by 1 in this equation, since the tax base just after
reinvestment is equal to the market value of the new position just after rein-
vestment (the capital gain was realized). Also, notice that the starting value of
the new position is NR(α,H), instead of X.
The lock-in cost (L(α,H) = Y − X) is the remuneration above the stock’s
intrinsic valueX such that an investor type (α,H) would be indifferent between
selling equity back to the firm for Y and holding it for the desired number of
years. Therefore, Y solves the following equation:
ATV y(α,H) = ATV (α,H).
⇒ (1− τg)[(1− τg)[Y − αX ] + αX ] · [δ − 1− ω] + [(1− τg)[Y − αX ] · [1 + ω] =
(1− τg)X [δ − α− ω] +X [α + ω],
such that
δ = (1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H ,
ω = (1− τd)d
∑H−1
h=0 (1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h.
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This equation can be rewritten as follows:
(1− τg)
2Y [δ − 1− ω] + (1− τg)Y [1 + ω] =
= (1− τg)X [δ − ω] +Xω + τgαX − {(1− τg)τgαX [δ − ω] + ατgXω − τ
2
gαX} =
= (1− ατg){(1− τg)Xδ + τgXω}+ αXτg(1− τg).
⇒ Y =
(1− ατg){(1− τg)Xδ + τgXω}+ αXτg(1− τg)
(1− τg){(1− τg)δ + τgω}+ τg(1− τg)
,
and solving for L(α,H) gives us
L(α,H) = X
{
(1−ατg){(1−τg)Ω(H)+τg(1−τd)d·
∑H−1
h=0 Ω(h)}+ατg(1−τg)
(1−τg){(1−τg)Ω(H)+τg(1−τd)d·
∑H−1
h=0 Ω(h)}+τg(1−τg)
− 1
}
,
s.t. Ω(v) = (1 + r + (1− τd)d)
v.
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Appendix F
Lock-In Cost Function
Derivatives
The lock-in cost function is
L(α,H) = X{ (1−ατg){(1−τg)(1+r+(1−τd)d)
H+τg(1−τd)d·SUM}+ατg(1−τg)
(1−τg){(1−τg)(1+r+(1−τd)d)H+τg(1−τd)d·SUM}+τg(1−τg)
− 1},
where
SUM =
H−1∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h.
Define: l(α,H) = (1−ατg){(1−τg)(1+r+(1−τd)d)
H+τg(1−τd)d·SUM}+ατg(1−τg)
(1−τg){(1−τg)(1+r+(1−τd)d)H+τg(1−τd)d·SUM}+τg(1−τg)
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F.1 The Derivative of the Lock-In Cost Function
with Respect to α
Note that:
∂L(α,H)
∂α
·
1
X
=
∂l(α,H)
∂α
=
[γ · θ − η · λ]
θ2
,
where
λ = (1− ατg){(1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM} + ατg(1− τg),
γ = −τg{(1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM} + τg(1− τg),
θ = (1− τg){(1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM} + τg(1− τg),
η = 0.
The denominator of this expression is positive; to show ∂L(α,H)
∂α
is negative we
must show the numerator is also negative.
The numerator is
[−τg(ψ) + τg(1− τg)] · [(1− τg)(ψ) + τg(1− τg)],
where ψ = (1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM .
Expanding this expression and collecting like terms gives us the following
τg(1− τg)(1− 2τg)(ψ)− τg(1− τg)(ψ)
2 + τ 2g (1− τg)
2,
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⇒ τg(1− τg)(ψ)[(1− 2τg)− ψ] + τ
2
g (1− τg)
2.
Note:
(1− 2τg)− ψ = (1− 2τg)− (1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H − τg(1− τd)d · SUM <
< (1− 2τg)− (1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H ≤ (1− 2τg)− (1− τg) = −τg.
Therefore
τg(1− τg)(ψ)[(1− 2τg)− ψ] < −τ
2
g (1− τg)(ψ) =
= −τ 2g (1− τg)[(1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM ] < −τ
2
g (1− τg)
2.
Which shows that
τg(1− τg)(1− 2τg)(ψ)− τg(1− τg)(ψ)
2 + τ 2g (1− τg)
2 < 0,
and thus, ∂L(α,H)
∂α
is negative.
F.2 The Change in the Lock-In Cost Function
with Respect to H
Note that:
L(α,H)−L(α,H−1)
X
= (1−ατg)ϑ(H)+ατg(1−τg)
(1−τg)ϑ(H)+τg(1−τg)
− (1−ατg)ϑ(H−1)+ατg(1−τg)
(1−τg)ϑ(H−1)+τg(1−τg)
,
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where
ϑ(H) = (1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM(H),
ϑ(H − 1) = (1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
(H−1) + τg(1− τd)d · SUM(H − 1),
SUM(H) =
H−1∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h,
SUM(H − 1) =
H−2∑
h=0
(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h.
Note that ϑ(H) > ϑ(H − 1).
Finding a common denominator and cancelling like terms gives us
[ατg(1−τg)2ϑ(H−1)+(1−ατg)τg(1−τg)ϑ(H)]−[ατg(1−τg)2ϑ(H)+(1−ατg)τg(1−τg)ϑ(H−1)]
[(1−τg)ϑ(H)+τg(1−τg)]·[(1−τg)ϑ(H−1)+τg(1−τg)]
.
The denominator of this expression is the product of two positive terms and is
therefore positive. To show the lock-in cost function increases in H, we must
show the numerator is also positive. The numerator can be rearranged as fol-
lows
[ατg(1− τg)
2 − (1− ατg)τg(1− τg)] · [ϑ(H − 1)− ϑ(H)].
Since (1−ατg) > (1−τg), and τg > ατg, both terms in the numerator are negative,
and therefore the lock-in cost function is increasing in H.
F.3 The Derivative of l(α,H) with Respect to τd
Note that:
∂l(α,H)
∂τd
=
γ · θ − η · λ
θ2
,
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where
λ = (1− ατg){(1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM} + ατg(1− τg),
γ = (1−ατg){−(1−τg)·H ·(1+r+(1−τd)d)
H−1 ·d−τg ·d·SUM+τg ·d·(1−τd)·SUM
′},
θ = (1− τg){(1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM} + τg(1− τg),
η = (1−τg){−(1−τg)·H ·(1+r+(1−τd)d)
H−1 ·d−τg ·d ·SUM+τg ·d ·(1−τd)·SUM
′},
SUM ′ =
H−1∑
h=0
−d · (h)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
(h−1).
The denominator of this expression is positive; to show ∂l(α,H)
∂τd
is zero (when
d = 0) we must show the numerator is also zero.
The numerator is
(1− ατg)(δ) · {(1− τg)(ψ) + τg(1− τg)} − (1− τg)(δ) · {(1− ατg)(ψ) + ατg(1− τg)},
where, ψ = (1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM,
and δ = −d(1− τg)H(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
(H−1) − τgd · SUM + τgd(1− τd) · SUM
′.
After expanding this expression and cancelling terms we are left with
(1− α)(1− τg)τgδ.
Each of these terms is positive other than δ, which is zero when d = 0. To see
this note that when d = 0 all three terms of δ are zero, and therefore ∂l(α,H)
∂τd
is
zero.
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Appendix G
Derivation of Each Repurchase
Function Using the Equity
Supply Curve
Recall the equity supply curve
S(q) = X + L̂(q),
where q =
HM∑
H=0
∫
{(α,H)|L(α,H)≤L̂(q)}
f(α,H)dα.
G.1 The Weak Repurchase Function
The weak repurchase function is characterized as follows
R(A) = X ·Q(A),
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where A =
∫ Q(A)
0
S(q)dq.
That is, the repurchase function is equal to the intrinsic value of the shares
repurchased (X ·Q(A)), where the number of shares repurchased (Q(A)) is such
that the integral below the supply curve from zero to the number of shares
repurchased equals the amount spent. Graphically, this repurchase function
can be represented as follows (note: S(q) is not necessarily linear)
6
-










0
X
Z
q
S(q)
Q(A)
W
where A is equal to the area (0, X, Z, Q(A)), and R(A) is equal to X·Q(A). The
aggregate lock-in premium in this case is the area (X, Z, W).
G.2 The Strong Repurchase Function
The strong repurchase function is characterized as follows
R(A) = X ·Q(A),
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where A = S(Q(A)) ·Q(A).
That is, the repurchase function is equal to the intrinsic value of the shares
repurchased (X · Q(A)), such that the amount spent repurchasing shares (A)
is equal to the product of the quantity of shares repurchased (Q(A)) and the
largest lock-in cost among the repurchased shares (S(Q(A))). Graphically, this
repurchase function can be represented as follows
6
-










0
X
Z
q
S(q)
Q(A)
W
Y
where A is equal to the area (0, Y, Z, Q(A)), and R(A) is equal to X·Q(A). The
aggregate lock-in premium in this case is the area (X, Y, Z, W).
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Appendix H
Properties of Each Repurchase
Function
H.1 The Weak Repurchase Function is Every-
where Concave
The weak repurchase function is
R(A) = max{α(H)}
[
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα
]
X
S.T.
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
[X + L(α,H)] · f(α,H) dα = A.
where X is the equilibrium intrinsic value of firm equity. We can take the
inverse of this function (amount spent given an amount repurchased), which is
A(R) = min{α(H)}
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
[L(α,H) +X ] · f(α,H) dα
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S.T. R =
[
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα
]
X,
⇒ R =
HM∑
H=0
[F (1, H)− F (α(H), H)]X,
⇒
∂R
∂α(H)
= −f(α(H), H)X.
As R increases, at least one of the α(H) > 0 must decrease. Without loss of
generality, suppose an increase in R is made through α(H∗) > 0, then
∂α(H∗)
∂R
=
−1
f(α(H∗), H∗)X
.
The change in A(R) given a change in α(H∗) is
∂A(R)
∂α(H∗)
− l(α(H∗), H∗) · f(α(H∗), H∗)X, 1
⇒
∂A(R)
∂R
= l(α(H∗), H∗).
This implies that A(R) is an increasing function of R (when the increase is made
through α(H∗)). The derivative of this function with respect to α(H∗) is
∂∂A(R)
∂R∂α(H∗)
=
∂l(α(H∗), H∗)
∂α(H∗)
< 0
(See above for a proof that ∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)
< 0).
⇒
∂∂A(R)
∂R∂R
= −
∂l(α(H∗), H∗)
∂α(H∗)
·
1
f(α(H∗), H∗)X
> 0.
Therefore, the function A(R) is convex in R using any α(H) > 0 to expand
the set of repurchased shares. Therefore the inverse of this function (R(A)) is
concave.
1Where l(α(H∗), H∗) is defined in Appendix F.
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H.2 The Strong Repurchase Function is Every-
where Below the Weak Repurchase Func-
tion
The strong repurchase function is
R(A) = max{α(H)}
[
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα
]
X
S.T. [max{H} L(α(H), H) +X ] ·
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα = A.
We can take the inverse of this function (amount spent given an amount repur-
chased), which is
A(R) = min{α(H)}{[max{H} L(α(H), H) +X ] ·
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα}
S.T. R =
[
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα
]
X
Recall from the main text that firms repurchase from the pool of shareholders
with the lowest lock-in effects regardless of shareholder tendering behaviour.
Therefore, for any amount repurchased (R), the α(H)s are the same for both the
weak amount spent function and the strong amount spent function for a given
value of X. Subtracting the weak amount spent function (denoted by A(R)weak)
from the strong amount spent function (denoted by A(R)strong), for a given R,
results in
A(R)strong −A(R)weak =
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
{[max{H} l(α(H), H)]− l(α,H)} · f(α,H) dα,
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where the α(H)s are the solutions to both minimization problems.
Since [max{H} l(α(H), H)] − l(α,H) > 0 for all α > α(H) and all H, the above
expression is an integral over two positive functions, which is itself positive.
This shows that for any amount repurchased the amount spent must be higher,
or conversely, for any amount spent the amount repurchased must be lower for
a given X.2 This shows that the strong repurchase function is everywhere below
the weak repurchase function.
H.3 Change in the Repurchase FunctionDeriva-
tive with Respect to a Change in τd
The weak repurchase function is
R(A) = max{α(H)}
[
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα
]
X
S.T.
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
[X + L(α,H)] · f(α,H) dα = A.
The strong repurchase function is
R(A) = max{α(H)}
[
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα
]
X
S.T. [max{H} L(α(H), H) +X ] ·
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H) dα = A.
Derivative of the weak repurchase function: when A increases at least one of
the α(H)s must decrease. Suppose that α(H∗) decreases, then
2This result will also hold when the firm’s value is lower when if faces a SRF vs. a WRF, all
else equal.
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∂A
∂α(H∗)
= −l(α(H∗), H∗) · f(α(H∗), H∗)X,
and
∂R(A)weak
∂α(H∗)
= −f(α(H∗), H∗)X,
⇒
∂R(A)weak
∂A
=
1
l(α(H∗), H∗)
.
Derivative of the strong repurchase function: when A increases at least one of
the α(H)s must decrease. Suppose that α(H∗) decreases, then
∂A
∂α(H∗)
=
∂l(α(H∗), H∗)X
∂α(H∗)
·
HM∑
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H)dα− [l(α(H∗), H∗) · f(α(H∗), H∗)X ],
and since
∂R(A)strong
∂α(H∗)
= −f(α(H∗), H∗)X,
⇒ ∂R(A)
strong
∂A
= −f(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂l(α(H∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)
·
∑HM
H=0
∫ 1
α(H) f(α,H)dα−[l(α(H
∗),H∗)·f(α(H∗),H∗)]
.
Now we look at the change in
∂R(A)
∂A
for both the weak and strong re-
purchase functions when τd changes.
Weak repurchase function:
∂∂R(A)weak
∂A∂τd
=
−∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
τd
l(α(H∗), H∗)2
.
It has been shown that ∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
τd
is zero when d = 0, therefore when d = 0 the
numerator is zero. Since l(α(H∗), H∗)2 is positive ∂∂R(A)
∂A∂τd
is zero.
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Strong repurchase function:
∂∂R(A)strong
∂A∂τd
=
f(α(H∗),H∗)·{∂∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)∂τd
·
∑HM
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H)dα− ∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂τd
·f(α(H∗),H∗)}
DEN2
,
where DEN = ∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)
·
∑HM
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H)dα− l(α(H∗), H∗) · f(α(H∗), H∗).
With regard to the numerator of this expression, f(α(H∗), H∗) is positive, ∂∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)∂τd
is zero when d = 0 (as shown below),
∑HM
H=0
∫ 1
α(H)
f(α,H)dα is positive, ∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂τd
is zero when d = 0, and f(α(H∗), H∗) is positive. Therefore the numerator is
zero when d = 0. The denominator (DEN2) is positive, and therefore ∂∂R(A)
strong
∂A∂τd
is zero when d = 0.
Proof that ∂∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)∂τd
is zero when d = 0.
∂l(α(H∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)
=
τg(1−τg)(1−2τg)ψ−τg(1−τg)ψ2+τ2g (1−τg)
2
((1−τg){(1−τg)(1+r+(1−τd)d)H+τg(1−τd)d·SUM}+τg(1−τg))2
,
from above, where
ψ = (1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM,
SUM =
∑H−1
h=0 (1 + r + (1− τd)d)
h.
Thus ∂∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)∂τd
= NUM
′·DEN−2·DEN ′·NUM
DEN3
,
where
NUM = τg(1− τg)(1− 2τg)ψ − τg(1− τg)ψ
2 + τ 2g (1− τg)
2,
DEN = (1− τg){(1− τg)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
H + τg(1− τd)d · SUM} + τg(1− τg),
NUM ′ = τg(1− τg)(1− 2τg)ψ(τd)
′ − 2τg(1− τg)ψψ(τd)
′,
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DEN ′ = (1−τg){−d(1−τg)H(1+r+(1−τd)d)
(H−1)−dτgSUM+τg(1−τd)d·SUM(τd)
′},
ψ(τd)
′ = −d(1− τg)H(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
(H−1) − τgdSUM + τg(1− τd)d · SUM(τd)
′,
SUM(τd)
′ =
∑H−1
h=0 −d(h)(1 + r + (1− τd)d)
(h−1).
Expanding the numerator of ∂∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)∂τd
and cancelling like terms results in
τ 2g (1− τg)
2(1− 2τg)ψ(τd)
′ − 2τ 2g (1− τg)
2ψ · ψ(τd)
′ − τg(1− τg)
2(1− 2τg)ψ · ψ(τd)
′ − 2τ 2g (1− τg)
3ψ(τd)
′.
Reducing this expression further, leads to
−τg(1− τg)
2ψ(τd)
′(τg + ψ).
This expression is zero since τg(1 − τg) is positive, ψ(τd)
′ is zero, and (τg + ψ) is
positive. Since DEN is always positive, ∂∂l(α(H
∗),H∗)
∂α(H∗)∂τd
is the quotient of zero and a
positive number.
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Appendix I
Dividend and Realized Capital
Gains Taxes in Canada
In an attempt to reduce the double taxation of dividend income, Canada has
instituted a rather complicated system of dividend taxation. Dividend income
is initially “grossed up” by a factor intended to reflect the value of gross corpo-
rate income from which dividends are paid. This factor is currently 1.411 for
“eligible” dividends.2 Shareholders pay regular tax on this amount, which is
analogous to paying tax on the amount of gross corporate income. In this way
corporate income is treated in a manner similar to flow-through income, as is
the case for non-corporate business income in Canada. Next, shareholders are
allowed to claim a tax credit on the grossed up amount of dividend income to
offset the corporate taxes already paid by the firm. The federal tax credit is
currently 16.44%3 for eligible dividends. The provincial tax credit varies by
province.
1For the 2011 tax year.
2The CRA makes a distinction between “eligible” dividends and “non-eligible” dividends.
The former constitute the vast majority of dividend payments made by public Canadian corpo-
rations. The gross up rate on non-eligible dividends is currently 1.25 (for the 2011 tax year).
Non-eligible dividends are primarily paid by Canadian controlled private corporations, which
are subject to the small business tax rate.
3For the 2011 tax year.
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This system does not eliminate double taxation altogether, but it does re-
duce it. The degree to which this happens is a function of the individual’s
marginal tax rate on dividend income. In general the higher is the individual’s
marginal tax rate the less effective is the elimination. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the tax treatment of dividend income, and for a discussion of how
this system affects individuals with different income levels see Rosen et al.
(2008).
The marginal tax rate on realized capital gains is equal to the marginal tax
rate on regular income multiplied by the inclusion rate. The inclusion rate has
changed over time, and is currently equal to 50%.4
I.1 Bibliography
ROSEN, H., B. DAHLBY, R. SMITH, J. WEN, AND T. SNODDON (2008): Public
Finance in Canada. McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, third edn.
4For the 2011 tax year.
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Appendix J
Change in Optimal Capital: Tax
Changes
From the user cost of capital condition in Chapter 3 we have
π′(K∗) = i∗ =
R′(At)
R′(At+1)
{
ρ
(1− τ c)(1− τa)
+
1
(1− τ c)
[
1−
R′(At+1)
R′(At)
]}
,
where π(·) is the firm’s profit function, i∗ is the user cost of capital, R(·) is
the repurchase function,1 ρ is the required after-tax rate of return demanded
by shareholders, and τ c and τa are tax rates on corporate income and accrued
capital gains respectively. Solving for K∗ gives us
K∗ = π′−1(i∗),
where π′−1(i) is the inverse function of π′(K). It was assumed that π(K) is
strictly concave in K, which implies that π′−1(i) is monotonically decreasing.
It will now be shown that K∗ is strictly decreasing in both τ c and τa, but is
unaffected by τd. Whenever dividends are paid before and after a tax change,
1For the following discussion, it is assumed that the repurchase function is of the weak
form. See Chapter 3 for a definition of the weak repurchase function.
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they are the marginal form of payout, and R′(A) = (1−τ
d)
(1−τa)
. Therefore
i∗ =
ρ
(1− τ c)(1− τa)
,
since R′(At) = R
′(A(t+1)). The derivative of i
∗ with respect to τ c is
∂i∗
∂τ c
=
ρ
(1− τ c)2(1− τa)
> 0,
and the derivative of i∗ with respect to τa is
∂i∗
∂τa
=
ρ
(1− τ c)(1− τa)2
> 0.
The derivative of i∗ with respect to τd is clearly zero. Therefore, when dividends
are the marginal form of payout i∗ is an increasing function of both τ c and τa,
whereas i∗ is unaffected by changes in τd. Since K∗ = π′−1(i∗) is a decreasing
function of i∗, it follows that K∗ is a decreasing function of both τ c and τa, and
is unaffected by τd.
Showing that i∗ increases in both τ c and τa, when share repurchases are the
marginal form of payout, is more involved. The derivative of i∗ with respect to
τ c is equal to
∂i
∂τc
=
[
R′′(At)·R
′(At+1)
R′(At+1)2
∂At
∂τc
− R
′(At)·R
′′(At+1)
R′(At+1)2
∂At+1
∂τc
]{
ρ
(1−τc)(1−τa) +
1
(1−τc)
[
1− R
′(At+1)
R′(At)
]}
+
R′(At)
R′(At+1)
{
ρ
(1−τc)2(1−τa) +
1
(1−τc)2
[
1− R
′(At+1)
R′(At)
]
+ 1(1−τc)
[
R′(At+1)·R
′′(At)
R′(At)2
∂At
∂τc
− R
′′(At+1)·R
′(At)
R′(At)2
∂At+1
∂τc
]}
.
When firms are initially in a steady state At = At+1 and the above equation
reduces to
∂i
∂τc
=
(
∂At
∂τc
− ∂At+1
∂τc
)
R′′(At)
R′(At)
{
ρ
(1−τc)(1−τa)
+ 1
(1−τc)
}
+
{
ρ
(1−τc)2(1−τa)
}
(1).
The second part of this expression is positive. For i∗ to decrease (and K∗ to
increase) when τ c decreases it must be that ∂At
∂τc
> ∂At+1
∂τc
, since R
′′(At)
R′(At)
< 0, from
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the concavity assumption on R(At). When share repurchases are the marginal
form of payout the following two equations hold:
TPt = At = (1− τ
c)π(Kt)− It,
TPt = At+1 = (1− τ
c)π(Kt + It)− It+1.
Taking derivatives of both, with respect to τ c leads to the following two equa-
tions:
∂At
∂τ c
= −π(Kt)−
∂It
∂τ c
,
∂At+1
∂τ c
= −π(Kt + It) + (1− τ
c)π′(Kt + It)
∂It
∂τ c
+
∂It+1
∂τ c
.
In addition, for K∗ to increase it must be that ∂It
∂τc
> 0. For ∂At
∂τc
> ∂At+1
∂τc
the
following must hold:
∂It+1
∂τ c
> [1 + (1− τ c)π′(Kt)]
∂It
∂τ c
,
which follows from It = 0 in an initial steady state. This states that investment
in period t + 1 must be higher than investment in period t by a factor of [1 +
(1 − τ c)π′(Kt)] > 1, i.e., the increase in investment from period t to t + 1 must
exceed the additional profit generated by It. For this to happen, it must also be
the case that i∗t+1 < i
∗
t which requires that
∂At+1
∂τc
> ∂At+2
∂τc
. By the same logic as
above, It+2 > [1 + (1− τ
c)π′(Kt)]It+1. Therefore
It+s > [1 + (1− τ
c)π′(Kt)]
s−1It,
and in the limit
lims→∞It+s =∞.
Therefore, there must be some s, such that At+s = 0 (i.e., all profits are used
for investment). Whenever A ≤ 0 R′(A) = 1, i.e. when a firm repurchases noth-
ing, or issues shares, the marginal value of a repurchase necessarily equals 1.
This follows from the assumption of chapter 3 that each combination (α,H) has
positive density, and therefore, there is a positive mass of shares that can be
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repurchased for the intrinsic value. At the point were At+s = 0 and At+s+1 < 0,
R′(At+s)
R′(At+s+1)
= 1 and i∗ = ρ
(1−τc)(1−τa)
, which contradicts the earlier requirement
that ρ
(1−τc)(1−τa)
> i∗t > i
∗
t+1 > .... Therefore, when share repurchases are the
marginal form of payout, an increase in the corporate tax rate leads to a de-
cline in the optimal level of capital.
For i∗ to increase (and K∗ to decrease) when τ c decreases, it must be that
∂At
∂τc
< ∂At+1
∂τc
from (1). This implies the following:
∂It+1
∂τ c
< [1 + (1− τ c)π′(Kt)]
∂It
∂τ c
,
and that ∂It
∂τc
< 0. The divestment in period t + 1 must therefore be larger
than the divestment in period t. For this to occur it must be that i∗t+1 > i
∗
t ,
which implies that ∂At+1
∂τc
< ∂At+2
∂τc
. By the same logic as above, this requires that
It+2 < [1 + (1− τ
c)π′(Kt)]It+1. Therefore
It+s < [1 + (1− τ
c)π′(Kt)]
s−1It,
and in the limit
lims→∞It+s = −∞
Therefore, there must exist some s such that It+s < Kt+s, i.e., since there is a
finite amount of capital to start each period, and divestment tends to negative
infinity, there must exist some future time period such that all capital is di-
vested. At this point, the only way to divest further is to issue equity. When
firms issue equity R′(A) = 1, and i∗ = ρ
(1−τc)(1−τa)
. This contradicts the earlier
requirement that ρ
(1−τc)(1−τa)
< i∗t < i
∗
t+1 < .... Therefore, when share repur-
chases are the marginal form of payout, a decrease in the corporate tax rate
leads to an increase in the optimal level of capital.
To show that optimal capital decreases in τa note that the derivative of i∗
with respect to τa, when firms are initially in a steady state, is
∂i
∂τa
=
(
∂At
∂τa
−
∂At+1
∂τa
)
R′′(At)
R′(At)
{
ρ
(1− τ c)(1− τa)
}
+
{
ρ
(1− τ c)(1− τa)2
}
.
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This expression is almost identical to (1) except 1
(1−τc)
does not appear in the
first curly bracket, and the derivatives of At, At+1 and
ρ
(1−τc)(1−τa)
are with re-
spect to τa. It can be verified that the proofs used to show K∗ is a decreasing
function of τ c also hold for τa.
What remains to be shown is that i∗ is unaffected by a change in the divi-
dend tax. It is clear that both ρ
(1−τc)(1−τa)
and 1
(1−τc)
are unaffected by τd. Ap-
pendix H shows that the repurchase function is also unaffected by the dividend
tax when share repurchases are the marginal form of payout (since the divi-
dend yield is necessarily zero in this case). Therefore, R
′(At)
R′(At+1)
is independent of
the dividend tax, and thus i∗ and K∗ are unaffected by τd.
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